Filed 9/1/26 L.G. v. Superior Court CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
L.G., F091812
Petitioner,
(Super. Ct. No. 25CEJ300061-1)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO OPINION COUNTY,
Respondent;
FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
THE COURT*
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Kimberly J.
Nystrom-Geist, Judge.
Kaelee Geller, Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent.
* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Snauffer, J.
Douglas T. Sloan, County Counsel, and Lisa R. Flores, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-
Petitioner L.G. (father) seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452)1 from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e))2 terminating his reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing for October 7, 2026, as to his one-year-old daughter, Baby Girl W. (the child). In his petition, father contends insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided. He also asks us to review findings and orders from the dispositional hearing in October 2025. We deny the petition.
FACTS
Initial Removal In April 2025, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department)
received a suspected child abuse report that the child was left without provision for support as a safe surrender baby by her mother, C.W. (mother). The child was taken into protective custody from the hospital shortly after her birth. The department filed an original petition alleging the child was described by section 300, subdivision (g). The petition alleged mother safely surrendered the child pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1255.7 at a local hospital. The identity of the child’s father was listed as unknown in the petition.
At the initial detention hearing held on April 11, 2025, the juvenile court ordered the child detained from mother’s custody, and a combined jurisdiction and disposition
1 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
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hearing was set for May 12, 2025. Mother contacted the department to exercise her right to claim custody of the child on April 21, 2025. She had surrendered custody of the child due to threats from the father of her two-year-old child, A.M. Father was not in communication with mother. Mother reported father left a few days prior to the child’s birth and wanted nothing to do with the child. The department attempted to assess mother’s living situation, but mother would not respond to the social worker’s attempts to visit her home. The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was continued due to the department’s contact with mother.
The social worker made first contact with father by phone on May 13, 2025.
Father indicated he was trying to locate the child since the day she was born. Mother did not answer his phone calls after he arrived at the hospital to see the child. He did not learn of the child’s removal until he received a letter from the department. Father believed he was the biological father of the child, and he wanted the child in his care. Father reported having his own apartment and baby supplies for the child.
The department filed an amended petition, which provided the full names of mother and father. Father was identified as an alleged father. The allegations involved mother’s unstable housing and refusal to allow the department to assess the suitability of her home. The petition further alleged mother had a history of exposing her children to domestic violence.
On May 28, 2025, mother and father were both present and appointed counsel at a second detention hearing. On that same date, father submitted a Statement Regarding Parentage (form JV-505) requesting genetic testing to determine whether he was the biological father of the child. The juvenile court ordered father to participate in a paternity test. The child was ordered detained from mother, and the jurisdiction and disposition hearing was reset to July 9, 2025. A second amended petition was filed to update the child’s last name.
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Jurisdiction and Disposition The department’s jurisdiction and disposition report, dated July 2, 2025, recommended that the allegations in the second amended petition be found true. It was also recommended that father be elevated to the status of a biological father based upon the results of the genetic testing. Family reunification services were recommended for father and mother. Father’s reunification services were to include parenting classes and any recommended treatment from a mental health assessment.
The report stated father had no criminal convictions in the State of California or child welfare history. Father requested placement of the child, but the department recommended father’s request be denied due to the lack of a relationship or participation in visitation. A social worker had also been unable to assess his home in Sacramento County. The department’s assessment concluded that father needed to demonstrate his ability to meet the child’s needs for stability and safety before obtaining placement.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing held on July 9, 2025, father was present and represented by counsel. The juvenile court found the allegations in the second amended petition to be true, and disposition was continued for further compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act. Supervised visitation was ordered between father and the child to be a minimum of once per week for a minimum of two hours per visit. The department was also provided with discretion to advance visitation to unsupervised.
On July 15, 2025, father’s counsel filed a “Kelsey Motion” requesting elevation to presumed father status. The motion argued that father was prevented from taking the child into his home by the actions of mother, and he requested to be assessed for placement as a presumed father of the child.
In an addendum report, dated August 22, 2025, the department provided updates on the parents’ circumstances. On August 13, 2025, the social worker contacted father by phone. Father explained that he was recently laid off from his employment, and he was currently searching for a job. Father was living with his cousin, and he had a room to
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share with the child. He reported having a “huge support system” to help assist with the child. The social worker notified father of the need to assess his living situation, and he reported that he was ready to care for the child.
