Lewis v. Upadhyay

90 Va. Cir. 81, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 39
CourtNorfolk County Circuit Court
DecidedMarch 3, 2015
DocketCase No. (Civil) CL14-3682
StatusPublished

This text of 90 Va. Cir. 81 (Lewis v. Upadhyay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Norfolk County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Upadhyay, 90 Va. Cir. 81, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 39 (Va. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

By Judge Junius P. Fulton, III

The Court has heard argument on the applicability of the Federal Patient Safety Act Privilege to email and other electronic correspondence and communications received by the defendant Dr. Jyoti Upadhyay from Dr. Arnold Zaritsky, Vice President of Clinical Services at Children’s Hospital of the King’s Daughters (CHKD).

Defendant, Dr. Jyoti Upadhyay, asserts the privilege and is joined by CHKD, although not a party to this matter. CHKD asserts that it has a compelling interest in the Court’s ruling in this matter as a member of the relevant Patient Safety Organization (PSO) as the entity that conducted the investigation which resulted in the communications in question.

CHKD asserts that these emails are patient safety work product prepared as part of an investigation conducted by Dr. Arnold Zaritsky for or on behalf of CHKD, for the purpose of reporting to a PSO. There is no dispute that Dr. Zaritsky, as Senior Vice President for Clinical Services at CHKD, was not involved in the care and treatment of the infant plaintiff. As part of his duties as Senior Vice President for Clinical Services, Dr. Zaritsky is a recognized and designated patient safety officer for CHKD. After the surgeiy which is the subject of this lawsuit, Dr. Upadhyay contacted Dr. Zaritsky in his role as a CHKD patient safety officer to discuss the care rendered to Darnell Lewis. Dr. Zaritsky undertook an investigation and assessment of the care rendered to Darnell Lewis as a result of Dr. Upadhyay’s report. Part of that investigation included Dr. Zaritsky’s meeting with health care professionals involved in the care of Darnell Lewis and other professional staff at CHKD [82]*82who provide assistance with his investigation. All who were consulted were advised that their communications and information associated with the investigation would be confidential and privileged from disclosure.

The plaintiff points out that the emails and electronic communications between Dr. Upadhyay and Dr. Zaritsky do not qualify under the Patient Safety Act definition for patient safety work product for two reasons. First, the emails were never actually sent to a “patient safety organization;” and, second, separate state and federal reporting requirements prevent the information in this case from receiving federal protection.

CHKD responds by arguing that Plaintiff misinterprets the Patient Safety Act. According to CHKD, information becomes “patient safety work product” the moment it is collected in anticipation of reporting to a “patient safety organization” and the statute does not require actual reporting. Additionally, CHKD claims that separate reporting requirements do not eviscerate the statutory privilege. Rather, the emails qualify as “patient safety work product” so long as the information was gathered in and remains in a “patient safety evaluation system.”

The Patient Safety Act provides that “patient safety work product shall be privileged and shall not be ... subject to discovery in connection with a ... State ... civil... proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a). Three provisions identify how information becomes patient safety work product. First, information may become patient safety work product if it is assembled or developed by a provider for the purpose of reporting to a PSO and is reported to a PSO. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(A)(i)(I). Second, patient safety work product is information developed by a PSO for the conduct of patient safety activities. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(A)(i)(II). Third, patient safety work product is information that constitutes the deliberations or analysis of, or identifies the fact of reporting pursuant to, a patient safety evaluation system. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(A)(ii).

Patient safety work product “does not include information that is collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists separately from a patient safety evaluation system.” 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B)(ii). A patient safety evaluation system refers to “the collection, management, or analysis of information for reporting to or by a patient safety organization.” 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(6). Lastly, a patient safety organization “means a private or public entity or component thereof that is listed by the Secretary... .” 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(4).

Plaintiff contends that Dr. Zaritsky’s affidavit fails to establish that the emails are privileged because the affidavit does not show a delivery of the emails to a patient safety organization. In the affidavit, Dr. Zaritsky maintained that “[a]t all times, my communications with Dr. Upadhyay [sic], by mail, by phone, or in person, regarding care rendered to Darnell Lewis, were undertaken as part of and for the purpose of reporting to a PSO [patient safety organization].” (Aff. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also maintains that [83]*83Dr. Zaritsky’s deposition, taken on August 29,2013, contradicts statements made in the affidavit. (Feb. 2015 Tr. at 40.)

Beginning with the actual reporting argument, a number of courts have considered the question and required actual delivery of patient safety work product to a patient safety organization. See Lee Medical, Inc., 312 S.W.3d 515, n. 70 (Tenn. 2010) (“Patient safety work product that is not actually reported to a patient safety organization is not privileged under PSQIA.”); see also Francis v. United States, 09 Civ. 4004 (GBD) (KNF), 2011 U.S. Dist. lexis 59762, at *21 (S.D. N.Y. May 31,2011) (“The quality assurance review documents at issue in this action are not protected under the PSQIA, since they were not provided to a PSO.”); Venosh v. Henzes, 31 Pa. D. & C. 5th 411, 436 (Common Pleas Court of Lackawanna County, Pa., 2013) (“The privilege is inapplicable if the patient safety work product materials are not actually furnished to a PSO.”). Indeed, in earlier litigation between these parties, a judge of this Court ruled likewise.

Despite those decisions, regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the agency responsible for implementing the Patient Safety Act, provide a more expansive definition. According to the regulations, patient safety work product includes information that is assembled or developed by a provider for reporting to a PSO and are reported to a PSO, which includes information that is documented as within a patient safety evaluation system for reporting to a PSO, and such documentation includes the date the information entered the patient safety evaluation system. Patient Safety Act, 73 FR 70798 (Nov. 21, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R., pt. 3, § 3.20).

Under the Secretary’s definition of patient safety work product, information is protected at collection. The Secretary explained that:

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Related

Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher
312 S.W.3d 515 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2010)
Tibbs v. Bunnell
448 S.W.3d 796 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2014)
Venosh v. Henzes
31 Pa. D. & C.5th 411 (Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
90 Va. Cir. 81, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 39, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewis-v-upadhyay-vaccnorfolk-2015.