RENDERED: AUGUST 14, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0898-MR
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON BEHALF OF HANNAH HURT APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE LUCY ANNE VANMETER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-01924
ANDERSON CAMPUS RENTAL PROPERTIES, LLC; HALEY BOYD; AND RON MORTON APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, A. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. JONES, A., JUDGE: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission (“the Commission”), on behalf of Hannah Hurt (“Hurt”), appeals from the Fayette Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of
Anderson Campus Rental Properties, LLC (“Anderson”),1 Haley Boyd, and Ron Morton (collectively “Appellees”). The Commission principally argues that the circuit court erroneously interpreted KRS2 383.300 by concluding that Hurt, who obtained an emergency protective order (“EPO”), was not entitled to terminate her lease under that statute. The Commission further contends that Anderson unlawfully retaliated against Hurt in violation of KRS 383.300 and KRS 344.280 by refusing to release her from the lease and by subsequently attempting to collect unpaid rent after she vacated the premises. We conclude that the circuit court correctly interpreted KRS 383.300 and properly entered summary judgment. Although we reach the retaliation claims by somewhat different reasoning than the circuit court, we likewise conclude that those claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2019, Hurt entered into a written lease agreement with Anderson for Apartment 6, located at 650 Maxwelton Court in Lexington,
1 The Commission’s complaint named “Anderson Campus Rental, Inc.” as the defendant. In their answer, Appellees noted that the proper entity is “Anderson Campus Rental Properties, LLC.” The complaint was never amended to correct the misnomer. Because the identity of the intended defendant is not at issue on appeal, we refer to the entity throughout this Opinion as Anderson Campus Rental Properties, LLC, which is the corporate designation used by the Commission in its notice of appeal. 2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
Kentucky.3 The lease term commenced on August 18, 2019, and expired on July 31, 2020. It expressly provided that “[t]here are no termination privileges with this lease.” Hurt also executed a Crime Free Lease Addendum, which provided that certain criminal activity by a tenant or the tenant’s guests could constitute grounds for termination of the tenancy.
On May 3, 2020, Lexington police responded to an incident at Hurt’s apartment involving Ramon Mercado.4 Later that day, Hurt petitioned for and obtained an EPO against Mercado pursuant to KRS 403.730(2)(a). Shortly thereafter, Hurt vacated the apartment, returned her keys, and provided Anderson with a copy of the EPO.5 On May 11, 2020, Anderson’s property manager, Haley Boyd (“Property Manager Boyd”), advised Hurt by email that the lease did not permit early termination and that Hurt remained financially responsible for rent through the lease’s expiration on July 31, 2020. Property Manager Boyd further
3 Hurt originally entered into the lease with another tenant, Kaylee Hoelscher. After Hoelscher moved from the apartment in January 2020, Hurt testified that the two agreed Hoelscher would continue paying her share of the rent until Hurt found another roommate. Sometime thereafter, Hurt’s romantic partner at the time, Ramon Mercado, began residing with Hurt at the apartment. 4 According to the record, both Hurt and Mercado were arrested following the May 3, 2020, incident and were charged with drug-related offenses. The charges against Hurt were subsequently dismissed. Nothing in this Opinion should be construed as expressing a view regarding the applicability of the Crime Free Lease Addendum under the facts presented here. Although the provision appears in the record, Anderson did not seek to terminate Hurt’s tenancy on that basis, and that issue is not before us. 5 The parties dispute precisely when Anderson received Hurt’s keys and a copy of the EPO. Because that factual dispute is not material to the issues on appeal, we need not address it further.
4
advised Hurt that she could execute a promissory note permitting her to satisfy the remaining balance through a payment plan and explained that, absent such an arrangement, any unpaid balance would be referred for collection.
Hurt responded that court personnel had informed her the EPO entitled her to terminate the lease without penalty. She further explained that she had previously raised concerns with fair housing authorities regarding Anderson’s management practices (entering her apartment without notice), that she was a survivor of sexual assault, and that she no longer felt safe residing in the apartment because Mercado had not yet been located or served with the EPO.6 Hurt indicated that if Anderson declined to release her from the lease, she intended to pursue relief through the fair housing process but would pay rent in the interim, so there was no need to refer her to collections. Property Manager Boyd reiterated Anderson’s position that the lease remained legally binding and that the EPO did not entitle Hurt to terminate the lease early.