The following week, the social worker inquired about scheduling a time to assess father’s current residence. Father explained that he “bounces” around homes, and he wanted his aunt’s home to be assessed. The paternal great-aunt had just moved into the home, but he agreed to discuss her availability for an assessment. A virtual assessment of the paternal great-aunt’s home was scheduled for August 26, 2025.
The social worker supervised two in-person visits between father and the child on August 8, 2025 and August 13, 2025. Father engaged with the child during the visits, and there were no concerns noted. He fed the child and consoled her when she began to cry.
On August 27, 2025, father was present for the continued disposition hearing. The department was ordered to hold a child and family team meeting to address father’s visitation progression. The disposition hearing and father’s “Kelsey Motion” were continued to October 8, 2025.
The department submitted a second addendum report on October 8, 2025. Father began his parenting program on September 18, 2025, and he completed three sessions at the time of the report. The virtual home assessment of the paternal-great aunt’s home was completed on August 26, 2025. There were no visible safety concerns in the home. Father stated he would have a crib in his bedroom, and he provided photos of baby supplies for the child. He provided the names of several family members that would be able to provide childcare while he was at work.
Supervised virtual visits took place between the child and father on August 22, 2025 and September 5, 2025 due to father’s inability to obtain transportation. Father cancelled scheduled visits on August 29, 2025 and September 16, 2025. On September 17, 2025, father requested to change his visitation dates due to a potential
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conflict with his new employment schedule. A September 22, 2025 visit was cancelled because father was receiving treatment for breathing difficulties.
At the continued disposition hearing held on October 8, 2025, mother and father were both present and represented by counsel. The juvenile court granted father’s “Kelsey Motion,” and he was elevated to presumed father status. Both parents lodged an objection to the department’s recommendation without presenting any evidence.
The juvenile court ordered the child removed from mother’s custody, and it found there was clear and convincing evidence that placement with father would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. Family reunification services were ordered for both parents. Father was ordered to participate in parenting classes and a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment. The court authorized the use of electronic means for visitation, but the department was to prioritize face to face contact between the child and father. Transportation for visits was to be facilitated by the department. Mother and father were advised of their appellate rights. A six-month review hearing was set for April 8, 2026.
Six-Month Review Period In its report for the six-month review hearing, dated March 26, 2026, the department recommended family reunification services be terminated for mother and father. The child was placed with his older sibling, A.M., in the home of a maternal aunt. The child, at 11-months of age, was developing in an age-appropriate manner without any medical concerns.
Father completed his parenting program on December 18, 2025. The progress report from class facilitators stated that father engaged in discussion and had a positive attitude. The social worker was unable to refer father for a mental health assessment due to his out-of-county residence. A list of mental health services providers in the area of Sacramento County was obtained by the social worker.
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On August 27, 2025, the social worker advised father that he was ordered to complete a mental health assessment. Father was given the option to request a mental health assessment as a walk-in through his medical insurance or use a service provider from the social worker’s list. Father indicated he was getting his medical insurance “ ‘figured out,’ ” but he believed that he had coverage. The social worker told father to check on his medical insurance to complete the mental health assessment as a walk-in. In October 2025, father was reminded to verify his medical insurance to complete his mental health assessment.
In January 2026, father had to move unexpectedly, and he was unsure where he would be staying in the future. On February 26, 2026, father informed the social worker that he was residing in Napa County. The social worker reiterated his need to complete a mental health assessment, and father was advised that a search for service providers in the area would be conducted. On March 19, 2026, the social worker provided father with a local mental health service provider’s contact information to schedule a mental health assessment.
At the beginning of the review period, father was participating in virtual visits. On October 2, 2025, the care provider stated she was willing to supervise in-person visits with father if he was able to travel to Fresno. She also expressed a willingness to transport the child to father when she travelled near him to visit family members. Father was in agreement with the care provider’s suggestions, and he intended to reach out for the next scheduled visit.
On October 24, 2025, father told the social worker that he was attending virtual visits because he did not have time to visit in person. He claimed his work schedule of Saturday through Thursday from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. prevented him from attending visits. The social worker advised father of the importance of visiting with the child in person due to her young age, and she indicated that visits could be scheduled on his days off. Father then identified transportation as another barrier to visiting in person.
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Assistance with train fares was offered as a solution by the social worker, and father stated he would keep the social worker updated when he was able to schedule an in-person visit.
