Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Lund
This text of 530 N.E.2d 166 (Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Lund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
William A. Lund, a guest passenger in an automobile owned and operated by Katherine Cencak, was killed in a single automobile accident. Lund’s father (defendant) became the administrator of Lund’s estate, and as administrator filed a complaint against the owner and operator of the vehicle2 and against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty), the liability insurer of Cencak’s automobile. Liberty denied it had to pay any benefits to Lund’s estate for his injuries under a policy of liability insurance purchased by Cencak. The defendant filed a demand for arbitration as required by the policy. Liberty filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking declaratory [1007]*1007relief and a stay of the arbitration proceedings. The parties filed a statement of agreed facts, and each party moved for a declaration consistent with the position each espoused. A judge in the Superior Court entered a judgment declaring that the defendant was not entitled to any benefits under the insurance policy purchased by Cencak from Liberty. The defendant appeals. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm.
Cencak purchased a standard personal automobile liability policy from Liberty. The policy provided coverage of $10,000 per person for negligently causing injuries to others and had a $20,000 maximum per accident. Cencak only purchased compulsory coverage and that coverage excluded “guest occupants of [the owner’s] auto.”3 The defendant correctly does not claim that, under this section of the policy, he is entitled to any benefits.
Relying on language in Part 3,4 the uninsured and underinsured part of the policy, the defendant asserts that the “Cencak auto was uninsured for the loss suffered by Lund even though it was insured for other losses.” Alternatively, the defendant argues that the Cencak vehicle “was underin-sured because its insurance was insufficient to compensate Lund fully for his damages.” The defendant concludes that any other construction of the policy would leave automobile accident victims without insurance protection for their losses. He asserts that such a result is contrary to public policy. We do not agree.
Underinsurance and uninsured motorist protection is not additional liability insurance but rather is “limited personal accident insurance chiefly for the benefit of the named insured.” Cardin v. Royal Ins. Co., 394 Mass. 450, 452 (1985), quoting Motorist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bittler, 14 Ohio Misc. 23, 32-33 (1968). To interpret uninsurance and underinsurance in the manner [1008]*1008urged by the defendant, “would effectively convert a form of coverage which is distinct from automobile liability insurance ... to additional liability coverage. . . . This we decline to do.” Manning v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 397 Mass. 38, 41 (1986), citing Cardin v. Royal Ins. Co., supra. The declaration entered in the Superior Court that Liberty is not liable to the defendant under its policy of insurance with Cencak is correct.
Judgment affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
530 N.E.2d 166, 403 Mass. 1006, 1988 Mass. LEXIS 268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/liberty-mutual-insurance-v-lund-mass-1988.