1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Olga Leza, No. CV-20-01066-PHX-JAT
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Olga L. Leza’s First (Doc. 31) and Second 16 (Doc. 33) Motions for the Award of Attorney Fees as Authorized by the Equal Access to 17 Justice Act (EAJA). The Court now rules on these motions. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 After being denied Social Security Disability benefits, Plaintiff sought review 20 before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims on February 21 8, 2019. (Doc. 34 at 1). Plaintiff’s claim was also denied before the Social Security 22 Administrative Appeals Council. (Id.). This Court subsequently affirmed the Agency’s 23 decision on May 11, 2021. (Id.). Plaintiff then filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit 24 challenging this Court’s decision. (Id.). The Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the 25 Social Security Administration for payment of disability benefits, and issued a formal 26 mandate on May 9, 2022. (Id. at 1–2). 27 II. LEGAL STANDARD 28 To receive attorney fees under the EAJA, three standards must be met: “(1) the party 1 seeking fees must be a prevailing party, (2) the government's position must not have been 2 substantially justified, and (3) there must not be special circumstances rendering an award 3 unjust.” Meza-Vazquez v. Garland, 993 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2021). If a prevailing party 4 seeks fees, the burden is placed on the government to show that its position was 5 substantially justified or that there are other circumstances that justify denying fees. See 6 Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014). The government’s position is justified 7 if it has “a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This 8 standard applies to both the government’s litigation position and to the agency action 9 giving rise to the litigation. Id. 10 If the government fails to make the case that its position was substantially justified, 11 it can seek to reduce a fee award by showing that the amount requested is unreasonable. In 12 making a reasonableness determination, courts must look at the “amount involved and the 13 results obtained.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 (1983); See Atkins v. Apfel, 154 14 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying Hensley to EAJA cases). Plaintiffs, the Court noted, are 15 “entitled to an award of fees for all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate 16 result achieved ....” Id. at 431. (internal citations omitted). They are not entitled to any 17 hours that were “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary ....” Id. at 434. Ultimately, 18 “[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully 19 compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the 20 litigation ....” Id. at 435. Unlike in the “substantially justified analysis,” however, in the 21 reasonableness analysis, “the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to 22 an award and documenting appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Id. at 437. 23 Finally, the court must also apply the Hensley “results obtained” analysis to fees for fee 24 litigation. See Atkins, 154 F.3d at 990. Thus, Plaintiffs should only be awarded fees for 25 EAJA litigation to the extent the applicant is successful in that litigation. See id. 26 III. ANALYSIS 27 First, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in the underlying lawsuit. 28 (See Doc. 32 at 1). Consequently, the first element of receiving a fee award under EAJA is 1 met. Second, the government makes no attempt to defend its litigation position or the 2 agency’s initial position as substantially justified. (See Doc. 41 at 2). Thus, the second 3 element is also met. It only remains, then, for this Court to determine whether there are 4 special circumstances that make an award here unjust. See Meza-Vasquez, 993 F.3d at 728. 5 The government argues that special circumstances do exist because the fee petition 6 is unreasonable. (Doc. 36 at 3; Doc. 37 at 2). The government makes two claims, one 7 related to the district court litigation, and another related to the circuit court litigation. It 8 first takes issue with the fact that Attorney Caldwell took five hours writing a detailed 9 complaint. (Doc. 36 at 4). It claims that it was unnecessary to include factual and procedural 10 summaries and arguments with case citations. (Id.). It next claims that there was 11 unnecessary duplication of efforts because Attorney Fern spent over fourteen hours 12 drafting and reviewing portions of the opening brief. (Id. at 5). The government asserts that 13 Attorney Caldwell did not need to spend so much time drafting a detailed complaint if 14 another attorney was going to do the exact same work when drafting the briefs. (Id.). The 15 government also complains about the time Caldwell took to edit the brief. (Id.). 16 Furthermore, it calls Caldwell’s efforts to familiarize himself with the record “overkill.” 17 (Id.). Finally, the government argues that it was unreasonable for Caldwell to spend over 18 twenty-one-hours preparing for a moot of the oral argument at the appellate level, 19 particularly because he was not the one who ultimately presented oral argument before the 20 Ninth Circuit. (Id. at 6). 21 Plaintiff responds that the government’s arguments are meritless because she 22 ultimately won, and had her attorney’s done less, she might not have. (Doc. 40 at 9). First, 23 she counters the assertion that the complaint was unnecessarily long and detailed. Although 24 complaints do not usually include citations to case law or argument, plaintiff maintains that 25 it was her attorney’s prerogative to include this. If the attorney believes it is beneficial to 26 his client’s case to include detailed discussion in a complaint, plaintiff maintains, then the 27 attorney may do so. (Id. at 6–7). Plaintiff next asserts that there was no unnecessary 28 duplication of efforts at the briefing stage. Although there are some similarities between 1 the complaint and the brief, this does not mean that there was duplication of effort that 2 warrants a fee reduction, she claims. (Id. at 8). This also applies to the government’s 3 complaints about the time devoted to editing, Plaintiff asserts. The editing process may 4 have made the writing more effective, Plaintiff maintains. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff further states 5 that the time her attorneys spent drafting the appellate brief was necessary because it 6 involved “transitioning a 25-page district court brief into a 49-page Ninth Circuit opening 7 brief ....” (Doc. 41 at 4). Finally, plaintiff contends that her attorneys spent a necessary 8 amount of time mooting the case because it was essential to prepare for effective oral 9 argument. (Doc. 40 at 4). 10 After having gone through the record and looked at the fee itemization provided by 11 Plaintiff, this Court finds the fee request to be reasonable. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 12 (noting that the district court must determine what fee is reasonable.). First, although it is 13 not usual for an attorney to submit a detailed complaint, it is still within the attorney’s 14 prerogative to do so. See Garcia v. Commr. Of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CIV 18-504, 2019 15 WL 4673335, *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2019). He may have done this because he thought it 16 would be more persuasive or because he thought it would more clearly present the issues 17 before the court. It is not this Court’s job to question legal strategy.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Olga Leza, No. CV-20-01066-PHX-JAT
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Olga L. Leza’s First (Doc. 31) and Second 16 (Doc. 33) Motions for the Award of Attorney Fees as Authorized by the Equal Access to 17 Justice Act (EAJA). The Court now rules on these motions. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 After being denied Social Security Disability benefits, Plaintiff sought review 20 before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims on February 21 8, 2019. (Doc. 34 at 1). Plaintiff’s claim was also denied before the Social Security 22 Administrative Appeals Council. (Id.). This Court subsequently affirmed the Agency’s 23 decision on May 11, 2021. (Id.). Plaintiff then filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit 24 challenging this Court’s decision. (Id.). The Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the 25 Social Security Administration for payment of disability benefits, and issued a formal 26 mandate on May 9, 2022. (Id. at 1–2). 27 II. LEGAL STANDARD 28 To receive attorney fees under the EAJA, three standards must be met: “(1) the party 1 seeking fees must be a prevailing party, (2) the government's position must not have been 2 substantially justified, and (3) there must not be special circumstances rendering an award 3 unjust.” Meza-Vazquez v. Garland, 993 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2021). If a prevailing party 4 seeks fees, the burden is placed on the government to show that its position was 5 substantially justified or that there are other circumstances that justify denying fees. See 6 Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014). The government’s position is justified 7 if it has “a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This 8 standard applies to both the government’s litigation position and to the agency action 9 giving rise to the litigation. Id. 10 If the government fails to make the case that its position was substantially justified, 11 it can seek to reduce a fee award by showing that the amount requested is unreasonable. In 12 making a reasonableness determination, courts must look at the “amount involved and the 13 results obtained.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 (1983); See Atkins v. Apfel, 154 14 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying Hensley to EAJA cases). Plaintiffs, the Court noted, are 15 “entitled to an award of fees for all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate 16 result achieved ....” Id. at 431. (internal citations omitted). They are not entitled to any 17 hours that were “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary ....” Id. at 434. Ultimately, 18 “[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully 19 compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the 20 litigation ....” Id. at 435. Unlike in the “substantially justified analysis,” however, in the 21 reasonableness analysis, “the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to 22 an award and documenting appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Id. at 437. 23 Finally, the court must also apply the Hensley “results obtained” analysis to fees for fee 24 litigation. See Atkins, 154 F.3d at 990. Thus, Plaintiffs should only be awarded fees for 25 EAJA litigation to the extent the applicant is successful in that litigation. See id. 26 III. ANALYSIS 27 First, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in the underlying lawsuit. 28 (See Doc. 32 at 1). Consequently, the first element of receiving a fee award under EAJA is 1 met. Second, the government makes no attempt to defend its litigation position or the 2 agency’s initial position as substantially justified. (See Doc. 41 at 2). Thus, the second 3 element is also met. It only remains, then, for this Court to determine whether there are 4 special circumstances that make an award here unjust. See Meza-Vasquez, 993 F.3d at 728. 5 The government argues that special circumstances do exist because the fee petition 6 is unreasonable. (Doc. 36 at 3; Doc. 37 at 2). The government makes two claims, one 7 related to the district court litigation, and another related to the circuit court litigation. It 8 first takes issue with the fact that Attorney Caldwell took five hours writing a detailed 9 complaint. (Doc. 36 at 4). It claims that it was unnecessary to include factual and procedural 10 summaries and arguments with case citations. (Id.). It next claims that there was 11 unnecessary duplication of efforts because Attorney Fern spent over fourteen hours 12 drafting and reviewing portions of the opening brief. (Id. at 5). The government asserts that 13 Attorney Caldwell did not need to spend so much time drafting a detailed complaint if 14 another attorney was going to do the exact same work when drafting the briefs. (Id.). The 15 government also complains about the time Caldwell took to edit the brief. (Id.). 