On November 25, 2025, the child’s care provider expressed concerns that the child was not able to engage with father during virtual visits due to her age. In December 2025, the care provider reported father was questioning her about the child’s schedule, and he complained that the child was too tired to visit with him. The social worker was informed that the care provider no longer wished to act as a third-party supervisor for father’s visits.
On January 14, 2026, the social worker inquired about father’s work schedule and transportation issues. Father acknowledged that transportation was a barrier to in-person visits, and he was currently seeking new employment. Father was in agreement with virtual visits, but he felt the care provider’s busy schedule prevented his visits from being productive. The social worker explained that the department could assist with transportation for an in-person visit by purchasing a train ticket. However, father claimed he was unable to get a ride to the train station because his support system only did things for him if they were getting something in return. The following week, father reported he was unable to attend the visit because he had to move unexpectedly. Father agreed to update the social worker when he was able to come to Fresno.
In February 2026, the social worker followed up with father about visitation. He stated that he had been waiting for a phone call from the social worker, but the social worker responded that he agreed to provide an update on his availability. Father explained that he was living in Napa County with his mother. He agreed to attend an in- person visit with transportation assistance on March 4, 2026. The social worker supervised the visit with father after providing him with a train ticket. The child began crying at the start of the visit. Father tried to soothe the child, but she continued to cry throughout the visit. He attempted to show her toys, provide her snacks, and hold her,
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but he was unable to console her for the duration of the visit. The child stopped crying once the visit came to an end.
On March 13, 2026 and March 18, 2026, the social worker supervised additional in-person visits between the child and father. The child cried throughout the visits despite father and paternal grandmother’s efforts to soothe her. Father rocked the child until she fell asleep after the paternal grandmother and a family friend left the visitation room during the March 18, 2026 visit.
The social worker’s report stated father had not shown any commitment or willingness to maintain consistency with in-person visitation. The department emphasized his inability to console the child during in-person visits, and his prognosis for reunification was described as poor. The department’s assessment concluded that father had been unable to progress in visits to demonstrate his ability to care for the child.
At the initial six-month review hearing, a contested hearing was set for May 20, 2026 at father’s request. Father and mother were present for the contested six-month review hearing. The contested hearing started with testimony from father. Father testified that his mental health assessment was delayed due to his relocation to another county. He was still in the process of obtaining a mental health assessment in Napa County.
Delays in transportation by train or bus would occasionally disrupt his ability to visit the child. Father’s medical condition prevented him from attending visits as well. Father had participated in approximately eight to 10 in-person visits with the child. He also utilized virtual visits to interact with the child. Father testified that the child cried every visit, and he rocked her to sleep to console her. A paternal great-aunt was identified as a potential third-party supervisor by father, but she was not approved by the department. His request to have visits occur closer to his home was also denied.
The assigned family reunification social worker testified that she had worked on the case since April 2025. She acknowledged that part of the reason the child was not
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placed with father was due to concerns about him being a first-time father. The social worker responded in the affirmative when asked if father was “pretty consistent” with his virtual visits. She was not aware of any department policy that expressed a preference for in-person visits over virtual visits.
An assessment of father’s current residence had not been completed due to a lack of progression in visitation. A difference of opinion between father and the care provider resulted in her no longer serving as a third-party supervisor. No other individuals had been assessed to provide third-party supervision after the care provider’s decision.
The social worker further testified that virtual visits did not provide the same connection as in-person visits. During visits with father, the child was calm for approximately five minutes, and she spent the majority of the visit crying despite father’s efforts to soothe her. According to the social worker, father attended nine in-person visits since October 2025. The department provided train tickets for father to visit the child in person. The social worker testified that father would have been provided train tickets weekly if he requested to travel to Fresno for visits on a weekly basis.
The contested hearing continued with closing arguments from the parties. Counsel for the department argued the department had shown by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were provided to the parents. Counsel for the child joined in the department’s argument. Father’s counsel argued that there were significant delays in father’s visits progressing, which may have contributed to the child’s “consolability” at visits. His counsel requested a finding that “reasonable services have not been provided and that father was improperly denied placement.”
