14‐193‐pr Lewis v. Connecticut Commissioner of Correction
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit ________
AUGUST TERM, 2014
ARGUED: OCTOBER 22, 2014 DECIDED: MAY 14, 2015 AMENDED: JUNE 22, 2015
No. 14‐193‐pr
SCOTT LEWIS, Petitioner‐Appellee,
v.
CONNECTICUT COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION, Respondent‐Appellant. ________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. No. 3 Civ. 196 – Charles S. Haight, Jr., Judge. ________
Before: WINTER, WALKER, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges. ________
In 1990, a jury convicted Petitioner Scott Lewis of murdering
Ricardo Turner and Lamont Fields. The government’s case against 2 No. 14‐193‐pr
Lewis depended almost entirely on the testimony of its key
witness―Ovil Ruiz. At the time of Lewis’s trial, however, the State
failed to disclose to the defense that Ruiz had repeatedly denied
having any knowledge of the murders and only implicated Lewis
after a police detective promised to let Ruiz go if he gave a statement
in which he admitted to being the getaway driver and incriminated
Lewis and another individual, Stefon Morant. Lewis now seeks
habeas relief on the grounds that the State of Connecticut denied his
constitutional right to a fair trial when it withheld exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Charles
S. Haight, Jr., Judge) granted Lewis’s habeas petition on the basis of
the Brady violation. We agree with the district court and AFFIRM the
grant of habeas corpus.
________
BRETT DIGNAM (Elora Mukherjee, on the brief), Morningside Heights Legal Services, Inc., New York, N.Y., for Petitioner‐Appellee.
MICHAEL PROTO, Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, Rocky Hill, C.T., for Respondent‐ Appellant. 3 No. 14‐193‐pr
________
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
In 1990, a jury convicted Petitioner Scott Lewis of murdering
Ricardo Turner and Lamont Fields. The government’s case against
Lewis depended almost entirely on the testimony of its key
witness―Ovil Ruiz. At the time of Lewis’s trial, however, the State
failed to disclose to the defense that Ruiz had repeatedly denied
having any knowledge of the murders and only implicated Lewis
after a police detective promised to let Ruiz go if he gave a statement
in which he admitted to being the getaway driver and incriminated
Lewis and another individual, Stefon Morant. Lewis now seeks
habeas relief on the grounds that the State of Connecticut denied his
constitutional right to a fair trial when it withheld exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Charles
S. Haight, Jr., Judge) granted Lewis’s habeas petition on the basis of
the Brady violation. We agree with the district court and AFFIRM the
grant of habeas corpus. 4 No. 14‐193‐pr
BACKGROUND
On October 11, 1990, Ricardo Turner and Lamont Fields were
shot and killed in their apartment at 634 Howard Avenue in New
Haven, Connecticut. The State charged Scott Lewis and Stefon
Morant with the murders and tried them separately in Connecticut
Superior Court. Morant was tried first and convicted of both
murders.
I. Lewis’s Trial
At trial, the State did not introduce any eyewitness testimony
or forensic evidence against Lewis. The government’s key witness,
Ovil Ruiz, was the only witness who directly implicated Lewis in the
murders. Ruiz testified at trial, in substance, as follows. On the
night of the murders, Ruiz drove Lewis and Morant to 634 Howard
Avenue and waited in the car while they went inside. While he was
waiting, he heard gunshots. Lewis and Morant then returned to the
car with gym bags containing drugs and cash. Ruiz later overheard a
conversation in which Lewis admitted to shooting Turner and 5 No. 14‐193‐pr
Fields. And two to three weeks after the murder, Ruiz saw Lewis
throw a gun into the river near the Chapel Street Bridge.
On May 10, 1995, the jury convicted Lewis on two counts of
murder and two counts of felony murder, one as to each victim. The
Superior Court sentenced Lewis principally to 120 years’
imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
affirmed Lewis’s convictions for the murders but vacated his felony
murder convictions on double jeopardy grounds. See State v. Lewis,
245 Conn. 779 (1998).
II. Subsequent Testimony
On October 25 and 26, 1999, Michael J. Sweeney, a 37‐year
veteran of the New Haven Police Department (“NHPD”)—and one
of two police detectives who questioned Ruiz on the night he first
implicated Lewis―provided critical information concerning the
circumstances in which Ruiz inculpated Lewis at the police station
on January 13‐14, 1991. At the hearing on Morant’s motion for a new 6 No. 14‐193‐pr
trial before the Honorable Judge Jon C. Blue of the Connecticut
Superior Court,1 Sweeney testified as follows.
