2025 IL App (1st) 242110 Opinion filed December 10, 2025
FIRST DISTRICT THIRD DIVISION
No. 1-24-2110
AMY M. LEWIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 21 L 9530 ) JANET KALBHEN, an Individual, and ) VANTIUS, INC., an Illinois Domestic ) Business Corporation, ) Honorable ) Eileen M. O’Connor, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 On January 21, 2020, Janet Kalbhen (Kalbhen) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage
against her husband, Carl. Kalbhen was represented by the law firm Beermann LLP (Beermann).
During the course of the divorce proceedings, Beermann retained a private detective agency,
Vantius, Inc. (Vantius), to conduct a check on the license plate of a vehicle suspected of belonging
to Carl’s girlfriend. The license plate check showed that the vehicle belonged to plaintiff.
Beermann then directed Vantius to perform a background investigation of her. Vantius conducted
the investigation and disclosed its findings in a written report to Beermann on October 20, 2020,
revealing plaintiff’s social security number and information about her residential addresses, phone
numbers, business ownerships, traffic violations, liens, and vehicle and voter registrations. The
divorce case settled on the eve of trial, and plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against
defendants Kalbhen and Vantius, alleging that they had committed multiple privacy torts against
her in the course of conducting the background investigation and preparing and issuing the report
detailing her private information. No claims were brought against Beermann. No. 1-24-2110
¶2 Count I of plaintiff’s second amended complaint for intrusion upon seclusion alleged that
defendants committed an unauthorized intrusion into her private affairs when Kalbhen (through
Beermann) hired Vantius to investigate her, after which Vantius issued the October 20 report
detailing her personal and private information. Count II for public disclosure of private facts
alleged that Kalbhen hired Vantius with the intention to cause her severe emotional distress, after
which Vantius published the October 20 report which contained private information about her.
Count III alleged that defendants violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) (18
U.S.C. § 2721 et seq. (2018)) when Kalbhen hired Vantius, who ran a check on plaintiff’s license
plate and then disclosed private information contained in her motor vehicle records. Count IV
sought injunctive relief.
¶3 The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on all four counts,
finding that their complained-of conduct in photographing and checking the license plate,
investigating plaintiff, and preparing the October 20 report in conjunction with the underlying
divorce proceeding was fully protected by the absolute litigation privilege. The court additionally
granted summary judgment for defendants on count III on the basis that there was no violation of
the DPPA. Plaintiff now appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶4 During discovery, depositions were taken of the following witnesses: Kalbhen, Holly Jean
Baer, Madison Boland, Candace Meyers, Sergio Serritella, Matteo Serritella, and plaintiff.
¶5 Kalbhen testified that she filed for divorce from her husband Carl in January 2020 and was
represented by Beermann. In February 2020, Kalbhen’s daughter told her that she had just visited
with Carl and learned that he was dating a woman named Amy, who lived in Georgia. On
September 12, 2020, Kalbhen’s children were visiting their grandmother (Carl’s mother) when
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they saw a woman standing outside the house near an automobile with Georgia license plates.
Suspecting that the woman was the person who Carl was dating, they phoned Kalbhen to let her
know of the woman’s presence outside the grandmother’s home. Kalbhen then texted and spoke
on the phone with her good friend, Holly Jean Baer, who lived near the grandmother’s home, and
asked her to take a photograph of the automobile’s license plate. Using her cell phone, Baer took
the photograph of the license plate and sent it to Kalbhen. Kalbhen forwarded the photograph to
her divorce attorneys at Beermann, who retained a private detective agency, Vantius, to conduct a
check of the license plate which revealed that plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle. Vantius
subsequently prepared a background report on plaintiff which it e-mailed to Beermann in October
2020. The report detailed certain identifying information including her social security number.
Beermann forwarded the report to Kalbhen in October 2021. Kalbhen never had any direct
communication with Vantius, and she never disclosed plaintiff’s social security number to anyone.
Kalbhen deleted the background report from her computer at the end of 2022.
¶6 Candace Meyers, an attorney with Beermann and the lead counsel in Kalbhen’s divorce
case, testified that another attorney in the firm, Madison Boland, contacted Vantius to run a check
on the license plate. Vantius routinely performs background checks and financial investigations
for Beermann. The license plate check identified plaintiff as the owner of the vehicle.