The parties continued communicating regarding the lease throughout the summer of 2020. During that time, a formal request was made that Anderson accommodate Hurt by permitting an early termination of the lease based upon Hurt’s status as a victim of domestic violence. Anderson declined the request.
6 Mercado was never served with the EPO. As a result, neither a domestic violence order (“DVO”) nor an interpersonal (“IPO”) was ever entered, and the EPO was ultimately dismissed on November 10, 2020.
5
In July and August 2020, after Hurt had vacated the apartment, Anderson’s in-house collections coordinator, Ron Morton (“Collections Coordinator Morton”), sent Hurt correspondence seeking payment of the remaining rent due under the lease and advising that ordinary collection remedies such as institution of a civil action or referral to an outside collections agency could follow if the balance remained unpaid.
On December 7, 2020, Hurt filed a housing discrimination complaint against Anderson with the Commission. Following an investigation, the Commission issued a probable cause determination in May 2022. Hurt thereafter elected to pursue her claims in circuit court pursuant to KRS 344.635 and KRS 344.670. On July 5, 2022, the Commission, on Hurt’s behalf, filed the underlying action in Fayette Circuit Court alleging that Anderson violated KRS 383.300 by refusing to permit Hurt to terminate her lease after obtaining an EPO and retaliated against Hurt in violation of both KRS 383.300 and KRS 344.280 by refusing to release her from the lease and subsequently attempting to collect unpaid rent. The complaint also alleged housing discrimination under KRS Chapter 344 arising from the same conduct.
Anderson answered the complaint, denying liability, and subsequently moved to dismiss the Commission’s claims. The circuit court denied that motion,
6
and the parties proceeded through written discovery, depositions, and the exchange of documentary evidence.
Following discovery, Anderson moved for summary judgment, arguing principally that Hurt was not a “protected tenant” entitling her to terminate her lease under KRS 383.300 because she obtained only an EPO rather than a DVO or IPO. Anderson further argued that the undisputed facts failed to establish actionable retaliation under either KRS 383.300 or KRS 344.280. The Commission opposed the motion, and at the circuit court’s request the parties submitted supplemental briefing addressing the statutory definition of a “protected tenant” and whether the protections afforded recipients of EPOs extend to the lease-termination provisions contained in KRS 383.300(5).
In a thorough written opinion, the circuit court concluded that the statute unambiguously limits the right to terminate a lease under KRS 383.300(5) to tenants who obtain a DVO or IPO and does not extend that remedy to recipients of an EPO. The court further concluded that, because Hurt was not entitled to terminate the lease under the statute, Anderson’s subsequent efforts to collect unpaid rent did not constitute actionable retaliation under either KRS 383.300 or KRS 344.280. Accordingly, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Anderson, Boyd, and Morton. This appeal followed.
7
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is taken from an order granting summary judgment. “The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial judge has granted a motion for summary judgment is whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” HMB Professional Engineers, Inc. v. Ives, 733 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Ky. 2026) (quoting Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. First Specialty Ins. Corp., 706 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Ky. 2024)). Because summary judgment involves no fact-finding, we afford no deference to the circuit court’s legal conclusions. State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Greenville Cumberland Presbyterian Church, 706 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Ky. 2024).
This appeal also presents issues of statutory interpretation. “Statutory interpretation is a question of law for the court to be reviewed de novo.” Bell v. Bell, 423 S.W.3d 219, 222 (Ky. 2014).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Commission advances three principal arguments.
First, it contends the circuit court erroneously construed KRS 383.300 by concluding that Hurt, who obtained an EPO, was not entitled to terminate her lease without further liability under the statute. Second, it argues the circuit court erred in dismissing Hurt’s retaliation claim under KRS 383.300. Finally, it contends the
8
circuit court improperly dismissed Hurt’s retaliation claim under KRS 344.280. We address each argument in turn. A. Hurt’s Status as a Protected Tenant Under KRS 383.300.
The Commission first argues that the circuit court erroneously concluded Hurt was not entitled to terminate her lease pursuant to KRS 383.300 because she obtained an EPO rather than a DVO or an IPO. Specifically, the Commission contends the circuit court interpreted the statute too narrowly by failing to recognize that KRS 383.300 extends “protected tenant” status to recipients of EPOs and that, once Hurt became a protected tenant, she was entitled to all of the protections afforded by the statute, including early termination of her lease without penalty. Anderson responds that the General Assembly deliberately distinguished between recipients of EPOs and recipients of DVOs and IPOs, extending certain protections to both groups while reserving the lease-termination remedy exclusively for tenants who obtain a DVO or an IPO.