Detective Vincent Raucci arrested Ruiz in connection with
another murder on January 13, 1991 and brought him to the New
Haven police station. Sweeney, Raucci’s supervising officer, first
questioned Ruiz about the Fields‐Turner murders. Ruiz said he did
not know anything about them. Then, Sweeney and Raucci jointly
interviewed Ruiz, who repeated that he had no information about
these murders and was not at the murder scene.
Raucci then began telling Ruiz the facts of the Fields‐Turner
case. Raucci described where the murders occurred, the apartment
building, and a scenario in which the murderers escaped with guns
in a gym bag. At that point, Sweeney asked Raucci to step outside
and told him that his interrogation approach was inappropriate.
When the detectives returned to the interrogation, Raucci told Ruiz
1 In this separate proceeding, Judge Blue denied Morant’s motion for a new trial based on his conclusion that there was extensive independent evidence implicating Morant in the murders. See Morant v. State, No. 398736, 2000 WL 804695 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 5, 2000), affʹd, 68 Conn. App. 137 (2002). This decision regarding Morant is not before us. Relevant here, however, Judge Blue determined at that hearing that Sweeney was a credible witness, and that the testimony recounted below should be credited. 7 No. 14‐193‐pr
that “he would let him go,” and that he wanted him to say “that he
was driving the car that night.” S.A. 443. Raucci also warned Ruiz
“that it was in his best interest to tell what happened [and] give a
detailed statement as to his participation and also the other two.”
S.A. 443. At that point, Ruiz started changing his statement.
Sweeney again took Raucci outside and told him to “knock it
off.” S.A. 444. Specifically, Sweeney told Raucci “don’t tell [Ruiz]
parts of the case and then five minutes later let him parrot what
you’re saying and take it as fact.” S.A. 444. When Judge Blue asked
Sweeney to clarify what information Raucci gave Ruiz, Sweeney
said, among other things, that Raucci told Ruiz “that he was present
with the two individuals, Scott Lewis and Stefon Morant.” S.A. 460.
On cross‐examination, Sweeney acknowledged that police officers
frequently divulge certain facts in order to extract additional
information from a potential suspect, but explained that Raucci was
“detailing the whole case” to Ruiz, S.A. 414, rather than telling him
“a little to get a lot,” S.A. 337. 8 No. 14‐193‐pr
Sweeney was then pulled away on another matter, so Raucci
interviewed Ruiz alone. When Sweeney returned, Raucci told him
that Ruiz wanted to give a detailed statement about his involvement
in the murders. Concerned by the significant change in Ruiz’s story,
Sweeney spoke to Ruiz alone and asked him if he was “truthful in
stating that these two persons were there and [he] drove the car.”
S.A. 446. Ruiz said “no . . . . [h]e was not telling the truth,” he
“knew nothing,” and “the information he did give . . . . was all
information gathered from Detective Raucci.” Id. Significantly, Ruiz
told Sweeney that he changed his story “because Detective Raucci
said he was gonna let him go.” Id.
Sweeney, again, confronted Raucci. At Raucci’s request,
Sweeney gave Raucci one final opportunity to interview Ruiz alone.
After that interview, Raucci told Sweeney that Ruiz wanted to say
that he “overheard these two people talking about the case, that he
wasn’t present.” S.A. 446. At that late point in the evening, Sweeney
thought that “might be true,” so he told Raucci to take the statement. 9 No. 14‐193‐pr
S.A. 446‐47. Shortly thereafter, Sweeney’s shift ended, and he did
not see Ruiz again.
In 1998, Sweeney retired from the NHPD and volunteered to
serve as a U.N. station commander, supervising police officers in
post‐war Bosnia. When he returned to the United States, he read in
a local newspaper that Raucci had resigned from the NHPD because
of misconduct. Specifically, Raucci was linked to the New Haven
drug trade; charged with larceny following an internal NHPD
investigation; arrested for a domestic‐violence incident; and, after
fleeing Connecticut as a result of the charges against him, was
ultimately arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
after a four‐hour standoff in New Mexico. Sweeney later testified
during an evidentiary hearing on Lewis’s federal habeas petition
that he came forward because he felt Ruiz was “absolutely
untruthful,” A. 39, and that the story implicating Lewis and Morant
was “fabricated,” S.A. 37.2 At Lewis’s trial in 1990, the prosecution
We also note that Sweeney’s testimony corroborates evidence obtained by 2
the FBI during an investigation of Raucci’s conduct. That evidence, which we do not take into consideration in deciding Lewis’s habeas petition, includes a letter Ruiz wrote to the FBI on August 24, 1999 in which he wrote that he “set up” 10 No. 14‐193‐pr
failed to disclose to the defense any of the circumstances of Ruiz’s
police interrogation to which Sweeney testified.
