Libby v. Edwards

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 27, 2007
DocketCUMre-02-64
StatusUnpublished

This text of Libby v. Edwards (Libby v. Edwards) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Libby v. Edwards, (Me. Super. Ct. 2007).

Opinion

, . ,- , ., % 7 r - ,,; i." j T-- r tiif.tt Il !:I:C L. STATEOFMAINE i;iJ~a~~~AND.SS SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. C;--F R K ' S OFFICE CIVIL ACTION ,

7281 fE8 27 P 2: 1 I WALTER LBBY,

Plaintiff,

DECISION AND JUDGMENT (Title to Real Estate Involved)

JAY C. EDWARDS, DEBORAH ZIMMERMAN, and CASCO BAY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Defendants.

I. BEFORE THE COURT

The plaintiff's complaint seeks judgment to quiet title, legally and equitably, and

for declaratory judgment that he is the owner of certain parcels of land in Falmouth by

way of adverse possession.

The defendants have counterclaimed, also seelung declaratory judgment to

establish their right title and interest to the lots in question.

This case was tried to the court without a jury.

11. BACKGROUND1AND DISCUSSION

The narrow issue in this case is plaintiff's claim of title to two lots claimed by

adverse possession.

To establish his title, Walter Libby must prove his claim by actual, open, visible,

notorious, exclusive and hostile use and possession of the two lots in question under a

claim of right for more than 20 years. See Stowell v. Swift, 576 A.2d 204, 205 (Me. 1990).

The court's recitation of the facts constitutes findings of fact by a preponderance of evidence unless stated otherwise. The evidence of the history of title and use of the two lots is extensive, but it boils

down to two central issues: hostile and exclusive.

The lots in question, 22B and 23 are clearly delineated on a plan for Underwood

subdivision. (Plaintiff's Exhbit 2) There is no dispute concerning their location or

boundaries. They are typical of the postage stamp lots located in h s area of Falmouth

Foreside on the shore of Casco Bay.

This area is historically known as Underwood Springs and was the site of

Underwood Springs Bottling Company owned by Jay Edward's grandfather over a

century ago. The site was a popular gathering spot for people from Portland who

would ride the trolley to the shore to picnic and enjoy summer breezes. Later, many

summer cottages were built that have been converted to year round residences. The

plaintiff's house is typical of many in the neighborhood. They take up most of the small

lots with little, if any, setback.

The plaintiff's home is on Lot 22A at 8 Glen Road. The front is located only a few

feet from the roadway. The back, facing Casco Bay, literally sits on the common

boundary with Lot 23. There is a small vacant area to the right between the house and

Underhll Road that goes from Route 88 to a dead end as it descends southeasterly to

Casco Bay. Lot 22B is to the left, between plaintiff's house and defendant's property.

The plaintiff does own a 10' strop of 22B but over the years has made consistent use of

the entire parcel for multiple purposes. Neither Jay Edwards nor any predecessor in

title made any protest of plaintiff's use until after Libby erected a storage shed without

a permit in 1994.

Plaintiff's father, Elmer Libby, purchased their property in 1941. Elmer resided

there with his family until October 1949 when he was institutionalized. His wife, June,

continued to live there until she passed away in June 2005. She raised four children at the house. The plaintiff resided there until he dropped out of high school in 1962 when

he joined the Air Force. Part of his military duty was at Dow Air Force Base in Bangor

and he frequently came back to his Glen Road home. He left the Air Force in 1967 after

suffering serious injury in a motor vehicle accident. After h s recovery period he spent

winters working on boats in Florida but always returned to Glen Road. He came back

to Maine for good in 1975. Even in the years when he spent winters in Florida, he

continually returned to Glen Road.

The Libby family made great use of all of Lot 22B and part of Lot 23 and

maintained the area as theirs.

The parties talk of Lot 23 as a whole. Although it is one lot by description, the

topographical/physical layout of the parcel divides it into two lots for any functional

purpose.

Lot 23 is approximately 100' x 120' and runs completely across the backside of

the Libby and Edwards property on Lots 22 and 20, from Underwood Road to the

chain-link fence on the northeasterly border with the Bayside condominiums.

There is a small stream (Underwood Spring) at the bottom of a large ravine or

gully that bisects Lot 23 diagonally from north to south.

The court finds that the Libby's use of the two sections of Lot 23 is and has been

substantially different.

The area west of the stream, behind their house, has been extensively and

continually used by the Libbys since the family acquired their property in 1941 to the

present. There has been an abundant variety of activity and use on the property by all

family members for over 60 years. There was no effort by the defendant or his

predecessors to limit or restrict use by the Libbys at any time until the advent of this

lawsuit. At all times, the Libbys used t h s part of Lot 23 as their own. The eastern part of Lot 23 on the other side of the ravine is a different story.

Although Walter Libby built a makeshift bridge or walkway over the upper part of the

gully in the northern corner of Lot 23, and he would cut back brush, their use of the

property was mainly as a play area in their youth and to keep brush trimmed back to

preserve their view of Casco Bay. Playing typical outdoor games as youth in the pre-

television/DVD/video-game era of today hardly qualifies as activity that any

reasonable person or family would consider as conduct consistent with the control

necessary to claim adverse possession. The Libby's use of the east side of the

Underwood Spring gully was not notorious, hostile, exclusive, continuous or under a

claim of right.

The court does find; however, by a preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff

has proven the essential elements of adverse possession to that portion of Lot 23

beginning at a point where the northeast line of Lot 22B meets the northwest line of Lot

23, thence in a southeast direction towards Casco Bay to the center of the Underwood

Spring stream at the bottom of the ravine, thence generally southerly to the

northeasterly line of Underwood Road, thence northwesterly along Underwood Road

to plaintiff's land, thence northeasterly along the line of the Libby's home lot, 22A, and

22B to the point of beginning.

Jay Edwards doesn't dispute the extensive use that the Libby family made of Lot

23 behind their home, but says they were doing so only with limited permission

generated by his mother's empathy to June Libby after her husband, Elmer Libby, was

institutionalized. The court compares the Libby's use of the property with Jay

Edwards1 testimony that he was present when his mother gave permission for use to

June Libby. The evidence is clear that many neighbors enjoyed a close friendship with

Mrs. Libby and expressed empathy for her when her husband left the home; however, even if iay Edwards was present when some type of conversation took place, he was a

youngster and unlikely to have been a part of or to have appreciated the significance of

any such conversation.

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Related

Stowell v. Swift
576 A.2d 204 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1990)

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