¶7 Boland testified that after the license plate check, she called Vantius’s president, Sergio
Serritella, and asked him to perform a background investigation and report on plaintiff. When
asked whether there was a written agreement between Beermann and Vantius with regard to the
background report on plaintiff, Boland testified no. Boland explained that such an informal
arrangement was not unusual because she had worked with Sergio for a long time, and that he
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generally would just orally inform her of the cost of the investigation, and she would relay that
information to the higher-ups in the firm.
¶8 Boland’s purpose in requesting the background report was to uncover information as to
whether Kalbhen’s husband Carl was dissipating marital assets by spending them on plaintiff and
also whether plaintiff was spending money on Carl to such a degree that she was effectively
another source of income for him. Boland and Meyers explained that a spouse’s sources of income
are always relevant in divorce cases because they affect how the court will distribute the marital
assets and whether and to what extent it will award maintenance. Sergio provided the requested
background report on October 20, 2020, which included plaintiff’s social security number as well
as information regarding her traffic violations, business ownerships, residential addresses and
phone numbers, property tax information, and vehicle and voter registrations.
¶9 Meyers explained that plaintiff’s social security number was provided because it could be
used to subpoena her bank records and obtain other financial information helpful for determining
whether Carl was dissipating marital assets by spending them on her and also whether plaintiff
was a source of income for Carl. Plaintiff subsequently provided financial records and gave a
deposition that showed that she and Carl exchanged gifts and visited each other out-of-state and
that she paid for the hotel room where they stayed in Florida in 2020 and also gave Carl $10,000
to help him pay his attorney fees in the underlying divorce litigation. Boland testified that
plaintiff’s deposition indicated that she was “financially entangled” with Carl.
¶ 10 Sergio testified consistently with Boland and Meyers that he “received a communication
from Beermann Law” to run a license plate check on a vehicle and then prepare a background
report on the owner of the vehicle. Sergio conducted the check on the license plate number that
was provided to him, revealing that plaintiff was the owner. Sergio’s brother, Matteo, another
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employee of Vantius, then prepared the background report by using certain proprietary databases
to generate information on plaintiff’s corporate filings, business names, property tax assessments,
residential and e-mail addresses and phone numbers, traffic violations, liens, and voter and vehicle
registrations. The report also contained plaintiff’s social security number. Sergio explained that
the social security number was provided to facilitate Beermann’s ability to issue subpoenas to
banks and uncover financial information relevant to Kalbhen’s dissipation claim against Carl.
¶ 11 Sergio stated that he did not bill Beermann for the license plate check and background
investigation and report because they did not take much time to perform. Sergio explained that he
had a long-standing relationship with Beermann which provided him and his company a lot of
work. As a sort of thank-you for the long-standing business relationship, he decided not to charge
Beermann for the relatively short amount of work entailed in investigating plaintiff.
¶ 12 Following the completion of discovery, the circuit court granted summary judgment for
defendants on all counts. The court found that plaintiff’s claims against Kalbhen were premised
on her conduct in asking her friend to take a photograph of the vehicle parked in front of her
mother-in-law’s house and forwarding that photograph to her divorce attorneys at Beermann.
Plaintiff’s claims against Vantius were premised on its running of a license plate check on the
vehicle and then investigating plaintiff and providing Beermann with the resultant background
report identifying her personal information. The court found that all of defendants’ complained-of
actions and communications were protected under the absolute litigation privilege and therefore
defendants were immune from liability. In addition to granting summary judgment for defendants
on counts I through IV on the basis of the absolute litigation privilege, the court separately
examined count III, which alleged a violation of the DPPA. The court found that defendants’
disclosure of plaintiff’s personal information was permissible under section 2721 of the DPPA (18
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U.S.C. § 2721 (2018)) and therefore also granted their motion for summary judgment on count III
on that basis. Plaintiff appeals.
¶ 13 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveal that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ledeaux
v. Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2024 IL App (1st) 220886, ¶ 38. Review is de novo. Id.
¶ 14 Our analysis will consider the order granting summary judgment in parts. We will address
the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment for Kalbhen and then for Vantius on counts I
and II (privacy torts) based on the absolute litigation privilege. Next, we will consider the circuit
court’s order for both defendants on count III (DPPA). Finally, we will address the circuit court’s
order granting summary judgment for both defendants on count IV (injunctive relief).
¶ 15 First, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the absolute litigation
privilege protects Kalbhen from liability on counts I and II for intrusion upon seclusion and public
disclosure of public facts.
¶ 16 The absolute litigation privilege immunizes statements by attorneys during the course of
litigation. Goodman v. Goodman, 2023 IL App (2d) 220086, ¶ 25. The privilege is based on section
586 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that an attorney is “absolutely privileged
to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed
judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial
proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977). The privilege is intended to secure attorneys “the
utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.” Id. § 586 cmt. a. It also furthers
the attorney’s ability to communicate fully and fearlessly with his client and to encourage the free
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flow of truthful information to the courts. O’Callaghan v. Satherlie, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152,
¶ 24. The privilege applies to communications before, during, or after litigation, regardless of
defendant’s motive in making that communication. Bedin v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital,
2021 IL App (1st) 190723, ¶ 40. The only requirement for the application of the privilege is that
the communication must pertain to proposed or pending litigation (Scarpelli v. McDermott Will &
Emery LLP, 2018 IL App (1st) 170874, ¶ 19), meaning that as long as the communication relates
to the litigation and is in furtherance of representation, the privilege applies. Id. All doubts are
resolved in favor of finding the communication pertinent to the litigation. Id.
¶ 17 Under section 587 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a private party to the litigation
enjoys the same privilege. See Bedin, 2021 IL App (1st) 190723, ¶ 39 (citing Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 587 (1977)). Comment a to section 587 explains that “[t]he privilege stated in this
Section is based upon the public interest in according to all men the utmost freedom of access to
the courts of justice for the settlement of their private disputes. Like the privilege of an attorney,
it is absolute.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 cmt. a (1977).
¶ 18 The privilege originally began to protect attorneys and parties from defamation claims (id.
§§ 586-587), but it has been extended to other causes of action. For example, in Johnson v. Johnson
& Bell, Ltd., 2014 IL App (1st) 122677, we held that the privilege applied to protect a party and
its attorneys from allegations of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of
contract, and invasion of privacy. Id. ¶ 1, ¶¶ 16-17. We noted that the privilege would be
meaningless if a simple recasting of the cause of action from defamation to a privacy tort or to
another cause of action could void its effect. Id. ¶ 17; see Bedin, 2021 IL App (1st) 190723, ¶ 46
(holding that the absolute litigation privilege protected a party from an intentional infliction of
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emotional distress claim that was premised on statements made in contemplation of, and that were
pertinent to, a pending guardianship action).
¶ 19 The privilege also has been extended beyond communications to conduct performed in the
litigation setting, when such conduct is pertinent to proposed or pending litigation. See
O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 27; Scarpelli, 2018 IL App (1st) 170874, ¶ 25. We
review de novo whether the privilege applies in a cause. Scarpelli, 2018 IL App (1st) 170874, ¶ 14.
¶ 20 None of the parties dispute that the absolute litigation privilege applies to protect a party’s
and an attorney’s communications and conduct from the allegations of intrusion upon seclusion
and public disclosure of public facts contained in counts I and II, as long as such communications
and/or conduct pertain to the underlying divorce litigation. The issue with respect to Kalbhen is
whether her conduct in this case, specifically, her request to Holly Jean Baer to take a photograph
of the license plate of the vehicle parked in front of her mother-in-law’s house and then forwarding
that photograph to her attorneys at Beermann, was pertinent to the underlying divorce litigation.
¶ 21 Kalbhen testified she asked Baer to photograph the license plate and forwarded it to
Beermann due to her suspicion that the vehicle belonged to the person dating her husband, Carl,
and that she was curious about that person’s identity. Kalbhen’s divorce attorneys, Boland and
Meyers, testified that after receiving the photograph, Boland directed Vantius to run a check of the
license plate, revealing that plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle. Boland then directed Vantius to
run a background investigation on plaintiff, which ultimately led to plaintiff being subpoenaed and
testifying to her financial entanglement with Carl, including her paying $10,000 of his attorney
fees in the divorce litigation.
