Leyner De La Rosa Villafana v. Caleb Vitello, Et Al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAFAYETTE DIVISION

LEYNER DE LA ROSA CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-3046 VILLAFANA

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

CALEB VITELLO, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM ORDER Before the Court is an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Record Document 2) and a Motion for Immediate Release or, in the Alternative, Motion for a Bond Hearing (Record Document 3) filed by the habeas petitioner in this case, Leyner De La Rosa Villafana (“Petitioner”). According to the Petition, Petitioner is a native of Cuba who is currently being detained at the Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center in Pine Prairie, Louisiana. See Record Document 1. Between his two filings (Record Documents 2 & 3), Petitioner requests (1) an order enjoining the Government from removing him from the United States; (2) an order prohibiting the Government from transferring him to a facility outside of this Court’s jurisdiction; (3) that the Court set an expedited briefing schedule on the Habeas Petition; and (4) that the Court order his immediate release. An applicant for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) must demonstrate each of the following: (1) a substantial likelihood his cause will succeed on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to the opposing party, and (4) granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Misquitta v. Warden Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center, 353 F. Supp.3d 518, 521 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2018) (citing Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981)). The decision of whether to grant or deny a TRO lies in the district court’s discretion. See Moore v. Brown, 868 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts should deny such motions more often than not. See Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.Supp.2d 523, 532 (E.D. La. 1999)

(explaining that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely issued.”); see also Suburban Propane, L.P. v. D & S GCTX LLC, 2025 WL 2429087, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (holding that the extraordinary relief under Rule 65 must be “unequivocally show[n].”); see also Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Only under ‘extraordinary circumstances’ will this court reverse the denial of a preliminary injunction.”). In this case, Petitioner seeks to enjoin his removal. A request for stay of removal is a challenge to a removal order. See Imran v. Harper, No. 25-30370, 2026 WL 93131, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026), citing In re Asemani, 2025 WL 1823953, at *1 (4th Cir. July 2, 2025) (construing habeas petitioner’s request for stay as seeking review of the final

removal order). The Fifth Circuit recently reiterated that “federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims connected directly and immediately with a decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” Id., (citing Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 943 (5th Cir. 1999) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (internal quotations omitted)). This Court lacks jurisdiction to grant Petitioner’s request to restrain Respondents from removing him from the United States while he seeks review of his Habeas Petition. See Fabuluje v. Immigration & Naturalization Agency, 244 F.3d 133, 133 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (holding that the district court was without jurisdiction to grant a stay of removal under § 1252(g)); Idokogi v. Ashcroft, 66 F. App’x 526, 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); see also Westley v. Harper, No. CV 25-229, 2025 WL 592788, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2025). Regarding the request to prohibit transfer to a different facility, “[m]ere speculation or conclusory allegations of an irreparable injury are insufficient to entitle a movant to

injunctive relief.” Lotter v. Lyons, 2025 WL 2946630, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2025). Petitioner fails to show a likelihood that he will be transferred to another facility. Additionally, this Court’s jurisdiction attaches with the filing of the habeas petition and is not destroyed by any subsequent transfer. See Pena Ramirez v. Noem, No. H-25-5484, 2025 WL 3443186, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2025) (citing Griffin v. Ebbert, 751 F.3d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 2014)). The Court is reluctant to set a precedent that would interfere with the government’s need to transfer any immigration detainee with a pending habeas petition. As for the request for an expedited briefing schedule, the Court will set the briefing deadlines in accordance with the procedures set out in Standing Order 1.74 (Record Document 5).

Finally, Petitioner seeks injunctive relief that mirrors the relief requested in his Habeas Petition, that is, immediate release. Recently, another judge within this District decided a similarly situated case, stating: The Supreme Court, very recently, reminded lower courts that preliminary injunctions are, as their name suggests, preliminary and should “not conclusively resolve legal disputes.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025). In other words, they should not be used to rule on the final, merits question. Rather, TROs and preliminary injunctions help “preserve the status quo until a trial” or other final disposition is rendered. Id. at 193. That begs the question: what does it mean to preserve the status quo? While the words “status quo” do not appear within Rule 65 . . . , it is implicit in the “irreparable harm” prong. . . . Irreparable harm must also take away “the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.” Canal Auth. of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Samuel L. Bray, The Purposes of the Preliminary Injunction, 78 Vand. L. Rev. 809, 823-26 (2025) (concluding the same after probing Founding-era sources). Put differently, “[t]here is always a status quo. There should not be a preliminary injunction to protect it, however, unless the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits would otherwise be in jeopardy.” Callaway, 489 F.2d at 573. Pema Sherpa v. Judith Almodovar, et al., No. 3:25-CV-01718 SEC P, 2026 WL 74401, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2026). A ruling on the instant Motion should not resolve the legal disputes in this case. Thus, to the extent Petitioner asks for an order of immediate release from custody, the Court views this request as an effort to obtain a ruling on the merits of his Habeas Petition through injunctive relief. Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief is essentially a motion to decide the habeas petition now. See Garcia-Aleman v. Thompson, No. SA-25-CV-00886-OLG-HJB, 2025 WL 3769302, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2025). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Record Document 2) and a Motion for Immediate Release or, in the Alternative, Motion for a Bond Hearing (Record Document 3) is DENIED. THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 14th day of August, 2026. kf By Z J S. MAURICE HICKS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE