Lexington State Bank v. Rose City Creamery Co.

Michigan Supreme Court

Lexington State Bank v. Rose City Creamery Co.

173 N.W. 481, 207 Mich. 81, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 390

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedJuly 17, 1919

DocketDocket No. 85

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 173 N.W. 481 (Lexington State Bank v. Rose City Creamery Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lexington State Bank v. Rose City Creamery Co., 173 N.W. 481, 207 Mich. 81, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 390 (Mich. 1919).

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Opinion

Kuhn, J.

(after stating the facts). The learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the question as to whether the defendants who signed the obligation as directors, signed for the purpose of binding themselves individually, or simply to legalize the action of the stockholders’ meeting, became, under the circumstances of this case, a question of fact. We are of the opinion that, under the authorities relied upon by the trial judge in his opinion above set forth, he arrived at a correct conclusion with reference thereto, and after a careful reading of the record we are also satisfied that he correctly determined the question of fact therein presented, for the reasons set forth in his opinion, which, we hereby adopt as our own.

The creamery company not being a party to this appeal, and having been defaulted, and because of the conclusion that there is no individual liability on the part of the other defendants, it becomes unnecessary for us to determine the other interesting question passed upon by the trial judge, as to whether or not [89]*89the defendant corporation was legally bound by the action of its stockholders as shown by the corporate records produced on the trial.

The decree of the court below is affirmed, with costs to the appellees.

Bird, C. J., and Ostrander, Moore, Steere, Brooke, Fellows, and Stone, JJ., concurred.

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Kuhn, J.

(after stating the facts). The learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the question as to whether the defendants who signed the obligation as directors, signed for the purpose of binding themselves individually, or simply to legalize the action of the stockholders’ meeting, became, under the circumstances of this case, a question of fact. We are of the opinion that, under the authorities relied upon by the trial judge in his opinion above set forth, he arrived at a correct conclusion with reference thereto, and after a careful reading of the record we are also satisfied that he correctly determined the question of fact therein presented, for the reasons set forth in his opinion, which, we hereby adopt as our own.

The creamery company not being a party to this appeal, and having been defaulted, and because of the conclusion that there is no individual liability on the part of the other defendants, it becomes unnecessary for us to determine the other interesting question passed upon by the trial judge, as to whether or not [89]*89the defendant corporation was legally bound by the action of its stockholders as shown by the corporate records produced on the trial.

The decree of the court below is affirmed, with costs to the appellees.

Bird, C. J., and Ostrander, Moore, Steere, Brooke, Fellows, and Stone, JJ., concurred.

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Bluebook (online)

173 N.W. 481, 207 Mich. 81, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 390, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lexington-state-bank-v-rose-city-creamery-co-mich-1919.

Opinion

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