¶ 22 Boland and Meyers testified that plaintiff’s testimony regarding her financial
entanglement with Carl was relevant to whether he was dissipating marital assets and whether she
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was a source of income for him, all of which could be considered when the court distributed assets
under section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750
ILCS 5/503 (West 2020)). Clearly, Kalbhen’s conduct that led to the identification and deposing
of plaintiff was pertinent to the divorce litigation and, as such, was protected by the absolute
litigation privilege.
¶ 23 Plaintiff counters, though, that the dissipation claim was not yet pending at the time
Kalbhen procured the photograph of the license plate and forwarded it to Beermann and therefore
the absolute litigation privilege did not then apply to protect her from liability for the alleged
privacy torts in counts I and II. Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. At the time the photograph was
taken, Kalbhen already had hired Beermann to represent her in the divorce proceedings, and
Beermann was considering whether to bring a dissipation claim on Kalbhen’s behalf; as discussed,
the photograph led to Beermann discovering plaintiff’s identity and to her subsequent deposition,
all of which provided information regarding the potential dissipation claim as well as information
about her financial entanglement with Carl. On these facts, Kalbhen’s conduct in procuring the
photograph and forwarding it to Beermann was pertinent to the divorce litigation and, as such, was
privileged.
¶ 24 Plaintiff also argues that the absolute litigation privilege does not protect Kalbhen from
liability for the privacy torts alleged in counts I and II because she admitted in her deposition in
the divorce case that her impetus for initiating the investigation of plaintiff was merely to satisfy
her own curiosity about the nature of plaintiff’s relationship with Carl and she was unsure how
such information would be of use to her attorneys at Beermann. In effect, plaintiff is arguing that
Kalbhen’s motives in procuring the photograph of the license plate and forwarding it to Beermann
had nothing to do with the litigation but only with her “prurient” interest in whether Carl was
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engaging in sex with plaintiff. However, Kalbhen’s motives underlying her conduct are irrelevant
for determining whether the absolute litigation privilege applies (see Bedin, 2021 IL App (1st)
190723, ¶ 40); the only requirement for application of the privilege is that the conduct pertained
to the divorce litigation. Scarpellli, 2018 IL App (1st) 170874, ¶ 19. As discussed extensively
above, Kalbhen’s conduct pertained to the divorce litigation and is protected by the privilege.
Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kalbhen on counts I and II.
¶ 25 Next, we address whether the circuit court correctly determined that the absolute litigation
privilege protects Vantius from liability for the privacy torts alleged in counts I and II because its
complained-of conduct (performing the license plate check and then investigating plaintiff and
disclosing her private information in the background report) was pertinent to the divorce litigation.
Plaintiff questions the applicability of the privilege to Vantius, as it is a private detective agency,
not an attorney or a party to the underlying divorce litigation.
¶ 26 None of the parties have cited any Illinois state cases factually similar to the instant case,
where the private detective or investigator has been sued for privacy torts allegedly committed
during his investigative work on behalf of an attorney and he has asserted the absolute litigation
privilege as a defense. The one state court case cited, Goodman, 2023 IL App (2d) 220086, ¶ 16,
involved a complaint brought by the wife against her ex-husband for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on the hiring of private investigators to conduct surveillance on her. The
appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the ex-husband on the basis of
the absolute litigation privilege, finding that the surveillance and its disclosure was pertinent to
issues in the parties’ underlying divorce proceedings. Id. ¶ 31. No suits were brought against the
private investigators themselves, and thus the absolute litigation privilege was not asserted on their
behalf.
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¶ 27 The parties have cited one factually similar case from the federal court, Steffes v. Stepan
Co., No. 96 C 8225, 1997 WL 305306 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 1997). In Steffes, the plaintiff was
employed by Stepan Company (Stepan) from 1978 through June 1996, working mostly in Stepan’s
maintenance warehouse. Id. at *1. In December 1993, Stepan placed the plaintiff on paid medical
leave and never reinstated her. Id. The plaintiff later filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission alleging that Stepan discriminated against her because of her allergies
and breathing difficulties. Id. Stepan was represented by the law firm of Seyfarth, Shaw,
Fairweather & Geraldson (Seyfarth). Id.
