Lewis v. Richardson

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedNovember 8, 1995
DocketCV-94-509-JD
StatusPublished

This text of Lewis v. Richardson (Lewis v. Richardson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Richardson, (D.N.H. 1995).

Opinion

Lewis v. Richardson CV-94-509-JD 11/08/95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Karen Lewis, et al.

v. Civil No. 94-509-JD

Myra C. Richardson

O R D E R

The plaintiffs, Karen Lewis, and her three minor children,

Michelle Lewis, Michael Lewis, and Ralph Lewis, III, bring this

negligence action against the defendant, Myra C. Richardson, for

injuries related to an automobile accident. Karen's husband,

Ralph Lewis, Jr., brings a claim for loss of consortium. Before

the court is the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction (document no. 9).

Background

The plaintiffs are residents of New Hampshire. Complaint at

5 1. The defendant isa resident of the Commonwealth of

Virginia. Id. at 5 2. On July 2, 1992, a vehicle driven by

Karen Lewis and containing her three minor children, collided

with a vehicle driven by the defendant in Hopkinton, New

Hampshire. Id. at 55 5, 6 & 14. The defendant "was charged

with, and pled guilty to, failure to stop at a stop sign and traffic light in violation of state statutes (N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 265:9 and 31)." Id. at 5 15.

Discussion

In its motion, the defendant asserts that the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claims of Ralph, Jr.

and the minor children (the "pendent plaintiffs"). The defendant

concedes that the court may exercise jurisdiction over Karen

Lewis' claim. However, the defendant argues that each of the

pendent plaintiffs have failed to assert claims establishing an

amount in controversy in excess of $50,000, exclusive of interest

and costs, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss at $[$[ 2, 5-11.1

The plaintiffs respond that the court has original diversity

jurisdiction over the claims asserted by each pendent plaintiff.

Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion to Dismiss at I 7. The

plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the court should

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent parties'

1The parties do not dispute that they are citizens of different states in accordance with 28 U.S.C § 1332(a) (1).

2 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because the claims derive from a

"common nucleus of operative facts." Id. at 55 5, 6.2

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the statutory or constitutional

power of the court to adjudicate a particular case. 2A James

William Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 5 12.07 (2d ed.

1995). The court assumes the truthfulness of the facts

concerning jurisdiction as alleged by the pleading, and the case

may be dismissed only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element

necessary for jurisdiction to exist. Id.; see Garita Hotel Ltd.

Partnership v. Ponce Federal Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st

Cir. 1992) ("court takes factual allegations in complaint as

true, indulges every reasonable inference helpful to the

plaintiff's cause"); Palumbo v. Robert!, 834 F. Supp. 46, 51 (D.

Mass. 1993) ("court is reguired to view the facts in plaintiff's

favor although the burden of persuasion as to jurisdiction rests

with [the] plaintiff").

The court may not exercise its jurisdiction in a manner

inconsistent with Article III, § 2 of the United States

2The plaintiffs have not pled § 1367 as a basis for jurisdiction. See Complaint at 5 3. However, under Rule 8(a)(1), the plaintiffs need only plead operative facts sufficient to bring their case within the jurisdiction of the court. See 2A James William Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, 5 8.07(1) (2d ed. 1995).

3 Constitution, which defines the outer boundaries of federal court

jurisdiction. However, the "scope of supplemental jurisdiction

is limited not only by Article III, but also by the applicable

statutory grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts." Acton

Co., Inc. of Mass. v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d 76, 79 (1st

Cir. 1982).

Congress has extended the court's supplemental jurisdiction

to the full extent of the constitution. The relevant statute

provides that

[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West 1993).3

Section 1367(a) unambiguously authorizes federal court

jurisdiction over supplemental claims "so related" to claims over

which the court has original jurisdiction, even where the

supplemental claims do not independently meet the amount in

controversy reguirement set forth in § 1332. Garza v. Na t '1 Am.

3The parties have not alleged, nor does the court find, that any of the exceptions enumerated in subsections (b) and (c) apply to the instant case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) & (c).

4 Ins. C o ., 807 F. Supp. 1256, 1258 (M.D.La 1992); see also Acton

Co., Inc. of Mass., 668 F.2d at 79 (supplemental jurisdiction, in

part, "is designed to enable a federal court having subject

matter jurisdiction over a dispute to resolve closely related

claims lacking an independent jurisdictional basis"). Therefore,

§ 1367(a) may be applicable whenever the pendent plaintiffs'

claims "form part of the same case or controversy under Article

III."

Under Article III, the court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction to adjudicate those state law claims based on the

same "common nucleus of operative fact" as that of a substantial

claim arising under federal law. United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also Owen Equip. & Erection

Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 (1978) (Supreme Court accepted

assumption that the "common nucleus of operative fact" test also

governs application of jurisdiction based on diversity of

citizenship). Thus, once the court has original jurisdiction

over a claim, § 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over

other claims that "derive from a common nucleus of operative

fact."

This case falls sguarely within the court's supplemental

jurisdiction under § 1367(a). Plaintiff Karen Lewis' claim, over

which the court has original jurisdiction, alleges that the

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Related

United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs
383 U.S. 715 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger
437 U.S. 365 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Palumbo v. Roberti
834 F. Supp. 46 (D. Massachusetts, 1993)
Garza v. National American Insurance
807 F. Supp. 1256 (M.D. Louisiana, 1992)

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