Lewis v. Prichard

50 S.E. 743, 57 W. Va. 542, 1905 W. Va. LEXIS 61
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedApril 11, 1905
StatusPublished

This text of 50 S.E. 743 (Lewis v. Prichard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Prichard, 50 S.E. 743, 57 W. Va. 542, 1905 W. Va. LEXIS 61 (W. Va. 1905).

Opinion

Cox, Judge:

This cause was before this Court on a former appeal. The decision on the former appeal is reported in 50 West Virginia, 239. The nature of the contract involved and a sufficient statement of the cause up to the time of that decision is contained in the opinion of the Court, and need not be repeated here. The contract involved provided that Lewis & Co. was to furnish to Crane & Co. certain timber and to drift it to the mouth of the Gujmndotte river at the prices specified in such contract.

The firm of Lewis & Co. was composed of R. H. Prichard and R. A. Lewis. R. H. Prichard was also a member of the firm of Prichard & Brubaker and of the firm of Prichard & Co. These firms and Prichard, as an individual, were also engaged in furnishing timber to Crane & Co. Lewis was not interested in any of these dealings except the dealings of Lewis & Co. Crane & Co. was a corporation. By an arrangement between Lewis and Prichard, Prichard was to attend to the measuring of the timber of Lewis & Co. at the mouth of the Guyandotte and collect therefor. Lewis superintended the work of getting out the timber and drifting it to the mouth of Guyandotte. Instead of Prichard measuring the timber and collecting therefor in person, the firm of Prichard & Brubaker, for the most part, attended to those duties for the firm of Lewis & Co. with the acquiescence of, or at least, without dissent from, Lewis to that manner of conducting the business. Crane & Co. kept only one account for the transactions by it with all these firms and with R. H. Prich-ard, as an individual, and that account was kept in the name of R, H. Prichard. A statement from the books of Crane & Co. is filed with the testimony and will be referred to as the books of Crane & Co. No books were kept by Lewis of the business of Lewis & Co. The only books kept of the transactions of Lewis & Co. were those kept by Prichard & Bru-baker, in which an account with Lewis & Co. appears. A statement from these books is filed with the testimony and will be referred to as the books of Prichard & Brubaker. The manner of keeping these books, or the failure to keep proper books, has led to much confusion and no small degree of uncertainty in the settlement of the accounts between [544]*544Lewis & Co. and Crane & Co. The contract between Lewis & Co. and Crane & Co. bears date the 22d.day of August, 1895. There were previous contracts but they are not involved. The contract of August 22, 1895, in most of its material features, was construed by the former decision. After this cause was remanded it was again referred to a commissioner to state and settle the accounts between Lewis & Co. and Crane & Co. and the commissioner reported a balance in favor of Crane & Co. against Lewis & Co. of $2,061.85. The report of the commissioner was excepted to by Lewis and the creditors of Lewis & Co., and the court sustained, inmost part, the exceptions and restated the account, and found an indebtedness in favor of Lewis & Co. against Crane & Co., of $38,587.85, and decreed the payment thereof by Crane & Co. to receivers appointed for the purpose. From this decree Crane & Co. appealed.

In considering the intricate questions arising in the settlement of. this account upon the testimony and the mass of documentary evidence we are presented with no new questions of law. In order to determine the correctness of the decree of' the lower court, and in order to determine what decree should have been entered by that court, it is necessary for us to pass upon the'principles involved in the statement of the items of the account. In doing this we must keep in mind the former decision and the law casting the burden of proof as between the parties.

The first contention is in regard to the basis of charge against Crane & Co. Lewis & Co. claims that the nine thousand logs on the banks of Big Ugly Creek, mentioned in the opinion delivered upon the former appeal, should be charged for at the contract price of seven cents per cube, averaging the logs at thirty-three cubes each (less thirteen hundred of said logs not delivered) regardless of whether the seven thousand seven hundred logs .were ever delivered at the mouthy of Guyandotte or not. Crane & Co. contends that it is only liable to be charged with the logs actually delivered and remeasured at the mouth of Guyandotte. The dealings tinder the contract'are at an end. Final settlement between the parties is all that remains. What is the true basis of chai;ge against Crane & Co. ? Under the opinion delivered by Judge Bbannon on the former appeal we are not left in [545]*545doubt. We quote therefrom as follows: “In January, 1897, there were delivered by R,. A. Lewis & Co. on the banks of Big Ugly creek nine thousand logs, which were measured, accepted and branded with ‘R. L.’, which, by the contract, was to be regarded the brand of Crane & Co., and by the contract title in these logs thereupon vested in Crane & Co., and it became liable to account therefor to Lewis & Co., at seven cents per cubic foot. No account of these logs was taken in the commissioner’s account between Lewis & Co. and Crane & Co.; no statement appears including these logs to the credit of Lewis & Co., and debit of Crane & Co. showing how much was debited to Crane & Co. on their account, and what payments were made thereon. The commissioner was asked to report whether the seven cents per cube payable under the contract for timber delivered on the banks of Big Ugly creek had ever been paid, and he responded that it had not been paid ‘in strict conformity with the terms of the contract;’ but that he was of opinion that ‘the advancements made from time to time by C. Crane & Co. was a substantial compliance with the terms of said contract. ’ * * * An account should be taken of those logs at the price of seven cents per cubic foot. Any advancements or payments made by Crane & Co. to the actual, separate use of the firm of Lewis & Co., should be credited to Crane & Co. The contract put upon Lewis & Co. the duty, not merely of putting logs on the banks of Big Ugly creek, but of rafting and drifting to the mouth of Guyan river. If Lewis & Co. failed to drift any of these logs, they could claim nothing for logs not drifted neither the seven cents nor three and a half specified in the contract.. But Crane & Co. took upon themselves the duty of rafting and drifting, owing to the inability of Lewis & Co. to do so, and for such as Crane & Co. drifted at their expense, that company would be liable to pay Lewis & Co. only the seven cents per cube, but nothing for drifting. For such as were drifted by the receiver and accepted by Crane & Co., Crane & Co. would be liable for both the seven and three and a half cents spoken of in the contract. It must be remarked that the contract gives Crane & Company the right of re-measurement at the mouth of Guyan for the correction of the preliminary measurement made for the purpose of the advancement of seven cents [546]*546per cube on the banks of Big Ugly creek, and also gives right of sapping old logs and deduction for defec five logs. ”

A further provision of the contract is as follows: “And the said R,. A.

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Bluebook (online)
50 S.E. 743, 57 W. Va. 542, 1905 W. Va. LEXIS 61, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewis-v-prichard-wva-1905.