¶ 28 In October 1996, the plaintiff filed answers to Seyfarth’s interrogatories in the
discrimination case, stating that a placement agency, First Choice Temporary Service, Inc. (First
Choice) had found her employment with Dow Chemical (Dow). Id. Seyfarth directed Stepan’s
human resources manager, Charles Worden, to call Dow and ask whether the plaintiff worked
there. Id. Worden called Dow, discovered that the plaintiff worked there, and informed Dow that
the plaintiff had sued Stepan for discrimination and that she had a weight restriction and could not
work near chemicals. Id. Dow subsequently told First Choice to inform the plaintiff not to return
to work until she disclosed her medical restrictions. Id. The plaintiff then sued the defendants,
Seyfarth, Stepan, and Worden, for retaliation and intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, alleging that as a result of Worden’s actions, she was temporarily deprived
of her job and that Dow will never hire her as anything other than a contractual employee through
First Choice. Id.
¶ 29 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Id. The district court granted the motion, agreeing
with Worden and Stepan’s argument that the absolute litigation privilege Seyfarth would have had
in communicating with Dow should be extended to Worden because he was acting as Seyfarth’s
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agent when he called Dow. Id. at *3. In so ruling, the court noted that “[c]ases from other
jurisdictions have consistently found that investigators acting on behalf of attorneys should be
accorded the same privilege as the attorneys themselves.” Id. The court cited several cases in
support including Leavitt v. Bickerton, 855 F. Supp. 455 (D. Mass. 1994), which we proceed to
discuss.
¶ 30 In Leavitt, the mother of a brain-damaged child brought suit against her obstetrician for
malpractice. Id. at 456. The mother’s attorney sent a letter about the suit to the medical school
where the obstetrician taught. Id. In turn, the obstetrician sued the mother and her attorneys for
libel. Id. While investigating the libel case, a private investigator working for the obstetrician’s
attorney spoke with the mother’s former employers and implied to them that the child’s brain
damage was caused by the mother’s alcohol use during her pregnancy. Id. The mother sued the
obstetrician’s attorney and the investigator for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id.
¶ 31 The investigator moved to dismiss the counts against him, arguing that the allegedly
defamatory statements were absolutely privileged as they were made in the course of the
underlying litigation. Id. The district court agreed and granted the dismissal motion, stating:
“[I]t is of little significance that the statements made to [the mother’s] former employers
were made by a private investigator and not by an attorney. The privilege conferred upon
attorneys relates to their function as an advocate on behalf of their client, as is evidenced
by the requirement that statements be made in the context of pending or ongoing litigation.
[Citation.] Thus, insofar as [the investigator] was engaged in a function which would be
protected had it been undertaken by an attorney, he is entitled to absolute immunity while
acting as an agent of an attorney.” Id. at 458.
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¶ 32 We agree with Leavitt and with Steffes that when an investigator is performing his
investigative work on behalf of and as an agent of an attorney, the investigator is entitled to the
same absolute litigation privilege as that enjoyed by the attorney. The purpose of the privilege is
to provide attorneys with the “ ‘utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients’ ”
(Kurczaba v. Pollock, 318 Ill. App. 3d 686, 701-02 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 586 cmt. a, at 247 (1977)), to further their ability to fully and fearlessly communicate with their
clients, and to promote the free flow of truthful information to the courts. Scarpelli, 2018 IL App
(1st) 170874, ¶ 17. These purposes would be undermined if the investigator retained by the
attorney to investigate his client’s claims was subject to liability for the statements made and/or
the conduct performed in furtherance of that investigation; the threat of such liability could
potentially inhibit the investigator in his work and dissuade him from fully communicating with
the attorney, thereby disrupting the attorney’s ability to fully communicate with and secure justice
for his client, as well as hampering the free flow of truthful information to the courts. The extension
of the privilege to an investigator working as an agent of an attorney is in accord with the principles
underlying the privilege and is consistent with case law which has similarly extended and
“modernized” the privilege. Id. ¶¶ 20, 25 (discussing how the privilege has been modernized and
extended to various out-of-court communications not originally intended, as well as to causes of
action outside of defamation, and to conduct beyond mere communications). We emphasize that
the privilege accorded to investigators is the exact same one enjoyed by attorneys during the course
of litigation, requiring that the investigator’s communications and conduct pertain to the litigation
in order for the privilege to apply.