III. The State Habeas Proceedings
On January 9, 2001, Lewis filed a pro se habeas petition in
Connecticut Superior Court. He raised three claims: (1) newly
discovered evidence that Ruiz perjured himself; (2) a Brady violation
based on the State’s failure to disclose evidence of Ruiz’s prior
inconsistent statements and Raucci’s coaching of Ruiz’s testimony;
and (3) newly discovered evidence of alibi testimony. In support of
his petition, Lewis included transcripts of Sweeney’s testimony at
the Morant hearing.
The Connecticut Superior Court (Howard Zoarski, Judge)
(hereinafter, the “state habeas court”) denied Lewis’s petition. With
respect to Lewis’s Brady claim, the state habeas court concluded that
“not only was all exculpatory evidence furnished to the defense, but
also the alleged evidence was available by due diligence to the
defense.” Lewis v. Warden, No. CV‐99‐0424021‐S, 2001 WL 1203354,
Lewis for a murder he did not commit at the instigation of a “corrupted cop.” S.A. 74. 11 No. 14‐193‐pr
at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2001). The state habeas court
determined that Raucci only provided Ruiz with “insignificant
facts”―such as the location of the apartment on Howard Avenue,
the color of the buildings, and the make of Lewis’s car―and that
“the information provided by Detective Raucci . . . did not disclose
the names of the petitioner or Morant.” Id. at *2. Notably, the state
habeas decision omitted any reference to Sweeney’s testimony that
Ruiz initially denied having any knowledge of the murders, that he
was parroting what Raucci told him, and, critically, that after he
changed his story to inculpate Lewis, Ruiz told Sweeney that he did
so because “Raucci said he was gonna let him go.” S.A. 446.
Pursuant to Section 52‐470(g) of the Connecticut General
Statutes, Lewis, acting pro se, petitioned a justice on the Connecticut
Supreme Court for certification to appeal to the Connecticut
Appellate Court.3 On October 22, 2001, the certification was denied
At the time of Lewis’s petition, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52‐470(b) (1983) 3
provided that a petitioner seeking to bring an appeal before the Connecticut Appellate Court could seek certification to appeal from the judge who decided the case, a judge of the Connecticut Appellate Court, or a justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court. The Connecticut Legislature revised this statute in 12 No. 14‐193‐pr
without opinion by a one‐justice order. Lewis then filed an
uncertified appeal with the Appellate Court. In support of his
appeal, Lewis provided the Appellate Court with transcripts from
his criminal trial, the probable cause hearing, and Sweeney’s
testimony at the Morant hearing; the state habeas court decision; and
excerpts from the FBI investigation discussing Ruiz’s relationship
with Raucci. On November 19, 2002, a three‐judge panel of the
Appellate Court issued a per curiam opinion, dismissing Lewis’s
appeal on the grounds that he failed to include the transcript from
his state habeas trial before Judge Zoarski and thus failed to provide
an adequate record for review. Lewis v. Commʹr of Corr., 73 Conn.
App. 597, 599 (2002). Thereafter, Lewis sought review by the
Connecticut Supreme Court through a petition for certification,
which was denied on January 14, 2003 without discussion. Lewis v.
Commʹr of Corr., 262 Conn. 938 (2003).
2002, eliminating the option to appeal to a Connecticut Supreme Court justice. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52‐470(g) (2002).
13 No. 14‐193‐pr
IV. The District Court Proceedings
Lewis filed a petition for federal habeas relief in the District of
Connecticut, arguing, in relevant part, that the State denied his right
to a fair trial and violated his right to due process when it withheld
Brady material during his trial. Judge Haight first considered and
rejected the State’s claim that Lewis had procedurally defaulted on
his Brady claim.4 Lewis v. Commʹr of Corr., No. 03 Civ. 196, 2012 WL
601773, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2012). Then, on December 16, 2013,
following extensive motion practice, a ten‐day evidentiary hearing
at which Sweeney testified in person, and oral argument, Judge
Haight granted Lewis’s petition for habeas relief in a thorough 68‐
page opinion. Lewis v. Commʹr of Corr., 975 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Conn.
