Levy v. Internal Revenue Service

531 F. Supp. 485, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 760, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9305
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJanuary 27, 1982
DocketNo. 81-1224-Civ-JLK
StatusPublished

This text of 531 F. Supp. 485 (Levy v. Internal Revenue Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Levy v. Internal Revenue Service, 531 F. Supp. 485, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 760, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9305 (S.D. Fla. 1982).

Opinion

ORDER RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING CASE

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.

This cause came on before the Court upon defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Said motion was supported by two affidavits and a fairly extensive memorandum.

I. THE GRAVAMEN OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act seeking the disclosure of certain records pertaining to interviews of plaintiff by agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The interviews concerned the audit of another taxpayer for whom plaintiff had provided professional services in his capacity as a Certified Public Accountant.

The documents sought in part consist of memoranda apparently prepared by agents of defendant subsequent to interviews with plaintiff on June 20, 1980, July 10, 1980, July 22, 1980, December 12, 1980 and January 29, 1981. Plaintiff also seeks the disclosure of an unsigned statement allegedly written by plaintiff on a Department of the Treasury-Internal Revenue Service form labeled “Affidavit.”

In conjunction with its motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted these documents to the Court for an in camera inspection. The documents were carefully reviewed by the Court.

II. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant’s motion is based on the theory that the documents in question are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). This subsection allows an agency to refuse to disclose:

(I)nvestigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, ... but only to the extent that the production of such records or information would ... interfere with enforcement proceedings.... ”

5 U.S.C. § 552b.

The defendant also argues that the documents, do not come within self-imposed IRS regulations which require the IRS to disclose affidavits and transcripts of question [487]*487and answer statements, Section 9353 of the Internal Revenue Service Manual and Section 246.5(3) of the Special Agent’s Handbook. Furthermore, the IRS Southeast Regional Commissioner has asserted that even if the Court determines that the documents fall within the IRS disclosure provisions, the Commissioner, pursuant to the authority granted him under these provisions, has decided that it is necessary to temporarily withhold a copy of the documents.

Plaintiff opposes the motion, claiming that the documents must be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act, and that the statutory exception to disclosure does not apply. Plaintiff further contends that in any event the documents must be disclosed pursuant to the self-imposed IRS disclosure provisions.

III. BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE

Plaintiff brought suit on June 5, 1981. Prior to that time, plaintiff had written to the IRS requesting the disclosure of the document in question. He received a reply from C. L. Laney, Disclosure Officer for IRS, who asserted that the documents were within the exception to the Freedom of Information Act. On October 27, 1981, the Court entered an Order stating that the action would be dismissed for lack of prosecution on November 18,1981 unless an affidavit showing good cause was filed by plaintiff prior to November 18th. Plaintiff’s counsel filed an affidavit on October 29, 1981, and the Court subsequently entered an Order on November 6, 1981 declaring that the case would not be dismissed. The Court’s Order also required defendant to comply with the guidelines for disclosure as set forth in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir.1973), by December 15, 1981. Defendant apparently did not disclose any of the documents, and simply moved for summary judgment on December 17, 1981.

IV. THE ISSUES AT BAR

A. The Freedom of Information Act Exception

The Freedom of Information Act provides that all documents are available to the public unless subject to a specific exemption. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C.Cir.1973). Generally, the exemptions from disclosure must be narrowly construed. Id. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the Freedom of Information Act was intended to provide disclosure to the public, and not to the self-interested individual who would abuse the right to disclosure. See generally Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1028, 39 L.Ed.2d 123 (1974).

A two-step inquiry must be made in determining whether the documents fall within the exception of § 552(b)(7)(A): whether the material was gathered for law enforcement purposes; and whether the disclosure of the documents would interfere with enforcement proceedings. In the instant case, the subject matter of the documents deals almost exclusively with the tax matters of the third-party taxpayer and the plaintiff’s participation in the preparation of the taxpayer’s taxes. Mr. William R. Bonelli, Jr., Special Agent with the Criminal Investigation Division of the Jacksonville District of the IRS, states in an affidavit that the taxpayer is the subject of an investigation. The documents themselves further indicate that the third-party taxpayer is the subject of an investigation. The Court therefore concludes that the substance of the memoranda and the unsigned statement, in conjunction with the statement of Mr. Bonelli, indicate that the information was gathered for law enforcement purposes.

With respect to the second stage of the inquiry, the Court must look to the facts of the case to determine whether disclosure would interfere with enforcement proceedings. See Title Guarantee Co. v. N. L. R. B., 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976).

One Court has held that interference may include:

Fears of disclosure of (1) evidence, (2) witnesses, (3) prospective testimony, (4) the reliance placed by the government [488]*488upon the evidence, (5) the transactions being investigated, (6) the direction of the investigation, (7) government strategy, (8) confidential informants, (9) the scope and limits of the government’s investigation, (10) prospective new defendants, (11) materials protected by the Jencks Act, (12) attorney work product, (13) the methods of surveillance, (14) subjects of surveillance.

Kanter v. Internal Revenue Service, 478 F.Supp. 552, 555 (N.D.Ill.1979).

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Bluebook (online)
531 F. Supp. 485, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 760, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9305, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/levy-v-internal-revenue-service-flsd-1982.