Lewis v. State
Opinion
Appellant, Terry Lewis, brings this appeal from the judgment entered against him after he pleaded nolo contendere to charges of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and carrying a concealed firearm by a convicted felon, expressly reserving the right to appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse.
We conclude that it constituted a stop when Lewis was ordered to step out of his automobile by Officer Skiles. Lewis’ motion to suppress should have been granted because the officers did not have a founded suspicion to stop Lewis. Rather, the officers were acting on a hunch or guesswork concerning Lewis’ presence in a car legally parked in a lot. Each officer who testified stated that he did not have reason to believe that criminal activity was about to take place when they confronted Lewis. Therefore, the sole support for a determination that the officers’ had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot is Officer Skiles’ testimony that Lewis mumbled, fidgeted, avoided eye contact, and rocked back and forth. This conduct alone does not justify a “founded” suspicion that criminal activity had taken place or was about to take place. See Cooper v. State, 584 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
Although the officers testified generally about the area in which appellant was parked being not only a “high crime area” but “as bad as it gets,” neither testified that they suspected appellant had a weapon until after he was ordered out of the ear. Neither subsection (2) nor subsection (5) of 901.151 Florida Statutes1 (1991), was implicated un-[86]*86der this factual situation. We therefore reverse the order denying the motion to suppress, and remand for further proceedings, if any.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
625 So. 2d 84 (Lewis v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.