Lichtenstadt v. Fleisher

Appellate Court of Illinois

Lichtenstadt v. Fleisher

24 Ill. App. 92, 1887 Ill. App. LEXIS 476

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois

DecidedNovember 23, 1887

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 24 Ill. App. 92 (Lichtenstadt v. Fleisher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lichtenstadt v. Fleisher, 24 Ill. App. 92, 1887 Ill. App. LEXIS 476 (Ill. Ct. App. 1887).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from the finding and judgment rendered by the chancellor upon a suggestion of damages on the dissolution of an injunction. The injunction was dissolved on final hearing, and much of the work done by counsel for which recompense was sought, was upon the merits and was necessary, and presumably would be valuable to appellant in the suit at law, to enjoin the prosecution of which the bill in chancery was filed. The only darnages claimed was for attorney’s fees.

While the testimony introduced would warrant the court in allowing a large amount, we are unable to say that the court so far erred in fixing the amount for which judgment was rendered as to require us to reverse the judgment.

The damages to.be allowed in such assessments are only such as result from an improper suing out of the injunction, and the solicitor’s fees must be confined to the proper allowance, for services rendered in the motion to dissolve. The allowance of such fees rests somewhat in the discretion of the chancellor before whom the litigation has proceeded, and the discrimination made by him between the services to be charged to the motion to dissolve and those to be referred to the trial of the entire case presents a difficult question for a reviewing court, and unless, therefore, he has very clearly gone wrong, his discretion will not be interfered with.

We find no case in which the judgment of the chancellor has in such case been set aside on the ground that the allowance of attorney’s fe.es was, under the evidence, too small, and in view of the opinions of the value of the services which are usually given by lawyers who are called as witnesses to prove the value of such services, we are loth to set a precedent. We can not reverse in such a case for the reason that the finding of the court is for a less sum than the lowest amount fixed by witnesses.

The judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

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Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from the finding and judgment rendered by the chancellor upon a suggestion of damages on the dissolution of an injunction. The injunction was dissolved on final hearing, and much of the work done by counsel for which recompense was sought, was upon the merits and was necessary, and presumably would be valuable to appellant in the suit at law, to enjoin the prosecution of which the bill in chancery was filed. The only darnages claimed was for attorney’s fees.

While the testimony introduced would warrant the court in allowing a large amount, we are unable to say that the court so far erred in fixing the amount for which judgment was rendered as to require us to reverse the judgment.

The damages to.be allowed in such assessments are only such as result from an improper suing out of the injunction, and the solicitor’s fees must be confined to the proper allowance, for services rendered in the motion to dissolve. The allowance of such fees rests somewhat in the discretion of the chancellor before whom the litigation has proceeded, and the discrimination made by him between the services to be charged to the motion to dissolve and those to be referred to the trial of the entire case presents a difficult question for a reviewing court, and unless, therefore, he has very clearly gone wrong, his discretion will not be interfered with.

We find no case in which the judgment of the chancellor has in such case been set aside on the ground that the allowance of attorney’s fe.es was, under the evidence, too small, and in view of the opinions of the value of the services which are usually given by lawyers who are called as witnesses to prove the value of such services, we are loth to set a precedent. We can not reverse in such a case for the reason that the finding of the court is for a less sum than the lowest amount fixed by witnesses.

The judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

24 Ill. App. 92, 1887 Ill. App. LEXIS 476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lichtenstadt-v-fleisher-illappct-1887.

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