¶ 33 Plaintiff argues that Vantius should not be deemed to have been retained by or acting as an
agent on behalf of Beermann at the time it checked the license plate and prepared the background
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report because it “undertook its intrusive investigations gratuitously, without any formal
engagement, and with the sole purpose of currying favor with Beermann.” Plaintiff’s argument is
belied by Sergio and Boland, each of whom testified to how Boland expressly retained Vantius on
behalf of Beermann to investigate plaintiff and prepare a background report on her in connection
with the underlying divorce litigation. They further explained that given the long-standing
relationship between Beermann and Vantius and the relatively short amount of time needed to
complete the investigation, no formal written agreement was entered into and no payment received.
Sergio explained that such an arrangement was not unusual and that despite the lack of a written
agreement and payment, Vantius only performed the investigative work at Boland’s express
direction and as part of its relationship with Beermann. Sergio and Boland’s testimony make clear
that Vantius was acting on behalf of Beermann and as its agent for purposes of the requested
investigative work.
¶ 34 Plaintiff argues, though, that neither Boland nor anyone else at Beermann ever informed
Sergio about the underlying divorce case and the suspicion that plaintiff was Carl’s paramour,
leaving Sergio unaware as to why Vantius was being asked to prepare the background report on
plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that Beermann’s failure to inform Sergio of the divorce litigation and
the nature and scope of the allegations and claims therein indicates that Beermann never formally
retained Vantius or entered into a principal-agent relationship with it. Again, plaintiff’s argument
is belied by Sergio and Boland’s testimony regarding how Beermann expressly retained Vantius
to run the check on plaintiff’s license plate and prepare the background report on her. Also, the
report itself is captioned “IRMO Kalbhen,” indicating that in fact Sergio was made aware of the
report’s intended use in an underlying divorce proceeding.
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¶ 35 Turning to an examination of Vantius’s work in this case, the purpose of its check of the
license plate was to determine the owner of the vehicle, who was suspected of being Carl’s
paramour. Once plaintiff was identified as the vehicle’s owner, Vantius prepared the background
report on her to facilitate the investigation into whether Carl was dissipating assets and whether
plaintiff was a source of income for Carl, all of which would affect the court’s distribution of assets
under section 503 of the Marriage Act. As such, Vantius’s check of the license plate and the
preparation of the background report was pertinent to the divorce litigation. Therefore, the absolute
litigation privilege protects Vantius from liability under counts I and II.
¶ 36 Plaintiff argues, though, that the background report prepared by Vantius was not pertinent
to any dissipation claims in the underlying divorce litigation, as the report provided “all-
encompassing and egregiously intrusive analyses of Plaintiff’s private and personally identifiable
information *** over a span of at least 35 years.” Plaintiff contends that the 35-year span of the
report makes it irrelevant to any dissipation claim, as the Marriage Act expressly provides that
“no dissipation shall be deemed to have occurred *** prior to 5 years before the filing of the
petition for dissolution of marriage.” 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2)(iv) (West 2020).
¶ 37 Plaintiff misconstrues the nature of the report. The report itself was not intended to show
whether Carl was dissipating assets by spending marital funds on plaintiff, but rather to provide
background information on plaintiff that would facilitate further investigation into the dissipation
claim as well into any financial entanglement between Carl and plaintiff (such as shared bank
accounts, vehicles, real estate, or businesses) affecting the distribution of marital assets. The report
provided Beermann with certain identifying information about plaintiff, including her date of birth
and social security number, from which it could distinguish her from other persons with the same
name, and also provided addresses to serve her with subpoenas and disclosed details regarding her
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businesses, vehicles, and properties going back many years. From all this information, Beermann
then could conduct further discovery into the level of any financial entanglement between plaintiff
and Carl, as well as whether Carl had been dissipating marital assets within the last five years by
transferring them to her bank accounts or distributing them to her businesses identified in the
report. Clearly, then, the report was pertinent to the divorce litigation and was protected under the
absolute litigation privilege.
¶ 38 Plaintiff focuses much of her argument on the report’s disclosure of her social security
number, contending that the privilege does not apply to the disclosure of such private information
unrelated to the underlying divorce litigation. As discussed, though, plaintiff’s social security
number was pertinent to identify and distinguish her from other persons with the same name;
further, Boland, Meyers, and Sergio testified that plaintiff’s social security number was provided
because it could be used in subpoenaing her bank records, which were relevant to determining the
level of her financial entanglement with Carl as well as whether he had dissipated any marital
assets by transferring them to her accounts. Given the pertinence of plaintiff’s social security
number in Beermann’s investigation of the dissipation claim and of her financial entanglement
with Carl, its disclosure in the report was protected by the privilege.
