Lewellyn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

438 S.W.2d 741, 222 Tenn. 542, 26 McCanless 542, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 459
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 31, 1969
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 438 S.W.2d 741 (Lewellyn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewellyn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 438 S.W.2d 741, 222 Tenn. 542, 26 McCanless 542, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. 1969).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Humphreys

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by this appeal is, whether State Farm’s policy insuring Lewellyns truck provided coverage [544]*544where a borrowed mobile welding rig wbicb Lewellyn was palling behind his track, came loose and damaged an aatomobile and injured a passenger therein. The Chancellor held there was no coverage, and we agree.

The pertinent provisions of the policy are to be foand in the definition section, relating to insaring agreements 1 and 2; and in the insaring agreement 2, relating to non-owned aatomobiles. A non-owned aatomobile is defined as including a non-owned trailer.1

A trailer is defined as one designed for ase with a private passenger aatomobile and not ased for business parposes with other than passenger aatomobiles.2

The non-owned aatomobile insaring agreement affords limited coverage to loss dae to a non-owned trailer in the event it is a non-owned trailer as defined in the definition of the policy.3

Since it is stipalated the trailing welding rig was non-owned, was not being palled by a private passenger or a atility aatomobile, and since the welding rig was a trailer designed for ase for basiness parposes with other than a private passenger aatomobile, there is no coverage afforded by the policy. For cases defining the mobile [545]*545welding rig as a trailer, see Waddey et al. v. Maryland Casualty Company, 171 Tenn. 112, 100 S.W.2d 984, 109 A.L.R. 654; Blue Ridge Insurance Company v. Roy L. Haun et al., 197 Tenn. 527, 276 S.W.2d 711.

The second contention, that there was a waiver of the policy provisions mentioned, or that the Insurance Company is estopped to rely thereon, must be denied.

These defenses, waiver and estoppel, are based on a letter written by the Company to Lewellyn wherein it pointed out certain policy provisions under which it contended it was not liable under its policy. However, since in this same letter,4 the Insurance Company reserved every defense available to it under its policy, and there is no showing whatsoever of any harm or injury to the appellant because of the letter, the defenses are not good. See 45 C.J.S. Insurance sec. 707, p. 677.

[546]*546The assignments of error are overruled and the decree of the Chancellor is affirmed.

Burnett, Chief Justice, and Dyer, Chattin and Ceeson, Justices, concur.

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Lewellyn v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
438 S.W.2d 741 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1969)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
438 S.W.2d 741, 222 Tenn. 542, 26 McCanless 542, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 459, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewellyn-v-state-farm-mutual-automobile-insurance-tenn-1969.