Levy v. Ward

33 La. Ann. 1033
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 15, 1881
DocketNo. 996
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 33 La. Ann. 1033 (Levy v. Ward) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Levy v. Ward, 33 La. Ann. 1033 (La. 1881).

Opinion

The'opinion of the Court was delivered by

Bermudez, C. J.

The object of this suit is to cause to be judicially ■corrected an error alleged to have been committed in the description of certain real estate, which the plaintiff claims to have acquired, in 1873, from Gr. C. Ward, since deceased.

The complaint is, that the land was, by inadvertence or mistake, [1034]*1034described as being in section 20, instead of section 21, of township 22, in Morehouse parish, in this State,

As administratrix, representing the succession of G. O. Ward, the defendant, pleaded the general issue, denying specially that Ward ever was divested of title to the land claimed as having been sold.

The tutrix administering the succession of E. J. Hope intervened, claiming to be a creditor of Ward for a sum liquidated by judgment and secured by judicial mortgage on the real estate alleged to have been sold.

From a judgment making the correction asked, and dismissing the claim of the succession of Hope, both the, defendant and the intervenor have appealed.

On the trial, the plaintiff introduced in evidence his title from Ward, and two acts of lease made by him to the latter. In the first act, dated February 26th, 1876, the property is stated to be known as the “ Willy Ward Plantation,” and to be leased at four dollars per acre, there being about ninety acres susceptible of cultivation. In the second act, dated April 19th, 1877, the plantation leased is mentioned as being the “Ward Place,” the same which’ Levy purchased from Ward on November 15th, 1873.

The next offered oral testimony to prove the error alleged to exist in the description of the property mentioned in his title from Ward, viz: that the number of the section, stated as 20, should have been 21, of township 22.

To the admission of this testimony the defendant objected, on-several grounds, and, to an adverse ruling, he reserved a bill.

We think the cou-rt ruled correctly, under the circumstances.

It is clear that, had the title contained no specific description of the real estate, but merely the name by which the property sold was known, oral testimony would have been admissible, to show the location and measurement of the land.

The title and the leases, taken together, as the acts of the parties, Levy and Ward, show, first, the specific description, and next, the name by which the property was commonly known. The land sold by Ward to Levy, on November 15th, 1873, was fully identified by Ward, in the leases, as the “Willy Ward Plantation,” or the “Ward Place.” The name of the land, the provenance of which is expressly stated, was, therefore, by Ward himself, legally interpolated into the deed, which he had previously made to Levy, at the date mentioned. So that the description of the property sold, was, as between Levy and Ward, in 1876 and 1877, amplified by the incorporation into the act of the two similar names by which the land went and was known. The irresistible conclusion is, therefore, that the real estate mentioned in the deed of [1035]*1035sale is the “Willy Ward Plantation,” or the “ Ward Plaoe,” which means one and the same land, such as the same then stood.

In presence of the error charged in the description, the insertion of the name of the property in the sale laid a foundation and opened a door for,the reception of oral testimony, explanatory and descriptive of what the land thus named was composed of at the time of purchase; in other words, it justified the admission of parol proof to show its location, measurement and condition. It is well settled that parol evidence is admissible to show error in the descriptio loci et descriptio persones, in the date contained in an act concerning real estate, namely, to show that the instrument was not made the actual depositary of the intention of the parties. If such was not the rule of law, no erroneous description of real estate acquired or sold could ever be established and rectified, as against an author or purchaser in bad faith, or against his representatives, in the event of his death. 12 M. 400; 15 L. 311; 9 L. 566; 4 L. 352; 1 R. 257; 7 R. 548; 12 R. 371; 9 An. 29; 3 An. 193; 12 An. 142; 13 An. 25, 318, 410; 14 An. 199, 209; 18 An. 577; 26 An. 257, 545; 3 Greenleaf, Sec. 360 et seq.; 4 Starkie Ev. 10 and 18.

The authorities relied upon by the defendant’s learned counsel, for the exclusion of the oral testimony offered, apply to cases in which, in. the absence of all muniment of title, parties seek to recover real estate; but they have no bearing to eases in which parties endeavor to show error when deeds have actually been executed.

The reception of parol testimony to establish a clerical error, almost patent in the description of land contained in the deed, as also to explain lurking ambiguities, to identify the property, to prove fraud practiced in the transfer of land, to show possession, to show boundaries, is no infringement of the rule which demands that title to real estate be evidenced in writing only. 9 M. 40; 11 M. 449; 12 M. 649, 670; 4 N. S. 190; 5 N. S. 297; 8 N. S. 161, 660; 10 L. 209; 17 L. 421; 19 L. 258; 2 R. 72, 85; 3 An. 193; 4 An. 441; 5 An. 231, 410; 13 An. 25; 15 An. 483; 21 An. 548, 470; 26 An. 257; 16 An. 307; 20 An. 211; 2 An. 909; 4 L. 351; and authorities above referred to.

The other objections raised to the reception of the oral testimony, because the title from Ward is a.n absolute nullity, as it purports to transfer property belonging to another; because the oral testimony offered is not the oath of the seller; because the plaintiff is estopped, having in a former suit claimed, under oath, and recovered title to the land, described as being in section 20, we do not consider well founded.

The title is not an absolute nullity. It is no nullity at all. It is a-valid instrument, irregularly drawn up, but which can be rectified, so as to be perfected, so as to accord with the original intention of the parties-

A party seeking to establish an error in the description of real [1036]*1036■estate sold to him, is not restricted to the formality of probing the conscience of his adversary. He may, at his option, altogether dispense from such resort, and have recourse to such legal evidence as will prove the error. It is the party to whom no title whatever has been made, 'but who was placed in possession by the vendor, under a verbal sale of 'real estate, who cannot recover title, unless upon complying with the law requiring the propounding of interrogatories to the vendor. C. C. 2275; 12 An. 213; 28 An. 806; 30 An. 898; 17 An. 1; 4 L. 377, 167; 2 L. 595; 12 An. 114.

From the fact that the plaintiff has, in a different action against the •succession of Ward, 32 An. 784, claimed under oath and recorded title •to the land, as situate in section 20, it does not follow that he is estopped, under a charge of error, from alleging and proving that the land lies in •section 21. When he swore, and claimed, as he did, he was under the honest impression that he was giving a correct description of the property which he was revendicating. The error thus committed is likewise •susceptible of revision and correction. The rectification of the description of the land in the suit will necessarily follow that in the deed.

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Bluebook (online)
33 La. Ann. 1033, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/levy-v-ward-la-1881.