After hearing argument from all counsel, the juvenile court continued the hearing for a ruling on June 11, 2026. In its ruling, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the department had provided reasonable services to overcome the problems leading to the continued removal of the child. The court reasoned as follows:
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“the [d]epartment has documented its efforts to provide visitation services to [father]. And [father] kept some of those visitation appointments, primarily preferring, it appears, to visit virtually. There were times that he said transportation was an issue, but the [d]epartment provided transportation vouchers for tickets for him to travel from his locations to Fresno County. He also at one point told the [d]epartment he didn’t have time to visit. [¶] The primary issue with [father]’s visits are a lack of commitment to developing an in-person relationship with this very small person who is barely one year old. A one-year-old cannot develop a bond effectively with a parent who is just calling in from time to time. And a higher level of personal face-to-face interaction was needed. And as the [d]epartment documents, [father] has spent very little time with the child to build that relationship, despite the [d]epartment’s best efforts.” The juvenile court found that return of the child to the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child, and both parents family reunification services were terminated. A section 366.26 hearing was scheduled for October 7, 2026.
DISCUSSION
Challenge to the October 8, 2025 Disposition Order Father contends the juvenile court erred by denying his request for placement and ordering family reunification services at the October 8, 2025 disposition hearing. However, the present extraordinary writ petition was filed on July 22, 2026, from the order terminating his family reunification services on June 11, 2026. To the extent father now seeks to challenge the October 2025 disposition order, the challenge is untimely. Father never filed a notice of appeal to contest the order, and we cannot now revisit them in this extraordinary writ proceeding from the June 2026 order setting a section 366.26 hearing. (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.)
Appeals in dependency case appeals are governed by section 395, which provides in relevant part: “A judgment in a proceeding under [s]ection 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment.” (§ 395, subd. (a); In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1234 (A.A.).) Under section 395, the disposition order in a dependency proceeding is the
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appealable judgment, and all subsequent orders are directly appealable as postjudgment orders. (A.A., at p 1234.) In an appeal from a disposition order, the appellant may challenge the jurisdiction findings underlying the disposition order declaring the child a dependent, and any other findings or orders made before or at the time of disposition. (In re B.P. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 886, 890.)
But an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order “ ‘ “is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” [Citation.] This “waiver [or forfeiture] rule” holds “that an appellate court in a dependency proceeding may not inquire into the merits of a prior final appealable order,” even when the issues raised involve important constitutional and statutory rights.’ ” (A.A., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234.) “[This] rule serves vital policy considerations of promoting finality and reasonable expedition, in a carefully balanced legislative scheme, and preventing late-stage ‘sabotage of the process’ through a parent’s attacks on earlier orders.” (In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355; accord, Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 259.)
Father cites to In re Serenity S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 355 (Serenity S.), where the appellate court excused compliance with the writ requirement to challenge the previous order terminating family reunification services. In that case, the parent was not present when the juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing, and the only notice provided to the parent failed to mention the writ requirement and was sent one month after the hearing. (Id. at p. 371.) Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the father could seek review of the juvenile court’s detriment finding on appeal of the orders terminating his parental rights. (Ibid.)
In the present case, the October 8, 2025, dispositional order included the juvenile court’s rulings denying father placement and ordering family reunification services. The order was not accompanied by a simultaneous order setting the section 366.26 hearing and was therefore immediately appealable. (Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41
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Cal.App.4th 1391, 1394.) Father was present at the time of the disposition hearing, and he was advised of his appellate rights. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that father has made a sufficient showing of good cause warranting review on the merits of the dispositional hearing findings and orders.
Since father did not timely appeal from the October 8, 2025 dispositional order, the order is now final. (See rule 8.104(a).) Thus, we are “accordingly without jurisdiction to consider [his] current challenge by means of [his] writ petition.” (Wanda B. v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) Since we lack jurisdiction to consider father’s challenge to the juvenile court’s rulings in the October 8, 2025 dispositional order, any claims involving the previous detriment finding and order of family reunification services fail.
Reasonable Services Father also contends the juvenile court’s finding that the department provided him with reasonable services is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, father argues that the court disregarded father’s commute time for visits, medical condition, and indigency when it determined that father failed to prioritize visits with the child.
A. Legal Principles “Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings.
[Citations.] At the dispositional hearing, the [juvenile] court is required to order the [department] to provide child welfare services to the child and his or her parents. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Services ‘may include provision of a full array of social and health services to help the child and family and to prevent reabuse of children.’ (§ 300.2.) Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family.” (In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (M.F.).)
At each review hearing, “if the child is not returned to his or her parent, the juvenile court is required to determine whether ‘reasonable services that were designed to
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aid the parent … in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent’ … (§§ 366.21, subds. (e)(8) & (f)(1)(A), 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) The ‘adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [department’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.’ [Citation.] To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, ‘the record should show that the supervising [department] identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult .…’ ” (M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 13–14.)