Resolution of this issue turns upon the language of KRS 383.300, which provides, in relevant part:
(2) As used in this section:
(a) “Named individual” means a person identified in the protective orders listed in paragraph (b) of this subsection as restrained from contact with the protected tenant; and
(b)1. “Protected tenant” means a residential rental or leased housing tenant, applicant for tenancy, or a tenant
9
with a minor household member, who is protected by a valid:
a. Domestic violence order issued pursuant to KRS 403.740, which restrains the adverse party from any unauthorized contact; or
b. Interpersonal protective order issued pursuant to KRS 456.060 which restrains the adverse party from any unauthorized contact.
2. For purposes of subsections (3) and (4) of this section, “protected tenant” also means a residential rental or leased housing tenant, applicant for tenancy, or a tenant with a minor household member who is protected by a valid:
a. Emergency protective order issued pursuant to KRS 403.730;
b. Temporary interpersonal protective order issued pursuant to KRS 456.040; or
c. Pretrial release no contact order issued pursuant to KRS 431.064.
(3)(a) A landlord shall not terminate, fail to renew, refuse to enter into, or otherwise retaliate in the renting or leasing of a residence because of the person’s status as a protected tenant.
(b) It shall be a defense to an action for possession of a rented or leased residential property if the court determines that: The tenant is a protected tenant; and The notice to vacate is substantially based on acts which violated the tenant’s protective order or led to the issuance of a protective order listed in subsection (2) of this section, including an action for possession based on complaints of noise, disturbances, or repeated presence of peace officers.
10
(4)(a) After informing the landlord of an intention to install a new lock, a protected tenant, at his or her expense, may install a new lock to his or her dwelling
...
(b) Regardless of any provision in the lease or rental agreement, the landlord may refuse to provide a key to the new lock to a named individual
...
(c) A named individual who has been excluded from leased or rented property under this section remains liable for rent.
(5)(a) For a protected tenant who obtains a valid protective order listed in subsection (2)(b)1. of this section after entering into a lease or rental agreement, the lease or rental agreement may be terminated by providing the landlord with:
1. Written notice of termination to be effective on a date stated in the notice that is at least thirty (30)
days after the landlord’s receipt of the notice; and
2. A copy of the valid protective order.
(b) For a protected tenant who obtains a valid protective order listed in subsection (2)(b)1. of this section before entering into a lease or rental agreement, the lease or rental agreement may be terminated by: Providing the landlord with written notice of termination. . . . Attaching a copy of the valid protective order; and Demonstrating a safety concern to the landlord that arises after execution of the lease.
(c) Upon termination of a lease or rental agreement under this section, the released protected tenant shall: Be liable only for rent prorated to the effective date of termination;
11
Not receive a negative credit entry or be liable for additional rent or fees solely because of the early termination; and Not be subject to damages or penalties under the circumstances specified by the statute.
(d) Regardless of whether the named individual is a party to the lease, the named individual is deemed to have interfered with the lease and is civilly liable for the landlord’s resulting economic losses.
Id.
The Commission’s argument focuses upon subsection (2)(b)2. It correctly observes that recipients of EPOs are included in the definition of “protected tenant.” From that premise, the Commission reasons that Hurt became entitled to every protection afforded by KRS 383.300, including the right to terminate her lease pursuant to subsection (5).
The difficulty with the Commission’s position is that subsection (2)(b)2. does not broadly redefine “protected tenant” throughout KRS 383.300. Rather, it expressly provides that recipients of EPOs, temporary IPOs, and no- contact orders are protected tenants “[f]or purposes of subsections (3) and (4)[.]” Id. (emphasis added). The lease-termination provisions, however, are found in subsection (5), not subsection (3) or (4). Moreover, subsection (5) does not apply generally to any “protected tenant.” Instead, it expressly limits the remedy to “a protected tenant who obtains a valid protective order listed in subsection (2)(b)1.” Id. (emphasis added). The only protective orders listed in subsection
12
(2)(b)1. are DVOs issued pursuant to KRS 403.740 and IPOs issued pursuant to KRS 456.060. An EPO issued pursuant to KRS 403.730 is not among them. This language is plain and unambiguous.