2013). The district court determined that Lewis’s habeas claim
survived scrutiny under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which requires
deference to state procedures, because the state habeas decision was
The district court also determined that Lewis did not fail to exhaust his state 4
remedies, a determination not challenged in this appeal.
14 No. 14‐193‐pr
based on an “erroneous and unreasonable” determination of the
facts, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 180, and “was contrary to [clearly]
established Federal law, [as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States],” id. at 181. The district court, after carefully
articulating the arguments on both sides and meticulously
reviewing all of the evidence, concluded that Lewis was entitled to
federal habeas relief. Id. at 198.
The district court therefore directed the Commissioner of
Correction of the State of Connecticut to release Lewis from its
custody “within sixty (60) days of the date of this Ruling and Order,
unless the State of Connecticut within those 60 days declares its
written intention . . . to retry [Lewis] on the charges against him
. . . .” Id. at 208‐209. On February 14, 2014, the parties submitted a
joint motion to release Lewis, which was granted by the district
court. Accordingly, on February 26, 2014, the district court signed a
writ ordering Lewis’s release. The State timely appealed. 15 No. 14‐193‐pr
DISCUSSION
The State argues that the district court erred in granting
habeas relief because: (1) Lewis procedurally defaulted on his Brady
claim at the state level, and (2) Lewis did not satisfy either of
AEDPA’s substantive conditions under § 2254(d) because the state
habeas court’s decision did not contravene clearly established
federal law and was not based on an unreasonable factual
determination. We disagree.
Lewis, who was a pro se litigant in state court, sufficiently
complied with all state‐law procedural requirements capable of
barring federal review. Moreover, Lewis satisfied both of § 2254(d)’s
substantive predicates, even though he only needed to satisfy one.5
We conclude both (1) that the state habeas court contravened clearly
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in
A federal court may only grant a petitioner relief with respect to any claim 5
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings if the State adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)‐(2). 16 No. 14‐193‐pr
Brady and its progeny when it held the defendant was required to
exercise “due diligence” to obtain exculpatory evidence, Lewis, 2001
WL 1203354, at *3, and (2) that the state habeas court based its
decision on unreasonable findings of fact when it ignored key
aspects of the record. Accordingly, the district court had authority
to consider the merits of Lewis’s Brady claim and properly granted
habeas relief.
I. Procedural Bars
We review do novo the question of whether a procedural
ground is adequate to support a state court’s judgment. See Monroe
v. Kuhlman, 433 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2006).
“[F]ederal courts will not review questions of federal law
presented in a habeas petition when the state court’s decision rests
upon a state‐law ground that ‘is independent of the federal question
and adequate to support the judgment.’” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449,
465 (2009) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). A
state court’s adjudication of a petitioner’s federal claim only bars
federal habeas review when “the last state court rendering a 17 No. 14‐193‐pr
judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment
rests on a state procedural bar.” Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 195
(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, it
must be “clear from the face of the opinion” that the state court’s
decision rests on a state procedural bar. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fama v. Commʹr of Corr.
Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 809 (2d Cir. 2000). However, even if the state
court’s decision clearly rests on a procedural bar, federal review will
only be precluded if that procedural bar constitutes “a firmly
established and regularly followed state practice.” Ford v. Georgia,
498 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The State argues that Lewis’s Brady claim was procedurally
barred because (a) he failed to provide the Appellate Court with an
adequate record for review, and (b) he failed to brief the issue of
whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny him certification to
appeal. Neither argument has merit.
18 No. 14‐193‐pr
A. The Adequate‐Record Rule
The State first argues that Lewis procedurally defaulted on his
Brady claim because he did not provide the Appellate Court with a
transcript of the state habeas proceedings and thus failed to provide
an adequate record for review under Connecticut Rule of Appellate
Procedure 61–10. Conn. Practice Book 1998 § 61‐10. This argument
fails for several reasons.