¶ 39 Plaintiff argues that applying the absolute litigation privilege in this case would “eviscerate
the privacy rights of innocent third parties who just happen to come across the radar of overzealous
private investigators and litigants who want to pry into every facet of those third parties’ protected
personal information.” Plaintiff contends that this “astonishing precedent would run head-first into
the expanding statutory and common-law protections of individuals’ privacy rights.”
¶ 40 In support, plaintiff cites the Personal Information Protection Act (Information Act) (815
ILCS 530/10 (West 2020)), which provides that any “data collector that owns or licenses personal
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information concerning an Illinois resident shall notify the resident at no charge that there has been
a breach of the security of the system data following discovery or notification of the breach.” The
Information Act also requires any data collector to “implement and maintain reasonable security
measures to protect those records [containing personal information] from unauthorized access,
acquisition, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.” Id. § 45(a). Plaintiff also cites Flores v.
Aon Corp., 2023 IL App (1st) 230140, ¶ 24, which analyzed the Information Act and held that the
Aon Corporation had a common-law duty to protect the personal information of its clients in
addition to its duty under the Information Act.
¶ 41 Plaintiff contends we should analyze the absolute litigation privilege through the “new
prism” of the Information Act and Flores, which has elevated and provided new protections for
individuals’ privacy rights, and hold that defendants here “should not be protected in their
unbridled investigations into 35 years of highly sensitive private information of an innocent third
party.” Initially, we note that the Information Act is not a “new prism,” as several cases addressing
the privilege have been decided subsequent to its enactment, none of which held that the privilege
is affected by the protections. See, e.g., Goodman, 2023 IL App (2d) 220086; Bedin, 2021 IL App
(1st) 190723. Further, the privilege itself prevents “unbridled investigations” into “highly sensitive
private information,” as it only protects communications and conduct pertinent to proposed or
pending litigation. See Scarpelli, 2018 IL App (1st) 170874, ¶ 19. The information detailed here
in the background report prepared by Vantius was pertinent to the underlying divorce litigation
and thus protected by the privilege and its disclosure to Beermann does not run afoul of any
requirements of the Information Act. We affirm the grant of summary judgment for Vantius on
counts I and II.
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¶ 42 Plaintiff argues, though, that the order granting summary judgment for both defendants on
counts I and II should be reversed because the circuit court erred by deciding that the absolute
litigation privilege applied “without any meaningful determination of any connection between the
[i]nvestigations and the divorce proceeding.” Plaintiff contends that the court applied an incorrect
standard by analyzing whether the information disclosed in the license plate check and in the
background report had been disseminated to parties unrelated to the litigation, which “has nothing
to do with the absolute litigation privilege and pertains at most to the elements of certain of
Plaintiff’s causes of action [for invasion of privacy].” Plaintiff asserts that the court instead should
have focused on whether the disclosed information pertained to the underlying divorce litigation,
as required for a determination that the privilege applied in the first instance.
¶ 43 Review of the summary judgment hearing shows that although the court discussed whether
the information contained in the report had been disseminated to unrelated third parties, it
specifically found that the absolute litigation privilege applied to Kalbhen and Vantius because
their complained-of conduct and communications pertained to the underlying divorce litigation.
Specifically, the court stated with regard to Kalbhen:
“[T]he issue with respect to Janet Kalbhen is that she, in fact, had her friend take a
photo of [plaintiff’s] license plate. The evidence establishes to me that the intent
and purpose of that was, at least in part, to obtain the identity of and identify this
witness for purposes of her divorce proceeding against Mr. Kalbhen. *** I do find
that that action would be—is barred or is protected by the absolute litigation
privilege. It’s clear to me that that action was taken in relation to and for the
furtherance of identifying who [plaintiff] was for the purposes of the underlying
divorce.”