“[C]ourts . . . have a duty to interpret and enforce a statute according to its plain-text meaning.” Normandy Farm, LLC v. Kenneth McPeek Racing Stable, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Ky. 2024). “Where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as it is written.” Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, 458 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. 1970). We are not at liberty “to add or subtract from the legislative enactment or discover meanings not reasonably ascertainable from the language used.” Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Ky. 2000).
The Commission advances several arguments for why recipients of EPOs should enjoy the same lease-termination rights as recipients of DVOs and IPOs. Those arguments, however, are more appropriately directed to the General Assembly than this Court. Our role is to apply statutes as written. In doing so, we must recognize that where the General Assembly creates a legislative cause of action, it alone retains the authority, within constitutional bounds, to prescribe the elements, limitations, and prerequisites for one who seeks to pursue such an action. See Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1994).
13
We do not rewrite legislation to remedy perceived omissions or to extend statutory protections beyond those the legislature has chosen to provide. “While liberal construction is proper to effect a beneficent purpose, a statute should not be construed so as to give it a meaning which the language of the statute does not fairly and reasonably support as it is ‘neither the duty nor the prerogative of the judiciary to breathe into the statute that which the Legislature has not put there.’” Commonwealth v. Garnett, 8 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Ky. App. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. SKW Alloys, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Ky. App. 1995)).
While the Commission persuasively articulates various reasons why it might be better to provide EPO recipients the same rights as recipients of DVOs and IPOs, our task is not to make such policy determinations, but instead, to determine what the legislature actually intended, gleaning this intent from the unambiguous statutory language the legislature chose to employ. Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Ky.1973) (“[I]t is for this court to interpret the law, not to enact legislation.”). If KRS 383.300 should afford recipients of EPOs the same lease-termination rights as recipients of DVOs and IPOs, the statute must be amended through the legislative process.
Nor is the distinction drawn by the General Assembly inherently irrational. Although the statute does not explain why recipients of EPOs receive fewer protections than recipients of DVOs and IPOs—and no explanation is
14
required—one plausible reason lies in the temporary nature of an EPO. Unlike DVOs and IPOs, which generally remain in effect for extended periods, an EPO is an ex parte order of limited duration that may never result in the entry of a DVO or IPO. The General Assembly may well have concluded that recipients of EPOs should receive the immediate protections afforded by subsections (3) and (4), while reserving the extraordinary remedy of unilateral lease termination for those who ultimately obtain a DVO or IPO. Whether that was, in fact, the legislature’s reasoning is beside the point. The language of KRS 383.300 clearly and unmistakably distinguishes between the two classes of protective orders. Because Hurt obtained only an EPO, she was not entitled to terminate her lease pursuant to subsection (5). The circuit court therefore correctly granted summary judgment on this claim. B. Retaliation Under KRS 383.300.
The Commission next argues that, even if Hurt was not entitled to terminate her lease pursuant to KRS 383.300(5), Anderson nevertheless retaliated against her in violation of KRS 383.300(3). Specifically, the Commission contends Anderson retaliated by refusing to release Hurt from her lease, demanding payment of the remaining rent, threatening legal action, and advising that the outstanding balance could negatively affect her credit.
15
Subsection (3) prohibits a landlord from “terminat[ing], fail[ing] to renew, refus[ing] to enter into, or otherwise retaliat[ing] in the renting or leasing of a residence because of the person’s status as a protected tenant.” Thus, even assuming Hurt qualified as a protected tenant for purposes of subsection (3), the Commission was still required to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Anderson engaged in retaliatory conduct prohibited by the statute.
The Commission failed to do so. The principal conduct identified by the Commission is Anderson’s refusal to release Hurt from the lease after she presented an EPO. But as discussed above, KRS 383.300 did not entitle Hurt to terminate her lease based on an EPO alone, and Hurt’s lease explicitly stated that it did not include any early termination rights. Anderson’s insistence that Hurt comply with the lease was based on its contractual rights under the lease and its legal obligations under KRS 383.300. And Hurt did not produce any evidence that Anderson responded to her early termination request any differently than it responded to similar requests by its other tenants.