First, it is not clear that the Appellate Court recognized the
Brady claim that Lewis indisputably raised, let alone dismissed it on
procedural grounds. The Appellate Court’s decision described the
issues before it as whether the state habeas court erred:
(1) in concluding that the testimony of Michael Sweeney, a police detective, did not constitute newly discovered evidence and (2) in failing to draw an adverse inference against the respondent commissioner of correction when Ovil Ruiz, a witness at the habeas trial, invoked his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self‐incrimination.
Lewis, 2012 WL 601773, at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 No. 14‐193‐pr
The Appellate Court appears to have missed Lewis’s Brady
claim entirely.6 Yet, in a clear and well‐researched pro se brief to the
Appellate Court, Lewis argued that the State failed to disclose
evidence that was material and exculpatory, citing Brady, United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), and United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976), among other relevant cases. With no reference to the
Brady claim in the Appellate Court’s decision, it is certainly not
“clear from the face of the opinion” that the state habeas court
rejected Lewis’s Brady claim on state‐procedural grounds. Coleman,
501 U.S. at 733; see also Messiah, 435 F.3d at 196.
Second, Lewis only failed to comply with the adequate‐record
requirement of Rule 61–10 if the state habeas transcript was
necessary for appellate review. Chapter 63 of Connecticut’s Rules
of Appellate Procedure states that an appellant must file the
portions of a trial‐court proceeding transcript that he “deem[s]
The Appellate Court’s failure to recognize Lewis’s Brady claim is likely due, 6
at least in part, to the State’s misrepresentation of the issues on appeal. The State’s brief before the Appellate Court characterized Lewis’s petition as presenting: (1) “claims of newly discovered evidence” and (2) “claims that the habeas court abused its discretion by not drawing an adverse inference against Ovil Ruiz.” S.A. 382. Nowhere in its brief did the State address Lewis’s Brady claim. 20 No. 14‐193‐pr
necessary” for review, but an appellant may file a statement that no
transcript is necessary. See Conn. Practice Book 1998 § 63–8; § 63–
4(a)(3). Lewis indicated in a statement to the Appellate Court that
the state habeas transcript was not necessary for review. See Lewis,
73 Conn. App. at 598. He was correct.
Lewis’s petition first argued that the state habeas court erred
as a matter of law by requiring him to exercise “due diligence” to
obtain Brady material. In the particular circumstances presented
here, the Appellate Court would have been able to decide the purely
legal question of whether the state habeas court improperly
incorporated a “due diligence” requirement into its opinion without
reviewing the transcript from the state habeas proceedings.
Moreover, it is not clear what additional information the
Appellate Court would have gleaned from the state habeas
transcript that it did not already have. The State did not call
witnesses or offer exhibits during the state habeas trial. In support of
his appeal, Lewis provided the Appellate Court with transcripts
from his criminal trial and the probable cause hearing; Sweeney’s 21 No. 14‐193‐pr
testimony at the Morant hearing; the state habeas court decision; and
excerpts from the FBI investigation discussing Ruiz’s relationship
with Raucci. In these circumstances, the materials provided by
Lewis were adequate to enable the Appellate Court to review
Lewis’s claims of error, and the state has not explained how the
transcript could have improved the record.
B. Certification
Section 52–470(g) of the Connecticut General Statutes requires
a petitioner seeking to appeal a habeas court’s decision to file a
petition for certification to appeal. A petitioner may file an
uncertified appeal, however, if the denial of certification constituted
an abuse of discretion. Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 615 (1994).
Under Connecticut law, failure to certify an appeal is an abuse of
discretion if the appeal is “not frivolous.” Taylor v. Commʹr of
Correction, 284 Conn. 433, 448 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The State argues that Lewis procedurally defaulted on his
Brady claim following the denial of certification to appeal by a justice 22 No. 14‐193‐pr
of the Connecticut Supreme Court because he failed to brief the
question of whether that denial constituted an abuse of discretion in
his petition to the Appellate Court. But the State has not shown that
“a firmly established and regularly followed state practice” required
Lewis to brief the certification issue. See Ford, 498 U.S. at 423–24. In
fact, the State does not identify any Connecticut authority for a
certification‐briefing requirement; rather, it argues that Lewis failed
to follow the procedure for appeals. Moreover, Connecticut courts do
not regularly enforce this procedure. See, e.g., Hankerson v. Comm. of
Corr., 150 Conn. App. 362, 368 (2014) (ordering supplemental
briefing when the petitioner failed to brief the certification question).
