Lewis v. New York Sleeping Car Co.

9 N.E. 615, 143 Mass. 267, 1887 Mass. LEXIS 280

• Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
• Decided: January 7, 1887
• Status: Published

Opinion

Morton, C. J.

The use of sleeping cars upon railroads is modern, and there are few adjudicated cases as to the extent of the duties and liabilities of the owners of such cars. They must be ascertained by appljdng to the new condition of things the comprehensive and elastic principles of the common law. When a person buys the right to the use of a berth in a sleeping car, it is entirely clear that the ticket which he receives is not intended to, and does not, express all the terms of the contract into which he enters. Such ticket, like the ordinary railroad ticket, is little more than a symbol intended to show to the agents in charge of the car that the possessor, has entered into a contract with the company owning the car, by which he is entitled to passage in the car named on the ticket.

Ordinarily, the only communication between the parties is, that the passenger buys, and the agent of the car company sells, a ticket between two points; but the contract thereby entered into is implied from the nature and usages of the employment of the company.

A sleeping car company holds itself out to the world as furnishing safe and comfortable cars, and, when it sells a ticket, it impliedly stipulates to do so. It invites passengers to pay for, and make use of, its cars for sleeping, all parties knowing that, during the greater part of the night, the passenger will be asleep, powerless to protect himself or to guard' his property. He cannot, like the guest of an inn, by locking the door, guard against danger. He has no right to take any such steps to protect himself in a sleeping car, but, by the necessity of the case, is dependent upon the owners and officers of the car to guard him and the property he has with him from danger from thieves or otherwise.

The law raises the duty on the part of the car company to afford him this protection. While it is not liable as a common carrier or as an innholder, yet it is its duty to use reasonable care to guard the passengers from theft, and if, through want of such care, the personal effects of a passenger such as he might reasonably carry with him are stolen, the company is liable for it. Such a rule is required by public policy, and by the true interests of both the passenger and the company; and the decided weight of authority supports it. Woodruff Sleeping & Parlor Coach Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474. Pullman Car Co. v. Gardner, 3 Penny. 78. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gaylord, 23 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 788.

The notice by which the defendant company sought to avoid its liability was not known to the plaintiff, and cannot avail the defendant.

The defendant contends that there was no evidence of negligence on its part. The fact that two larcenies were committed in the manner described in the testimony is itself some evidence of the want of proper watchfulness by the porter of the car; add to this the testimony that the porter was found asleep in the early morning, that he was required to be on duty for thirty-six hours continuously, which included two nights, and a case is presented which must be submitted to the jury.

We have considered all the questions which have been argued in the two cases before us, and are of opinion that the rulings at the trial were correct.

Nxcejptions overruled.