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¶ 44 With regard to Vantius, the court stated:
“The court has to look at whether [the background check] bears some relation to
the litigation. *** [T]he comprehensive background check was requested by the
attorneys as part of the litigation for a multitude of reasons, one of which was
potentially to investigate the dissipation claim. *** The question at hand is whether
the subject spouse dissipated [marital] assets to [plaintiff]. *** There is also
evidence that [plaintiff] did pay some of the attorney fees. *** [T]he comprehensive
background check and obtaining her identity by getting the photo of the license
plate did bear some relevance and pertinency to a contentious divorce proceeding
in which the question of finances is at the core of any distribution of marital
property in a nonfault state like the state of Illinois. So for all of those reasons, I do
find that Vantius’s actions are also protected by the absolute litigation privilege.”
¶ 45 On this record, the circuit court utilized the correct standard (the pertinence of the
communication and conduct to the underlying litigation) for determining the applicability of the
absolute litigation privilege. We find no error. Further, even if the circuit court had employed an
incorrect standard, our result here would be the same. Our de novo review of the summary
judgment order shows that all of defendants’ complained-of conduct and communications
pertained to the underlying divorce litigation and were protected by the absolute litigation
privilege. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on counts I
and II. See Moore v. Pendavinji, 2024 IL App (1st) 231305, ¶ 20 (when conducting de novo
review, we may affirm the circuit court’s judgment on any basis in the record, regardless of
whether the court relied on that basis or its reasoning was correct).
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¶ 46 Next, we address the grant of summary judgment for defendants on count III, which alleged
that they violated the DPPA when Kalbhen (through Beermann) hired Vantius to run a check on
the license plate, after which Vantius disclosed plaintiff’s motor vehicle records and certain
personal information contained therein, including her social security number. The court granted
summary judgment for defendants on count III on the basis that the absolute litigation privilege
protects them from liability for their alleged violation of the DPPA and, additionally, because
defendants’ disclosure of plaintiff’s personal information was permissible under section 2721 of
the DPPA (18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2018)).
¶ 47 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the absolute litigation privilege should not be extended to
protect against liability for a statutory cause of action under the DPPA. We need not address this
issue, because we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the alternative basis that, under the
facts of this case, the disclosure of plaintiff’s personal information was permissible under the
DPPA.
¶ 48 Section 2724(a) of the DPPA (id. § 2724(a)) generally prohibits a person from knowingly
obtaining, disclosing, or using personal information from a motor vehicle record, subject to an
exception for when the disclosures are for a permitted purpose under section 2721. Section 2721
states that personal information obtained from a motor vehicle record may be disclosed for use in
connection with any civil proceeding in any federal or state court (id. § 2721(b)(4)) and for use by
“any licensed private investigative agency *** for any purpose permitted under this subsection.”
Id. § 2721(b)(8). As extensively discussed earlier in this opinion, the information obtained from
plaintiff’s motor vehicle records, including her identity and social security number, were properly
disclosed to Beermann by Vantius, a licensed private investigative agency, for use in the
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underlying divorce litigation. As such, the disclosure was for a permissible purpose under the
DPPA. We affirm the grant of summary judgment for defendants on count III.
¶ 49 Finally, we address count IV, which sought injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from
disseminating plaintiff’s private information contained in the background report and requiring
defendants to delete all such information. To be entitled to injunctive relief, plaintiff must show
that she has a clear and ascertainable right that needs protecting, she will suffer irreparable harm
if injunctive relief is denied, and she has no adequate remedy at law. City of Rock Falls v. Aims
Industrial Services, LLC, 2024 IL 129164, ¶ 19. Plaintiff makes no argument on appeal that she
has made the requisite showings entitling her to injunctive relief nor has she cited any case law in
support thereof. The issue is forfeited. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1,
2020). We affirm the order granting summary judgment for defendants on count IV.
¶ 50 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants on all four counts of plaintiff’s second amended complaint.
¶ 51 Affirmed.
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Lewis v. Kalbhen, 2025 IL App (1st) 242110
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 21-L-9530; the Hon. Eileen M. O’Connor, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Hillard M. Sterling and Veronica Coyne, of Roetzel & Andress, for LPA, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Joshua J. Muench and Esther Joy Schwartz, of Schwartz for Gilligan, of Chicago, for appellee Janet Kalbhen. Appellee: Erik J. Ives and L. Brandon Liss, of Fox Swibel Levin & Carroll LLP, of Chicago, for other appellee.
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