Even assuming such a briefing requirement existed, Lewis
effectively complied with it by arguing to the Appellate Court that
his appeal was not frivolous. Connecticut courts apply the criteria
set forth in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32 (1991) (per curiam),
when determining whether an appeal is frivolous. Under Lozada, a
petitioner must demonstrate one of the following: “that the issues
are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the 23 No. 14‐193‐pr
issues in a different manner; or that the questions are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 498 U.S. at 432
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and alternations
omitted). Thus, in deciding the abuse of discretion question, a court
“necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying
claims.” Taylor, 284 Conn. at 449.
Lewis fully argued the merits of his Brady claim. Although he
did not cite Lozada by name, Lewis contended, inter alia, that the
state habeas court “applied the wrong standard of review
concerning the evidence of Sweeney’s testimony,” and that its
factual findings were “unsupported by the evidence.” S.A. 296. He
also provided citations to the portions of Sweeney’s testimony
before Judge Blue, see supra note 1, which undermined Ruiz’s
credibility. At the very least, Lewis demonstrated that his case
presented issues that were debatable among jurists of reason. See
Lozada, 498 U.S. at 432. Given that courts interpret pro se filings
liberally, see, e.g., Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011);
Ajadi v. Commʹr of Corr., 280 Conn. 514, 549 (2006), we easily 24 No. 14‐193‐pr
interpret Lewis’s brief to argue that his appeal was not frivolous and
thus that it was an abuse of discretion to deny certification.
Accordingly, we find no procedural bar to considering the
merits of Lewis’s habeas claim and thus turn to AEDPA’s
substantive predicates.
II. § 2254(d) Substantive Predicates to Federal Habeas Review
We review a district court’s decision to grant a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
Hemstreet v. Greiner, 491 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
AEDPA provides for federal habeas relief when a “person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), subject to certain conditions. AEDPA states that
a federal habeas court may only grant a petitioner relief with
“respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings” if the State adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 25 No. 14‐193‐pr
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)‐(2); see also, e.g., Brown v. Alexander, 543 F.3d
94, 100 (2d Cir. 2008). A federal habeas court must assume that all
factual determinations made by the state court were correct unless
the petitioner rebuts those findings by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Bierenbaum v. Graham, 607
F.3d 36, 48 (2d Cir. 2010). Given that the Appellate Court denied,
erroneously in our view, Lewis’s petition on the basis that he failed
to file the transcript of his state habeas proceeding, the only state
court that adjudicated Lewis’s habeas petition “on the merits” was
the state habeas court.
The phrase “clearly established federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States” refers to “the holdings, as
opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the
time of the relevant state‐court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 412 (2000). A state court decision is contrary to such clearly
established federal law if it “applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases” or “if the state 26 No. 14‐193‐pr
court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a
result different from its precedent.” Boyette v. Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 90
(2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406) (internal alterations
omitted). A state court decision is based on a clearly erroneous
factual determination if the state court “failed to weigh all of the
relevant evidence before making its factual findings.” Doe v. Menefee,
391 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998,
1010 (9th Cir. 2013) (a state court decision is based on an
“unreasonable determination of the facts” if the state court fails “to
consider key aspects of the record”).
In sum, in order to satisfy § 2254(d)’s substantive predicates
and merit federal review of his Brady claim, Lewis need only
establish either that the state habeas court’s decision: (1) contravened
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court, or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts. Here, Lewis has shown both.
27 No. 14‐193‐pr
A. Clearly Established Federal Law: Brady and its Progeny
Well‐established Supreme Court precedent holds that the
prosecution has a clear and unconditional duty to disclose all
material, exculpatory evidence. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. This duty
exists whether or not the defense requests exculpatory evidence. See,
e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681‐2; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154‐
55 (1972) (applying Brady to impeachment evidence). The Supreme
Court has never required a defendant to exercise due diligence to
obtain Brady material. See, e.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (“[I]f the
evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives
the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should
equally arise even if no request is made.”).
To be sure, we have held in several cases that “[e]vidence is
not ‘suppressed’ [for Brady purposes] if the defendant either knew,
or should have known, of the essential facts permitting him to take
advantage of any exculpatory evidence.” DiSimone v. Phillips, 461
F.3d 181, 197 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100
(2d Cir. 1982). The “knew” prong of this requirement is subjective, 28 No. 14‐193‐pr
and the “should have known” prong is objective—meaning that, if a
reasonable defendant in these circumstances should have known the
relevant facts, then the prosecution’s failure to disclose that evidence
does not implicate Brady. This requirement speaks to facts already
within the defendant’s purview, not those that might be unearthed.
