Lewis v. Exxon Corp.

451 So. 2d 24
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 11, 1984
DocketNo. 14984
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 451 So. 2d 24 (Lewis v. Exxon Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Exxon Corp., 451 So. 2d 24 (La. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinion

COVINGTON, Judge.

This is a suit for damages brought by Vernon L. Lewis against Exxon Corporation (Exxon) and Robert D. Litt, a section supervisor for Exxon1. The worker’s compensation insurer, Associated Indemnity Corporation, intervened for recovery of the compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff.' [26]*26Exxon brought a third party action against H.E. Wiese, Inc. (Wiese) and its insurer, Aetna Insurance Company, based on an indemnity clause in its contract with Wiese, and a third party action against Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. (Tyler) and its insurer, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claim on the grounds that the plaintiff was a statutory employee of Exxon and a co-employee of Litt. The trial court also dismissed the third party claim by Exxon against Tyler and its insurer, and Wiese and its insurer. Further, the court dismissed the intervention of Associated Indemnity Company, plaintiff’s worker’s compensation carrier. This Court affirmed, 441 So.2d 192, the trial court’s decision, and the plaintiff obtained writs from the Louisiana Supreme Court, which reversed both lower courts on the issue that plaintiff was a statutory employee of Exxon Corporation, and remanded the case to this Court for a determination of the liability of the defendants and the quantum due to the plaintiff, in the event of liability.

The facts in this case are not in serious dispute and have been stated in our previous decision.2

An accident happened on March 10,1977, at the Exxon chemical plant in East Baton Rouge Parish. Lewis was employed as a pipefitter/welder by Wiese, which had entered into a contract with Exxon to convert an existing ethanol unit to production of isopropanol. While Lewis was welding a 'flange on a gas line, in order to install a metering device, a seal plug, which had been inserted in the line to isolate a section thereof, blew out, causing severe injuries to plaintiff’s left arm and shoulder.

The line involved was one carrying gas from the Exxon refinery for use in the chemical plant. For internal accounting purposes, the refinery would bill the chemical plant for gas supplied. Since all of the gas was not used, Exxon needed to measure the gas so that an accounting could be made. The job that plaintiff (and the Wiese crew) was working on at the time of the accident was installing a metering device on the line for this purpose. Prior to the accident a “hot-work permit” had been issued by defendant Litt certifying that the area in which Lewis was to weld was safe for that purpose, a test having been conducted to check for combustible gases and the line having been purged by nitrogen.

Shortly before the accident, a portion of the gas line had been cut out after purging and testing the line. The work area was then isolated, by using a heavy seal plug. The plug was inserted just before plaintiff’s welding of the flange. As plaintiff commenced the welding, the,plug blew out, causing the injuries to plaintiff.

Lewis bases his claim for damages upon Exxon's negligence and/or strict liability as the owner and custodian of the pipe on which he was working. The criteria for determining Exxon’s duty and the risk to Lewis, and ultimately its liability, was set out in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Company, 418 So.2d 493, 497 (La.1982), as follows:

In a typical negligence case against the owner of a thing (such as a tree) which is actively involved in the causation of injury, the claimant must prove that something about the thing created an unreasonable risk of injury that resulted in the damage, that the owner knew or should have known of that risk, and that the owner nevertheless failed to render the thing safe or to take adequate steps to prevent the damage caused by the thing. Under traditional negligence concepts, the knowledge (actual or constructive) gives rise to the duty to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious consequences resulting from the risk, and no responsibility is placed on the owner who acted reasonably but nevertheless failed to discover that the thing presented an unreasonable risk of harm.
In a strict liability case against the same owner, the claimant is relieved only of proving that the owner knew or should have known of the risk involved.

[27]*27The evidence in this case discloses that Exxon exercised exclusive control over all engineering, safety and operational decisions related to the work performed by Wiese and its employees. Exxon’s engineers made all decisions concerning procedures used on this project. The testimony of Exxon’s employees indicates that Exxon personnel supervised all work, conducted the tests necessary to determine the presence of gases in the pipeline and issued the “hot work permit” only after all safety procedures had purportedly been followed, and Exxon concluded it was safe for Lewis to weld the flanges onto the pipe.

These procedures included inspection of the pipe by Litt, purging the line of hydrocarbons by the injection of nitrogen into the line, inserting the seal plug in the pipe to isolate any remaining hydrocarbons after the purge, and testing the area in front of the seal plug to determine the presence or absence of combustible material in that part of the pipe. All of the procedures were performed by Exxon employees before the “hot work permit” was issued and the work by Lewis was begun. Even if Exxon followed their so-called normal procedures in determining that the pipe was “safe” to work on, it is evident that the procedures employed were faulty. The purging of the pipe took place about twenty hours before the cold cutting of the pipe. This lapse of time allowed gases leaking from the valve to reenter the pipe. After the cold-cut section of the pipe was removed, air entered the pipe and mixed with hydrocarbons, forming a combustible mixture. Then the seal plug was inserted in order to isolate the section of the pipe to be welded and contain any gases in the pipe behind the seal plug. After the accident Exxon tested the line for hydrocarbons and found that the pipe contained 3% ethane, 28% propylene, 63% propane, 2% isopropy-lether, 1% isopropylalcohol and 3% hydrogen.

The traditional test of negligence in cases of this type requires the plaintiff prove that the thing within the defendant’s custody and control created an unreason-able risk of injury which resulted in injury and damages. In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew or should have known of that risk, and that the owner, nevertheless failed to render the thing safe or to take reasonable steps to prevent the injury caused by the thing. This knowledge, whether actual or constructive, gives rise to the duty to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious consequences resulting from the risk, and so, responsibility is not placed on the owner who acted reasonably, but, nevertheless, failed to discover that the thing presented an unreasonable risk of harm. Buchanan v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury, 426 So.2d 720 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).

To apply this test to the facts of this case we have reviewed the testimony concerning Exxon’s knowledge of the risk and the steps it took to avoid an accident. There is no doubt that Exxon owed a duty to take steps to protect against an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff. We find that Exxon failed to take those reasonable steps to protect him, and thus violated this duty.

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Bluebook (online)
451 So. 2d 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewis-v-exxon-corp-lactapp-1984.