Lichtenwalter v. United States

D.C. Circuit

Lichtenwalter v. United States

190 F.2d 36, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 187, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2374

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJune 28, 1951

Docket10679_1

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 190 F.2d 36 (Lichtenwalter v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lichtenwalter v. United States, 190 F.2d 36, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 187, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2374 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced upon an indictment for arson in the malicious burning of the building of another. 22 D.C.Code § 401 (1940). Here, on appeal, he contends: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and (2) that the court deprived him of the right, through counsel, to make an opening statement to the jury. In our opinion neither point is well taken.

There was substantial evidence, including defendant’s own admissions, to support the essential findings that the defendant did intentionally, and thus maliciously, set fire to and burn the building. Therefore, the case was properly submitted to the jury and its verdict is conclusive.

As we view the incident concerning the opening statement, there was no denial of the right to make a statement, but rather a proper effort to limit counsel to an outline of proposed proof and to avoid an argumentative and detailed recital of anticipated testimony by the defendant. Moreover, the defendant did testify briefly and no other evidence was offered in his ‘ behalf. In such circumstances, interference by the court with the opening statement, had it been unwarranted, could not have prejudiced the defendant.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced upon an indictment for arson in the malicious burning of the building of another. 22 D.C.Code § 401 (1940). Here, on appeal, he contends: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and (2) that the court deprived him of the right, through counsel, to make an opening statement to the jury. In our opinion neither point is well taken.

There was substantial evidence, including defendant’s own admissions, to support the essential findings that the defendant did intentionally, and thus maliciously, set fire to and burn the building. Therefore, the case was properly submitted to the jury and its verdict is conclusive.

As we view the incident concerning the opening statement, there was no denial of the right to make a statement, but rather a proper effort to limit counsel to an outline of proposed proof and to avoid an argumentative and detailed recital of anticipated testimony by the defendant. Moreover, the defendant did testify briefly and no other evidence was offered in his ‘ behalf. In such circumstances, interference by the court with the opening statement, had it been unwarranted, could not have prejudiced the defendant.

Affirmed.

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190 F.2d 36, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 187, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2374, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lichtenwalter-v-united-states-cadc-1951.

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