It imposes no duty upon a defendant, who was reasonably unaware
of exculpatory information, to take affirmative steps to seek out and
uncover such information in the possession of the prosecution in
order to prevail under Brady.
Here, the Connecticut Superior Court’s ruling imposed just
such an affirmative “due diligence” requirement. See Lewis, 2001
WL 1203354, at *3 (rejecting Lewis’s claim because the exculpatory
evidence at issue “was available by due diligence to the
defense”). Accordingly, the state habeas court’s imposition of such a
due diligence requirement plainly violated clearly established
federal law under Brady and its progeny.
The State’s argument that the state habeas court’s “due
diligence language is reasonably interpreted as directed to the 29 No. 14‐193‐pr
petitioner’s ‘actual innocence’ assertion, rather than his Brady claim,”
Resp. Br. at 39, distorts the state habeas court’s decision. The
relevant portion of the decision states:
The claim of the petitioner that exculpatory information was not provided to the defense prior to the trial in 1995, has not been proven. This court finds not only was all exculpatory evidence furnished to the defense, but also the alleged evidence was available by due diligence to the defense, and the petitioner was obliged to raise his claims before the trial court or the Appellate Court.
Lewis, 2001 WL 1203354, at *3 (emphasis added). The “due
diligence” language patently pertains to Lewis’s claim that
“exculpatory evidence was not provided to the defense,” in other
words, to his Brady claim.
The State also argues that the due diligence finding was an
“alternate basis” for the state habeas court’s denial of Lewis’s
petition, and therefore the legal error is immaterial. That argument,
however, only succeeds if the state habeas court had a valid basis for
determining that “all exculpatory information [was] turned over to 30 No. 14‐193‐pr
the defense,” and thus that there was no Brady violation. For the
reasons explained below, it did not. 7
B. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts
The state habeas court’s determination that “all exculpatory
evidence [was] furnished to the defense” was clear factual error. The
prosecution never disclosed to Lewis or to defense counsel either
prior to or during trial that Raucci had coached Ruiz on the
testimony he ultimately gave at trial, that Ruiz was parroting what
Raucci told him, or that he was doing so because Raucci said he
would let him go. Nothing in the record supports a finding to the
contrary. The fact that the information to which Sweeney testified
The state habeas court also erred to the extent that it concluded that 7
Sweeney’s testimony would not have affected Lewis’s conviction and thus did not satisfy Brady’s materiality requirement. See Lewis v. Warden, 2001 WL 1203354, at *3 (“The petitioner has failed to prove that any critical information was disclosed by Detective Raucci, or that he provided any false information to Ruiz.”). The state habeas court’s implication that Sweeney’s testimony would not have affected Lewis’s conviction also “involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Leka, 257 F.3d at 104 (“The touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result.”). For the reasons explained in Part V, Sweeney’s testimony satisfied the materiality standard because there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have caused a different result. Any legal determination to the contrary, therefore, involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Additionally, as described in greater detail below, the state habeas court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See infra Part II.B. 31 No. 14‐193‐pr
had not been provided to the prosecution at the time of trial is of no
import. The State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence,
including impeachment evidence, in its possession constitutes a
Brady violation, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, and regardless of whether the
information is known only by the police and not the prosecutor, see
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437‐38 (1995); see also United States v.
Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 544 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2008). 8
Moreover, Judge Blue concluded that Sweeney was a credible
witness,9 see Morant v. State, No. 398736, 2000 WL 804695, at *9
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 5, 2000) affʹd, 68 Conn. App. 137 (2002), and
the state habeas court never questioned Sweeney’s credibility. Thus,
Lewis has rebutted the presumption in favor of the state habeas
We have held that evidence in state possession is not attributed to the 8
prosecution if known only by entities outside the “prosecution team.” See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he propriety of imputing knowledge to the prosecution is determined by examining the specific circumstances of the person alleged to be an ‘arm of the prosecutor.’” (quoting United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555 (2d Cir. 1975)). Here, there is no question that the evidence showing that Raucci coached Ruiz was within the possession of police officers, both Raucci and Sweeney, who were part of the investigative team and thus were “arm[s] of the prosecutor.” 9 After the federal habeas hearing, Judge Haight reached the same conclusion.
