Lewis v. Board of Education

50 A. 346, 66 N.J.L. 582, 37 Vroom 582, 1901 N.J. LEXIS 110
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 15, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 50 A. 346 (Lewis v. Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Board of Education, 50 A. 346, 66 N.J.L. 582, 37 Vroom 582, 1901 N.J. LEXIS 110 (N.J. 1901).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Depue, Chief Justice.

The classification made by this legislation for the constitution and government of schools is contained in sections 45 and 46 of the act as amended. Section 45 provides that “In each city, incorporated town, borough, township or other municipality which now is or which shall be hereafter divided into wards, the mayor or other chief executive officer of such municipality shall, after the first day of May and before the thirtieth day of June next after the acceptance of the provisions of this section, as is hereinafter provided, appoint nine persons to be members of the board of education of the school district situate in said municipality, who shall severally possess the qualifications for said membership prescribed in this article. Three of such persons shall be appointed to serve for one year, three for two years and three for three years, and annually thereafter, after the [585]*585first day of May and before the thirtieth day of June, the said mayor or other chief executive officer of such municipality shall appoint three members of said board of education to serve for the term of three years, to take the place of those members whose terms shall expire in such year. Any vacancy in such board of education shall be forthwith reported by the secretary of said board to the mayor or other chief executive officer, who shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy for the unexpired term. To every such appointee, as aforesaid, said mayor or other chief executive officer shall issue and deliver a certificate of his appointment. The term of office of a member of the board of education, except a member appointed to fill an unexpired term, shall begin on the first day of July next succeeding his appointment.” Section 46 provides that “In each city, incorporated town, borough, township or other municipality which now is or which shall be hereafter divided into wards, there shall be elected at the first municipal election held in such municipality next after the acceptance of this section as is hereinafter provided, nine persons to be members of the board of education of the school district situate in said municipality, who shall severally possess the qualifications'for said membership prescribed in this article. Three of such persons shall be elected to serve for one year, three for two years and three for three years; and thereafter, at the regular municipal election in such municipality in each year, there shall be elected three members of said board of education to serve for the term of three years to take the place of those members whose terms shall expire in such year. Should any vacancy occur in such board of education, the remaining members of said board shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy to serve only until the next succeeding municipal election in said municipality, at which election a member shall be elected to serve for the unexpired term. The term of office of a member of the board of education, except a member elected to fill an unexpired term, shall begin on the first day of July next succeeding his election.” Pamph. L. 1901, p. 222. Section 83 provides for the acceptance of the provisions of sections 45 and 46 by the qualified voters of any [586]*586municipality “which now is or which shall be hereafter divided into wards, at a general or municipal election to be held therein.” The basis of classification adopted in this legislation is the. fact of the division of municipalities into wards. In the brief of the plaintiffs in error these classes are designated as class A and class B. Por convenience I will adopt the same method of distinguishing. Class A comprises cities, incorporated towns, boroughs, townships and other municipalities which now are or hereafter shall be divided into wards; class B comprises all other municipalities in the state, that is, municipalities not divided into wards. The former are organized under article VI. of the original act as amended by the act of 1901, with powers and duties in connection with the control and management of public schools comprised in sections 45 to 184, inclusive, and the amendments. The latter are organized under section 85, article VII., of the original act, with the powers, duties and control of schools comprised in sections 85 to 106, inclusive.

An examination of this legislation discloses material diversities in the organization, management, powers and control of the boards of education in the two classes of municipalities. It is not necessary to go into particulars in that respect. The case, then, resolves itself into the question whether the classification adopted in this legislation is valid.

Por the purposes of legislation regulating the internal affairs of municipalities there are two sorts of classifications known to the law: First, the common law classification of municipalities into counties, cities, boroughs, towns, townships and villages. This classification is independent of statutory prescriptions; it rests on the common.law and is recognized by the constitution of this state. Hence an act of the legislature which applies to any one of these political subdivisions is per se a general law, within the meaning of the constitutional provision. But the subdivision of common law municipalities into subordinate classes is a legislative classification, and legislation with respect to any of such classes depends upon the appropriateness of the legislative classification. A system of classification which will merely [587]*587individualize the political districts of the state to which the act shall he applied is plainly insufficient. Something more is required than mere designation by such characteristics as would serve to identify. The classification must rest on some characteristic or peculiarity plainly distinguishing the places included from those excluded and making the legislation fit and appropriate to those included and inappropriate to those which are omitted. It must embrace all and exclude none, whose conditions and wants render such legislation equally appropriate to them as a class. For instance, population is a legitimate basis of classification in statutes relating to the structure, machinery and powers of municipal government, where population bears a reasonable relation to the necessities and proprieties of the various grades of municipal government; but population cannot be made the basis of classification where it does not bear a reasonable relation to the necessities and proprieties of the various grades of municipal government. State v. Hammer, 13 Vroom 435, 440; Rutgers v. New Brunswick, Id. 51; Van Giesen v. Bloomfield, 18 Id. 442; Wood v. Atlantic City, 27 Id. 32; Atlantic Water Works Co. v. Consumers Water Co., 17 Stew. Eq. 427; Wanser v. Hoos, 31 Vroom 482; Boorum v. Connelly, ante p. 197; McArdle v. Jersey City, post p. 590.

An examination of the census of 1900, as published in Fitzgerald’s Manual of the Legislature of New Jersey (1901), discloses the fact that the division of municipalities into wards is not based upon population. It also discloses the discrepancy between the population of those municipalities which are divided into wards. By the act of March 8th, 1882, which is a supplement to an act entitled “An act relating to the division of certain cities of this state into wards” (Pamph. L., p.

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Bluebook (online)
50 A. 346, 66 N.J.L. 582, 37 Vroom 582, 1901 N.J. LEXIS 110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewis-v-board-of-education-nj-1901.