Lewis v. Willard

3 Pelt. 102, 1920 La. App. LEXIS 10
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 12, 1920
DocketNo. 7634
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Pelt. 102 (Lewis v. Willard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Willard, 3 Pelt. 102, 1920 La. App. LEXIS 10 (La. Ct. App. 1920).

Opinion

CHARLES T. CLAIBORNE, JUDGa.

This is a suit for attorney's fees. Petitioner is an >attorney-at-law. He alleges that the defendant called at his ^7^ office and engaged his services for opening the Succession of --her late husband and probating his will; that he opened the succession and probated the will of her said husband, Charles 3?. Willard, and had her appointed Executrix thereunder and caused an inventory to be taken, including the examination of papers found in the oank-box of the-deceased with the view of ascertaining what had become of certain bonds claimed by defendant aggregating $6,000 in value; that the inventory showed that the deceased had left very little property; that, at the request of defendant, petitioner examined, during several days^several trunks of papers to ascertain whether any of them were of any value; that the deceased left three policies of insurance upbn his life in favor of the defendant as beneficiary; one for $1000 in the Royal Arcanum^and two for $5000 each in the- Security Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hew York; that at the request of defendant petitioner corresponded with both insurance companies with the result that two of the policies were found to be of no value, and that the Security Company admitted its liability upon one of the policies which it paid, after deducting a loan of $800, and after petitioner had prepared and forwarded proofs of death; that the deceased, Charles H. Tillard,met his death by falling from a tramway; that he was carried^in an unconscious condition^to the Touro Infirmary which refused to receive him; and that petitioner was requested by the defendant to examine into the circumstances of the accident in order to ascertain whether she had a claim in damages againstthe railway company or the Infirmary, and that he advised her that she had no claim against either; -cthat the defendant' consulted many times and at length with petitioner concerning the above matters, and that petitioner spent much time entertaining [104]*104the creditors of the estate^and explaining to them that the succession was without funds; that in the safe of the deceased were found certain mortgage notes drawn hy one Saranflo aggregating #8,000, which deceased's hook-keeper said did not belong to deceased, and which petitioner discovered were the property of the Department of Banks in Ohio represented hy a New Orleans lawyer, and petitioner, advised the defendant to have the claimant file a rule so as to retain a record of their disposition; that about this time petitioner broached the subject of compensation, when the defendant informed him that he could not expect to be paid since the succession had no funds, although on a prior occasion defendant had told petitioner not to forget to send his bill to her; that petitioner had made no stipulation with the defendant for a fee; that his services are well worth #160 which the defendant is well able to pay as she has received $9200 on two life insurance policies^and owns two lots and a large residence worth $3000 after paying» the mortgage upon them.

The defendant, for answer, admitted that she had called at plaintiff's office with her deceased husband's will, in which she was appointed executrix, and told him that she did not think that it was necessary to open her husband's succession as he had left but little property; but that plaintiff advised her to have the will probated and to have herself appointed executrix; that she then engaged the services of plaintiff after he had explained to her that there was no personal liability, but that all costs and attorney's fees would be an obligation of the succession; she admits the services performed by plaintiff, but avers that they were rendered to the succession and not to her personally; that the whole service rendered by plaintiff concerning the policies of insurance’, consisted in writing to the Royal Arcanum one letter and receiving a reply that the policy was no longer an obligation of the company; that the services of the plaintiff were not necessary with reference to the two policies in the Security Company; that the resident agents of the company had obtained the necessarybblanks for the proofs of death, and that the only service rendered by plaintiff in relation thereto wm to procure the signature of the physician at the Charity Hospital which plaintiff volunteered to get; she denied that ehe employed [105]*105the plaintiff to fix any liability upon the Touro Infirmary or upon the Street Railway Company; ohe alleges that she called at plaintiff'w office only when requested by him so to do, and then consulted only concerning the affairs of the succession; she avers that she referred the creditors of the succession to the plaintiff as attorney of the succession under his instructions, and that the Saranflo notes were surrendered under an order of court as a part of the proceedings of the succession; she further averred that at the request of plaintiff, she called at his office bringing with her her personal check-book, and that plaintiff then and there informed her of the total amount due to him for all services rendered to her personally to that date, for which he in his own handwriting made out a check to his own order, which he stated wap a payment in full for all amounts due to him on whatever account; and that plaintiff then told her that she was under no personal liability to him on account of the succession of Charles HLWillard

There was judgment for the plaintiff for $13. Prom this judgment he has appealed.

The record of the Succession of Charles H. Willard shows that the plaintiff, acting as the attorney of the defendant, filed a petition praying for the probate of the will and the appointment of the defendant as executrix and for an Inventory; that the appraisement of the property left by the deceased amounted to $194.28, consisting, for the greater ’part, of office furniture; that the contents of the bank-box of the deceased were scrutinized by him, and mentioned in the Inventory; that he obtained an order for the sale of the movables to pay debts; that in conjunction with another attorney he defended a rule taken by the owners of the Sarebflo notes. After this he withdrew from the case as counsel. Á few days thereafter, the defendant filed an account as executrix. The assets amounted to $215.72. The funeral charges amounted to $156.49, and the-law charges to $89.65, among '.vhich figured the following item"; "Attorney's fees, Walter S. Lewis $35"; the proportion coming to him was -''16.10. The account was homologated without opposition, but the . plaintiff was never paid the $16.10.

There were only two witnesses examined: the plaintiff and the defendant.

[106]*106The plaintiff makes no claim for services rendered to the Succession proper; his demands are for services he alleges he rendered to the defendant individually. We consider that all his effotts in connection with the probate of the will and appointment of the executrix, and with the Inventory, such as thé- examination of the contents of the bank-box and of the papers in the office of the deceased, and the procuring of the order of saiet and his defense of the rule for the Sarenflo notes, and his several consultations with the defendant and conferences with the creditors are all part and parcel of the succession proceedings and properly chargeable to the succession. For these he has been put upon the account of the Executrix for $35, and that account has been homo-logated without opposition.

Article C. C.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Pelt. 102, 1920 La. App. LEXIS 10, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewis-v-willard-lactapp-1920.