Lewis v. State of Nevada

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 SAMMEON LEWIS, Case No. 2:23-cv-00829-GMN-DJA

6 Petitioner, v. ORDER 7 NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., 8 Respondents. 9 10 This habeas matter is before the Court on pro se Petitioner Sammeon Lewis’s failure to 11 comply with the Court’s prior Order (ECF No. 3). 12 In May 2023, he submitted a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1-1). The 13 Court instructed Lewis to show cause in writing why this action should not be dismissed based 14 on his failure to exhaust his claims in Nevada state courts. ECF No. 3. The Court instructed 15 Lewis to file a “Response to Order to Show Cause” in writing within 30 days and warned that his 16 failure to timely and fully comply with the order would result in a dismissal of this action 17 without prejudice and without further advance notice. Id. at 3. However, Lewis did not comply 18 with the order by filing a response to the order to show cause, and the 30-day deadline expired. 19 To date, Lewis has not filed a response to the order to show cause, or taken any action to 20 prosecute this case. 21 I. Discussion 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 23 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 24 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 25 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 26 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 27 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 28 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 1 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) 2 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 3 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 4 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 5 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. 6 U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 8 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal. The third factor, risk of 9 prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises 10 from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting 11 an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the 12 public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors 13 favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 15 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 16 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 17 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 18 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 19 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 20 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 21 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 22 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 23 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 24 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because litigation cannot progress without Lewis’s 25 compliance with court orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another 26 deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable 27 and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case 28 will be an exception. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 1 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 2 II. Conclusion 3 It is therefore ordered that Petitioner Sammeon Lewis’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 4 Corpus (ECF No. 1-1) is dismissed without prejudice based on his failure to comply with the 5 Court’s order. 6 It is further ordered that a certificate of appealability is denied as jurists of reason would 7 not find the Court’s dismissal of the petition to be debatable or wrong. 8 It is further ordered that under to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the 9 Clerk of Court is directed to add Nevada Attorney General Aaron D. Ford as counsel for 10 respondents and informally serve the Nevada Attorney General by directing a notice of 11 electronic filing of this order to his office. No response is required from respondents other than 12 to respond to any orders of a reviewing court. 13 It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter final judgment 14 accordingly and close this case. 15 DATED: October 4, 2023

16 ________________________________ 17 GLORIA M. NAVARRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28