At the six-month review hearing, “the juvenile court may not set a section 366.26 hearing unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent.” (M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) Reunification services are a benefit, and there is no constitutional “ ‘ “entitlement” ’ ” to child welfare services. (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242, citing In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 476.) Furthermore, the resources available to the court are not unlimited. (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 566.)
B. Standard of Review “In reviewing the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all reasonable and legitimate inferences to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] ‘If there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of a juvenile court, a reviewing court is without power to weigh or evaluate the findings.’ ” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361– 1362.)
C. Analysis Father complains that the department denied his request to hold visits closer to his residences in Sacramento County and Napa County. He asserts that the juvenile court
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failed to acknowledge the barriers that prevented him from visiting in person when it concluded that he failed to prioritize visits with the child.
In support of his argument, he continues to rely on the case of Serenity S., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 355. The father there, who was not living with his 18-month-old child before the dependency began, was unable to visit with his child in person because of the distance between the foster placement and his home, and the social services department arranged an online video visit. (Id. at pp. 359, 361–362.) He was also unable to take custody of the child at the outset of the dependency because he lacked adequate housing, but the department did nothing to help him obtain a stable residence. (Id. at p. 376.)
Thus, the juvenile court found a due process violation where the “state detained and removed the child based only on allegations against mother and the court found giving father custody would be detrimental based on problems arising from his poverty.” (Serenity S., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 355 at p. 359.) Specifically, the father there could not regain custody of his child because of his “economic situation .… He lacked adequate housing and also lacked transportation.” (Id. at p. 376.) The appellate court concluded the father was not given an adequate opportunity to reunite with the child before his parental rights were terminated; although he visited with her in person only six times, the record showed he missed visits because the distance and his work schedule made visitation difficult, and the agency did not assist his efforts to supplement the in-person visits with video meetings. (Id. at p. 377.)
Father’s reliance on Serenity S., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 355 is misplaced. There the juvenile court was not considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of reasonable services. Instead, the appellate court was concerned with the juvenile court basing its detriment finding on father’s poverty. Here, father’s limited transportation and changes in employment may have impacted his ability to visit with the child in person, but not by phone or video. The department provided father virtual visits when he had
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issues with transportation, medical problems, or conflicts with his employment scheduled.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered supervised visits to occur between father and the child, and electronic means were an authorized form of visitation. The department was ordered to prioritize face to face contact between the child and father, and transportation was to be facilitated by the department. At the start of the review period, father elected to participate in virtual visits because he did not believe his employment gave him sufficient time to travel to Fresno. The care provider was initially willing to act as a third-party supervisor or bring the child closer to his home, but a conflict with father resulted in her withdrawal as a third-party supervisor option for visits.
In January 2026, the social worker attempted to provide father with a train ticket to attend in-person visits. However, he cancelled the in-person visit because he had to move unexpectedly. In-person visits resumed in March 2026 between father and the child after the department provided train tickets. The social worker testified that the child cried for the majority of the visits. There were approximately nine in-person visits attended by father according to the social worker’s testimony.
A review of the record discloses that the greatest impediment to an early reunification was father. Father cited multiple excuses for his failure to attend an in-person visit with the child for the first five months of the reunification period. The department offered to accommodate father by providing assistance with transportation and scheduling visits on his off days.
The adequacy of a reunification plan and of the department’s efforts is judged according to the circumstances of each case. The effort must be made to provide suitable services, in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success. The record should show that the department identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the
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parents when compliance proved difficult. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010–1011.) The record here so demonstrates.
Father was regularly offered the opportunity to attend in-person visits with the child throughout the reunification period. He simply chose not to take sufficient advantage of those opportunities. Reunification services are voluntary and the social services department is not required to force them on unwilling parents. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365.) Father’s failure to attend in-person visits for the majority of the reunification period is a primary cause of his inability to develop a relationship with the child. “The reality is that childhood is brief; it does not wait while a parent rehabilitates himself or herself. The nurturing required must be given by someone, at the time the child needs it, not when the parent is ready to give it.” (In re Debra M. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1038, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 234.)
While father now complains that the department did not arrange in-person visits sooner, the visits provided were reasonable under the circumstances and the department made a good faith effort to assist father when compliance proved difficult. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [“In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect” but the standard is “whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.”].) Consequently, we conclude substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided. (Id. at p. 545.)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is dismissed. This court’s opinion is final forthwith as to this court pursuant to rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).