Levy v. Teamsters' Trust Fund

17 Pa. D. & C.3d 524, 1980 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 200
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County
DecidedJanuary 30, 1980
Docketno. 1565
StatusPublished

This text of 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 524 (Levy v. Teamsters' Trust Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Levy v. Teamsters' Trust Fund, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 524, 1980 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).

Opinion

PRATTIS, J.,

Plaintiff Santo Levy’s motion for partial summary judgment is presently before the court.

The record of this case indicates that plaintiff [525]*525took judgment by default on August 12, 1976. This judgment was subsequently opened by order of the court on February 28, 1977. Plaintiff appealed. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the lower court. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal.

On October 18, 1978 plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied by order of this court on January 26,1979. Plaintiff now comes before the court on his motion for partial summary judgment requesting the same relief that he sought in the prior motion. While this motion does not substantially differ from the previous motion for summary judgment, the record is expanded. The record now contains interrogatories and answers which were not apart of the record in January of 1979. We conclude; therefore, that plaintiff has resubmitted his motion with the additional evidence in an effort to resolve the remaining question of fact which was fatal to his original motion, i.e., whether plaintiff has amassed the required number of years of credited service to qualify for pension benefits from the Fund. Upon consideration of the entire record, we conclude that he has not amassed the requisite continuous service, as defined by .the Pension Trust Plan and, therefore, he is not entitled to pension benefits.

In order for plaintiff to qualify for pension benefits, he must meet the criteria set forth in Article II, Sections A(c) and B(c). of the Pension Trust Plan (“Plan”). Under these sections, plaintiff must have been an employe:

“1. who has reached his 57th birthday; and
2. who has completed 20 years of Continuous Service as defined in Article I, Section Q, or who [526]*526has completed 10 years of such Continuous Service; and
3. who has completed 5 years of Employment as defined in Article I, Section S(b) and
4. who has completed 5 years of Continuous Service under a Collective Bargaining Agreement; and
5. who has had at least 875 Covered Days of contributions paid into the Trust Fund by a Covered Employer on his behalf. ...”

All parties agree that the only provision in dispute is number two above. Plaintiff contends that he has amassed “ten calendar years” of continuous service, without a break in service, from 1965 to 1975-He maintains that he has met all the requirements and is entitled to pension benefits. Defendant counters that while plaintiff was employed for a ten year period, without a break in service, he has accrued only six and one-half years of credited continuous service. Defendant maintains that this service is insufficient to qualify for pension benefits.

In order to decide this dispute, reference must be made to the relevant portions of the Plan which are in Article I, Sections L, M, N, O, Q, and S, which provide:

“Section L. Covered Employment:
The term Covered Employment shall mean any Employment in a capacity for which Employer Contributions are payable to the Trust Fund in accordance with a Pension Agreement. (Emphasis added.)
Section M. Employer Contributions on Account of an Employee:
The term Employer Contributions on Account of an Employee shall mean the Employer Contribu[527]*527tions made with reference to the Employee’s Covered Employment.
Section N. Covered Day:
The term Covered Day shall mean a day of Employment of an Employee with respect to which an Employer Contribution is paid on his account into the Trust Fund. (Emphasis added.)
Section O. Continuous Covered Employment:
The term Continuous Covered Employment shall mean the period expressed in completed years and completed half years thereof counted from the latter of—
(i) .the Employee’s first Covered Day or
(ii) the Employee’s most recent Breakin Service. (Emphasis added.)
Section Q. Continuous Service:
The term Continuous Service shall mean the sum of Continuous Past Employment and Continuous Covered Employment, both counted from the most recent Break in Service.
Section S. Year of Employment:
Year of Employment shall mean—
(a) A calendar year prior to the period of Covered Employment in which an employee had at least 1.000 hours Covered Employment or 25 weeks in the Armed Forces of the United States or the Dominion of Canada. If an Employee has less than 1.000 hours of Employment but at least 500hours of Covered Employment or if he has less than 25 weeks in the Armed Forces of the United States or the Dominion of Canada but at least 18 such weeks, he shall be given credit for one-half of a year of employment during any such calendar year.
(b) A calendar year subsequent to the period of Covered Employment in which contributions for a period of at least 175 Covered Days have been paid [528]*528to the Trust Fund by the Covered Employer on behalf of the Employee. Credit shall be given for one-half of a year of Employment during any calendar year in which contributions for a period of at least 100 Covered Days but less than 175 Covered Days have been paid to the Trust Fund by the Covered Employer on behalf of the Employee.”

Plaintiff admits that he is not entitled to any credit for “continuous past employment.” As noted, supra, there has been no “break in service” during the relevant period óf time. Therefore, the dispute rests on the interpretation of “continuous covered employment. ” This term is specifically explained in Article I, Section O of the Plan. Reference to Section O reveals the use of the terms “completed years and completed half years.” Section N defines “covered day” with reference to “a day . . . with respect to which an Employer Contribution is paid” into the Trust Fund. Accordingly, where an employe has had no break in service and no continuous past employment, the employe’s entitlement to pension benefits accrues in completed years and completed half years measured by his employer’s paid-in-contributions on the employe’s account into the Trust Fund.

In order to compute completed years and completed half years, reference must be made to the definition of year of employment in Article I, Section S. This is the only provision of the Plan which sets forth the computation formula for “years and half years.”1

[529]*529In the case at bar, plaintiff was in covered employment, without a break in service between January 1, 1965 and the date he filed an application for a pension on November 25, 1975. However, during that period the contributions from his employers, calculated in years and half years, resulted in years of .credited service as follows: «

1965 one half year

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17 Pa. D. & C.3d 524, 1980 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/levy-v-teamsters-trust-fund-pactcomplphilad-1980.