Libby v. United States

209 F. Supp. 793, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4551
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedSeptember 24, 1962
DocketCiv. A. No. 20218
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 209 F. Supp. 793 (Libby v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Libby v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 793, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4551 (E.D. Mich. 1962).

Opinion

MACHROWICZ, District Judge.

A trial of the issues in this case was had before the Court without a jury on September 18 and 19, 1962. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case the Government, defendant herein, moved for a judgment in its favor, which motion was denied without prejudice to renewal; the motion was renewed after presentation of evidence by both parties.

Upon a review of the pleadings and after hearing all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff and the Government, as well as arguments of counsel, and after a study of all the briefs submitted by counsel of record, all of which were fully considered, this Court makes the [795]*795following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff, a citizen of the State of Michigan and resident of Wayne County in said state, filed this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A., §§ 1346(b) and 2671 et seq., for recovery of damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by defendant’s employees’ negligence.

2. The Government, as defendant, filed third-party complaints against Roth, Wadkins & Wise, Inc., an independent contractor engaged by the Government by contract to construct certain supporting facilities at its NIKE site located in River Rouge, Michigan, and against the Detroit Elevator Company, a subcontractor of Roth, Wadkins & Wise, Inc., and plaintiff’s employer, which was engaged in making certain alterations on an elevator on the site in question, and in which work plaintiff was engaged on the day of the accident and resulting injuries alleged in the complaint.

3. Roth, Wadkins & Wise, Inc., filed a cross-action against the Detroit Elevator Company. The third-party action of the Government, defendant, against Detroit Elevator Company, third-party defendant, was dismissed before trial of this case.

4. The elevator on which the employees of the Detroit Elevator Company were doing alterations on the date in question was located in pit “A” at the NIKE site. On or about October 2, 1958 control of pit “A” was turned over to the general contractor after all missiles were removed therefrom and the pit was thoroughly cleaned by Government personnel. The general contractor assumed control of the pit under its contract with the Government during the construction operations, and work was completed on or about October 14, 1958 when the control of the premises was again assumed by the Government, after a final inspection of the work.

5. The Government maintained a military guard at the entrance to the NIKE site. It conducted “alert exercises” at other NIKE sites at which plaintiff and other employees of the Detroit Elevator Company were employed at the time of such alerts and participated therein, but no such exercises were conducted at the River Rouge site between October 6, 1958, when plaintiff began his work at the site, and the date on which the injury occurred. On about three occasions a Government employee entered the pit to see that the work proceeded according to specifications. At no time did any Government officer or employee issue any instructions or directions to any members of the Detroit Elevator Company crew, and there was no attempt whatsoever to supervise any of their work.

6. Detroit Elevator Company’s employees began work at the site on October 6, 1958; the crew performing the work consisted of an elevator mechanic who was in charge of the crew and three mechanic’s helpers, including plaintiff. Plaintiff had been employed by the Detroit Elevator Company in the same capacity for approximately two months; his duties consisted of carrying tools and equipment and doing general labor work. The work in which the crew was engaged on October 8, 1958 in pit “A” caused deposits of oil and grease on the floor which plaintiff traversed while doing his work and on the tools and equipment he carried, and grease and oil adhered to his hands and to the soles of his shoes or boots. ■ While there was a slight seepage of oil, a “spot here and there”, normal to the operation of a hydraulic elevator of the type involved, it was inadequate to cause the greasy and oily condition of the soles of plaintiff’s shoes on the date of the accident. The only facilities available to the crew for wiping off grease and oil were “some greasy rags.”

7. There were three means of entry and exit to and from pit “A”:

“(a) The elevator on which the crew was making alterations which [796]*796was used as a preferred means by the crew but which was not operating on October 8, 1962 because the current was cut-off by the employees of the Detroit Elevator Company some time prior to the morning of that day;
“(b) A front hatch through which the pit could be reached by means of a steel ladder, approximately 17 feet long, with mesh steps. This ladder was permanently attached to the sides of the hatchway, about 7 inches away from the wall at the top and 21 inches from the wall at the bottom. A railing was attached to each side of the ladder, with curved ends at the top extending a few feet above the surface and continuing down the ladder and a few inches from the rungs. A lid, with handles on the outside and inside thereof, permitted closing and opening of the hatchway either from the outside or the inside of the hatchway. The crew used this hatchway whenever the elevator was not in operation and used it for descent into the pit on October 8, 1958 when they reported to work on that morning;
“(c) A rear escape hatch which was somewhat narrower than the front hatch and had a perpendicular rather than a sloped ladder. It could be opened or closed by a lid such as was used on the front hatch. Testimony offered at the trial supports an inference that this hatchway .was closed throughout the period of time during which the crew was working on this occasion. The crew did not make use of this hatchway during that period.”

8. The surface above the pit was part asphalt and part concrete. Dips in the surface, commonly called “bird baths”, caused water to accumulate in time of rain. It rained throughout the night of October 7 and 8, and continued to rain from the time plaintiff left his home until he arrived at the work site at about 7:30, in his automobile, which, he parked in water some 30 feet from the front hatchway, and remained in his automobile. His workday began at 8:00 A.M. His foreman arrived shortly before 8:00 A.M. and opened the front hatchway by removing the lid, to gain entry. Plaintiff took a direct route from his automobile to the front hatch which necessitated walking through a large pool or puddle of water some 12 to 15 feet in diameter, but he could reach the opening of the hatchway by walking around the puddle of water. When he reached the front hatchway, it was open.

9. Rain entered the hatchway while it was open and the floor of the hatchway was “damp or so-called wet”, although a drain with which the pit was equipped prevented any accumulation of water therein.

10. At about 9:30 A.M. of October 8th the crew stopped for a “coffee break”. The foreman supplied black coffee which he brought in a jug and plaintiff volunteered to get milk for the coffee which he had in a thermos in his automobile. Such a “coffee break” was unauthorized under the company rules of plaintiff’s employer but he was given permission by his foreman to go for the milk.

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Bluebook (online)
209 F. Supp. 793, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4551, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/libby-v-united-states-mied-1962.