16 Furthermore, it calls Caldwell’s efforts to familiarize himself with the record “overkill.” 17 (Id.). Finally, the government argues that it was unreasonable for Caldwell to spend over 18 twenty-one-hours preparing for a moot of the oral argument at the appellate level, 19 particularly because he was not the one who ultimately presented oral argument before the 20 Ninth Circuit. (Id. at 6). 21 Plaintiff responds that the government’s arguments are meritless because she 22 ultimately won, and had her attorney’s done less, she might not have. (Doc. 40 at 9). First, 23 she counters the assertion that the complaint was unnecessarily long and detailed. Although 24 complaints do not usually include citations to case law or argument, plaintiff maintains that 25 it was her attorney’s prerogative to include this. If the attorney believes it is beneficial to 26 his client’s case to include detailed discussion in a complaint, plaintiff maintains, then the 27 attorney may do so. (Id. at 6–7). Plaintiff next asserts that there was no unnecessary 28 duplication of efforts at the briefing stage. Although there are some similarities between 1 the complaint and the brief, this does not mean that there was duplication of effort that 2 warrants a fee reduction, she claims. (Id. at 8). This also applies to the government’s 3 complaints about the time devoted to editing, Plaintiff asserts. The editing process may 4 have made the writing more effective, Plaintiff maintains. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff further states 5 that the time her attorneys spent drafting the appellate brief was necessary because it 6 involved “transitioning a 25-page district court brief into a 49-page Ninth Circuit opening 7 brief ....” (Doc. 41 at 4). Finally, plaintiff contends that her attorneys spent a necessary 8 amount of time mooting the case because it was essential to prepare for effective oral 9 argument. (Doc. 40 at 4). 10 After having gone through the record and looked at the fee itemization provided by 11 Plaintiff, this Court finds the fee request to be reasonable. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 12 (noting that the district court must determine what fee is reasonable.). First, although it is 13 not usual for an attorney to submit a detailed complaint, it is still within the attorney’s 14 prerogative to do so. See Garcia v. Commr. Of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CIV 18-504, 2019 15 WL 4673335, *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2019). He may have done this because he thought it 16 would be more persuasive or because he thought it would more clearly present the issues 17 before the court. It is not this Court’s job to question legal strategy. And this Court cannot 18 say that it was objectively unreasonable. The same is true for the time spent drafting the 19 complaint and the various briefs for the district court and appellate court litigations. None 20 of the time spent was out of proportion to what is normal. Furthermore, the time spent 21 reviewing the record and editing, as well as preparing for and undertaking the moot were 22 also reasonable. This is particularly true in light of the outcome achieved. Plaintiff’s case 23 was not simply remanded for a rehearing, but rather was remanded for an immediate award 24 of benefits. The best possible outcome. Ultimately none of the line entries for services 25 performed, individually or taken together, is out of proportion for a case that went before 26 both the district court and the Ninth Circuit. While differing legal minds might disagree 27 over how much time to spend on what aspect of a case, nothing in this case was 28 unreasonable or “overkill.” Thus, this court will award all requested fees for the Social 1 Security litigation. 2 Looking to the seven hours that Plaintiff claims were spent on the EAJA fee 3 litigation, and the outcome achieved, this Court finds the time spent entirely reasonable. 4 Given that Plaintiff is being granted her full fee request, the seven hours spent on drafting 5 these motions and memoranda is not that significant. This Court will award all requested 6 fees for the EAJA litigation. 7 Finally, Plaintiff requests that the fees awarded be made payable to her attorney. 8 This Court will deny this portion of her motion. As the United States Supreme Court has 9 made clear, under the EAJA all fees awarded are to be paid to the “prevailing litigant,” not 10 that litigant’s attorney. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 598 (2010). This Court cannot 11 ignore the clear language of the statute or the mandate of this nation’s highest court. 12 Consequently, the awarded fees must be made payable to Plaintiff, not her attorneys. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 Accordingly, 15 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s First (Doc. 31) and Second (Doc. 33) Motions for 16 the Award of Attorney Fees as Authorized by the Equal Access to Justice Act are 17 GRANTED in the amounts of $14,887.91 and $21,191.16 respectively. 18 / / / 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, after receiving this Order, the Commissioner: 2|| (1) determines that Plaintiff does not owe a debt that is subject to offset under the Treasury □□ Offset Program, and (2) agrees to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, then 4|| the check for the fees awarded herein will be made payable to Plaintiff's attorney pursuant || to the assignment executed by Plaintiff. However, if there is a debt owed under the 6|| Treasury Offset Program, the Commissioner cannot agree to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, and any remaining Equal Access to Justice Act fees after offset will 8 || be paid by a check made out to Plaintiff but delivered to Plaintiffs attorney. 9 Dated this 27th day of March, 2023. 10 11 A 12 James A. Teilborg 13 Senior United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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