Likewise, the record establishes that the subsequent correspondence from Property Manager Boyd and Collections Coordinator Morton demanding payment of the remaining rent, offering a payment plan, advising Hurt of the outstanding balance, and warning that ordinary collection remedies could follow
16
was in conformity with Anderson’s standard operating practices for overdue or unpaid rent.7 Ultimately, the Commission’s retaliation claim depends on the premise that Anderson’s continued insistence on enforcement of the lease was retaliatory simply because Hurt asserted statutory rights with which Anderson disagreed. KRS 383.300(3) does not compel that conclusion. Because the Commission failed to identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Anderson retaliated against Hurt in the renting or leasing of the residence because of her status as a protected tenant, the circuit court properly entered summary judgment on this claim. C. Retaliation Under KRS 344.280.
Finally, the Commission argues the circuit court erred in dismissing its retaliation claim under KRS 344.280. KRS 344.280(1) provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person, or for two (2) or more persons to conspire:
(a) To retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because he has opposed a practice declared unlawful by this chapter, or because he has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
7 Although Anderson advised Hurt that failure to satisfy the debt could result in collection activity, the record does not indicate that Anderson immediately filed suit or imposed any penalties beyond those contemplated by the lease.
17
participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter[.]
Id.
As the Commission correctly observes, a retaliation claim under KRS 344.280 is analytically distinct from the underlying discrimination claim. “[T]he standard [for proving retaliation] is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII complaint.” Asbury University v. Powell, 486 S.W.3d 246, 252 (Ky. 2016) (citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff need not ultimately prevail on the underlying claim to maintain a retaliation claim under KRS 344.280.
That principle, however, does not alter the outcome here. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she was disadvantaged by an act of [the defendant], and (3) there was a causal connection between the [protected] activity and the [defendant’s] act.” Kentucky Department of Corrections v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130, 133-34 (Ky. 2003).
Even assuming Hurt engaged in protected activity by contacting the Commission, filing a formal housing discrimination complaint against Anderson, and participating in the Commission’s subsequent investigation, the Commission failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
18
Anderson thereafter subjected Hurt to a materially adverse action because of that protected activity.
The Commission identifies no conduct by Anderson following Hurt’s protected activity that differed in any meaningful respect from Anderson’s position before that activity occurred. Immediately after Hurt vacated the apartment, Property Manager Boyd advised Hurt that she remained liable under the lease because Anderson did not believe KRS 383.300 authorized early termination based upon an EPO. Property Manager Boyd simultaneously offered Hurt the opportunity to satisfy the remaining balance through a payment plan. The subsequent correspondence from Collections Coordinator Morton merely reiterated that same position by requesting payment of the outstanding balance and advising Hurt of the potential consequences of continued nonpayment. Those communications were consistent with Anderson’s previously stated contractual position; they did not reflect a new or different course of conduct undertaken in response to Hurt’s protected activity.
Nor did the Commission present evidence that Anderson treated Hurt differently from similarly situated tenants or otherwise departed from its ordinary business practices in attempting to collect what it believed to be a lawful debt. The record simply does not support a reasonable inference that Anderson’s collection
19
efforts were motivated by Hurt’s protected activity rather than by its longstanding position that Hurt remained contractually obligated under the lease.
The Commission emphasizes the temporal proximity between some of Anderson’s collection correspondence and Hurt’s contacts with the Commission. Temporal proximity, however, cannot alone create a genuine issue of material fact where the challenged conduct merely continues a course of action that began before the protected activity occurred. Montell v. Diversified Clinical Services, Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 507 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that where the defendant merely proceeds along lines previously contemplated before knowledge of the protected activity, we cannot rely on temporal proximity as evidence of causality).
Here, Anderson consistently maintained—from its first communication with Hurt after she vacated the apartment through the conclusion of the parties’ correspondence—that Hurt remained liable under the lease. The Commission has identified no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Anderson’s actions changed because Hurt sought relief from the Commission.
Accordingly, although we reach the issue by somewhat different reasoning than the circuit court, we likewise conclude that the Commission failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on its retaliation claim under KRS 344.280. Summary judgment on this claim was therefore proper as well.
20
IV. CONCLUSION
The circuit court correctly concluded that Hurt was not entitled to terminate her lease pursuant to KRS 383.300 and properly entered summary judgment on the Commission’s remaining claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove Carroll M. Redford, III Lexington, Kentucky Elizabeth C. Woodford Lexington, Kentucky