See Lewis, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 194. 32 No. 14‐193‐pr
court’s findings by “clear and convincing evidence.” See Bierenbaum,
607 F.3d at 48.
The State argues that as a “corollary” to its finding that all
exculpatory information had been provided to the defense, the state
habeas court determined that Sweeney’s testimony was not
exculpatory. Nothing in the state habeas court’s decision supports
the State’s argument, and we do not owe AEDPA deference to
speculation that the state habeas court reached that conclusion. See
Boyette, 246 F.3d at 91.
In any event, the state habeas court plainly based its decision
on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state habeas
court found that Raucci only provided Ruiz with “insignificant”
details. Lewis, 2001 WL 1203354, at *2. But Sweeney’s testimony is
replete with evidence showing that Raucci supplied Ruiz with, in
Sweeney’s words, “the whole case,” S.A. 317, and told Ruiz to say
that “he was present with the two individuals, Scott Lewis and
Stefon Morant,” S.A. 460. The state habeas decision also notably
failed to reference the evidence that Ruiz not only denied having 33 No. 14‐193‐pr
any knowledge of the murders three different times, but that after
implicating Lewis in the murders, Ruiz told Sweeney the
inculpatory account was false and that he was lying to protect
himself. In failing to note, much less consider, these key facts, the
state habeas court based its decision on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. See, e.g., Menefee, 391 F.3d at 164; Milke,
711 F.3d at 1010.
Given that Lewis has satisfied AEDPA’s substantive
predicates, we finally turn to the merits of his Brady claim.
III. Section 2254(a): The Merits of Lewis’s Brady Claim
There are three components of a Brady violation: “The
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it
is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued.” Boyette, 246 F.3d at 89 (quoting
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281‐82 (1999)).
We agree with Judge Haight’s thoughtful analysis of Lewis’s
Brady claim, summarized as follows. 34 No. 14‐193‐pr
A. Exculpatory Evidence
Sweeney’s testimony and the facts he revealed were clearly
favorable to Lewis. “Evidence is favorable to the accused if it either
tends to show the accused is not guilty or impeaches a prosecution
witness.” Boyette, 246 F.3d at 90 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676).
Ruiz―the State’s key witness at trial―repeatedly denied to the
police that he was at the murder site and that he knew anything
about the murders. His statement changed only after Raucci
provided critical details about the case, told Ruiz “that it was in his
best interest to tell what happened [and] give a detailed statement as
to his participation and also the other two,” S.A. 317, and promised
to “let [Ruiz] go” if he did so, S.A. 446. That evidence was “of a kind
that would suggest to any prosecutor that the defense would want
to know about it.” Leka, 257 F.3d at 99.
If defense counsel had known this information at trial, he
could have cross‐examined Ruiz regarding his prior inconsistent
statements and the extent to which Raucci coached him and induced
him to testify falsely. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154‐55 (applying Brady to 35 No. 14‐193‐pr
material that can be used to impeach a prosecution witness). As the
district court concluded, Sweeney’s testimony was clearly
exculpatory under Brady or impeachment material under Giglio, if
not both.
B. Failure to disclose
For the reasons explained above, the State plainly failed to
disclose Brady evidence to the defense in Lewis’s case.
C. Prejudice
To establish prejudice, a plaintiff must show that the evidence
was material. Leka, 257 F.3d at 104 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434).
“The touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a
different result.” Id. (alteration omitted). As the Supreme Court has
explained:
The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). 36 No. 14‐193‐pr
At trial, no witness other than Ruiz directly implicated Lewis
in the murders,10 and the State did not introduce any forensic or eye‐
witness testimony against Lewis. As a result, Ruiz’s testimony was
critical to the State’s obtaining a conviction.
Sweeney provided credible evidence that Ruiz simply
parroted information supplied by an unscrupulous police officer.
Sweeney’s testimony thoroughly undermines Ruiz’s credibility and
thus any reasonable confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Kyles,
514 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, the State’s failure to disclose the
evidence relating to Ruiz’s interrogation prejudiced Lewis and
deprived him of his Constitutional right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s
order granting Lewis’s petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.
The only other witness who offered any testimony connecting Lewis to the 10
murders, Jose Roque, recanted prior to trial and insisted that Raucci had coached him on what to say in his statement. S.A. 187‐188. Significantly, at Lewis’s trial, Roque also testified that Raucci told him that Raucci “wanted to put Scott Lewis away.” S.A. 193.