Lewis v. New York City Tr. Auth.

Opinion

Lewis v New York City Tr. Auth.

2026 NY Slip Op 05175

September 2, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Sophia Lewis, etc., respondent,

v

New York City Transit Authority, et al., appellants.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on September 2, 2026

2024-03493, 2024-11396, (Index No. 500886/22)

Betsy Barros, J.P.

Lillian Wan

James P. McCormack

Phillip Hom, JJ.

Anna J. Ervolina (Armienti, DeBellis & Rhoden, LLP, New York, NY [Vanessa M. Corchia], of counsel), for appellants.

Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., New York, NY (Adam Stoltz of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Leon Ruchelsman, J.), dated January 25, 2024, and (2) an order of the same court dated July 24, 2024. The order dated January 25, 2024, insofar as appealed from, granted the plaintiff's motion pursuant CPLR 3124 to compel the defendants to comply with certain discovery demands. The order dated July 24, 2024, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel production of Erick Velez, Richard Walker, Ray Paez, and Leroy Knight as additional witnesses for depositions and denied that branch of the defendants' cross-motion which was to preclude the plaintiff from filing further discovery motions without leave of the court.

ORDERED that the order dated January 25, 2024, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, and the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel the defendants to comply with certain discovery demands is denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated July 24, 2024, is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provisions thereof granting those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel production of Erick Velez, Richard Walker, Ray Paez, and Leroy Knight as additional witnesses for depositions, and substituting therefor a provision denying those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order dated July 24, 2024, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff's decedent, Felicia Lewis, was killed as a result of a motor vehicle accident on January 16, 2020, involving a bus owned by the defendants New York City Transit Authority and MTA Bus Company (hereinafter MTA) and driven by the defendant Robert Beckford. In this action, the plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the defendants were negligent with respect to the accident.

In September 2023, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel the [*2]defendants to comply with certain discovery demands, including the disclosure of Beckford's personnel file, documents related to the duties and hours worked by MTA agents who operated the bus the week preceding the accident, and "copies of the policy manual that governed the MTA . . . agents in effect at the time of the accident." In an order dated January 25, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the plaintiff's motion and directed the defendants to produce "all outstanding discovery."

The plaintiff subsequently moved to compel the depositions of additional witnesses. The defendants opposed the motion. In response to a separate motion by the plaintiff, the defendants cross-moved, inter alia, to preclude the plaintiff from filing further discovery motions without leave of the Supreme Court. In an order dated July 24, 2024, the court, among other things, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel production of Erick Velez, Richard Walker, Ray Paez, and Leroy Knight as additional witnesses for depositions and denied that branch of the defendants' cross-motion. The defendants appeal.

Pursuant to CPLR 3101(a), "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." "'[T]he words, material and necessary, are . . . to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity'" (Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d 656, 661 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406). "'However, a party is not entitled to unlimited, uncontrolled, unfettered disclosure'" (Smith-Percival v MTA Bus Co., 232 AD3d 928, 929, quoting C.B. v New York City Tr. Auth., 219 AD3d 1397, 1398). "The essential test is usefulness and reason" (Rrengo v New York City Tr. Auth., 204 AD3d 1049, 1050 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d at 406).

A party moving pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel compliance with outstanding discovery demands bears the burden of demonstrating that "'the method of discovery sought will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the claims, and unsubstantiated bare allegations of relevancy are insufficient to establish the factual predicate regarding relevancy'" (Smith-Percival v MTA Bus Co., 232 AD3d at 929, quoting Whitnum v Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery, P.C., 142 AD3d 495, 496). Thus, "[a] motion to compel responses to . . . [discovery] demands . . . is properly denied where the [discovery] demands . . . seek information [which] is irrelevant, overly broad, or burdensome" (Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc. v County of Rockland, 206 AD3d 668, 668-669 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Wentworth, 211 AD3d 684, 686).

"The supervision of discovery, and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions for disclosure, are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court" (Smith-Percival v MTA Bus Co., 232 AD3d at 929 [internal quotation marks omitted]). However, "this Court is vested with its own discretion and corresponding power to substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court, even in the absence of abuse" (Harris v Christian Church of Canarsie, Inc., 147 AD3d 818, 818; see Pulgarin v Richmond, 219 AD3d 1356, 1358).

Generally, "where an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment, the employer is liable for the employee's negligence under a theory of respondeat superior, and a plaintiff may not proceed with a cause of action to recover damages for negligent hiring and retention" (Tangalin v MTA Long Is. Bus, 92 AD3d 766, 767; see Rrengo v New York City Tr. Auth., 204 AD3d at 1050). Thus, since here, the defendants admit that Beckford was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, neither his personnel file nor the portions of the defendants' policy manual relating to the retention or training of Beckford are discoverable (see Rrengo v New York City Tr. Auth., 204 AD3d at 1050; Tangalin v MTA Long Is. Bus, 92 AD3d at 767). In addition, the plaintiff failed to show that any alleged remaining portions of the policy manual "would yield matter material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of the action" (John v New York City Tr. Auth., 242 AD3d 718, 720; see Rrengo v New York City Tr. Auth., 204 AD3d at 1050; Tangalin v MTA Long Is. Bus, 92 AD3d at 767-768).

Moreover, the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that her demand for "all documents relating [to] duties and hours worked by any of your agent(s) . . . who operated said Bus for the week of January 16, 2020," was "relevant to this case within the meaning of CPLR 3101(a)" (First Commerce Bank v B & T Hillel, LLC, 241 AD3d 1283, 1285). Additionally, the plaintiff's use of the term "all" with respect to the category of items sought failed to request any document with "sufficient particularity" (Weiss v Meiselman, 155 AD2d 533, 534).

"For purposes of depositions, a corporate entity has the right to designate, in the first instance, the representative who shall be examined" (Giordano v New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 84 AD3d 729, 731; see Teodoro v C.W. Brown, Inc., 200 AD3d 997, 998). "In order to show that an additional deposition is warranted, the movant must demonstrate that (1) the representatives already deposed had insufficient knowledge, or were otherwise inadequate, and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the persons sought for depositions possess information which is material and necessary to the prosecution of the case" (Nunez v Chase Manhattan Bank, 71 AD3d 967, 968; see Teodoro v C.W. Brown, Inc., 200 AD3d at 998).

Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel production of Erick Velez, Richard Walker, Ray Paez, and Leroy Knight as additional witnesses for depositions. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the witnesses who had already testified on behalf of the defendants had insufficient knowledge or were otherwise inadequate and that there was a substantial likelihood that the additional witnesses the plaintiff sought to depose possessed information material and necessary to the prosecution of the case (see Navarrete v First Steps Trans., Inc., 243 AD3d 916, 918-919; Heins v Vanbourgondien, 180 AD3d 1019, 1026).

Finally, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the defendants' cross-motion which was to preclude the plaintiff from filing further discovery motions without leave of the court (see Klein v New York City Tr. Auth., 201 AD3d 501, 502; Clarke v Clarke, 113 AD3d 646, 646-647).

BARROS, J.P., WAN, MCCORMACK and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court