Levy v. Germain

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJune 6, 2016
DocketCUMcv-16-123
StatusUnpublished

This text of Levy v. Germain (Levy v. Germain) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Levy v. Germain, (Me. Super. Ct. 2016).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

Cumberland, ss. STATE OF MAINE Cumberland, ss, Clerk's Office

HELENE LEVY, LEONARD LEVY JUN 06 2016 and VICTORIA LYNCH

Plaintiffs RECEIVED v. Docket No. PORSC-CV-16- 123

ANNEMARIE G ER1\1AIN and ANNEMARIE GERJ.\1AIN, personal representative of the Estate of Eleanor Potter

Defendants

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Annemarie Germain, in her capacity as personal representative of the Estate of Eleanor

Potter [hereinafter the Personal Representative], has filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims

asserted against her by Plaintiffs Helene Levy, Leonard Levy and Victoria Lynch. The

Plaintiffs have filed a timely opposition and the Personal Representative has filed a timely

reply. The court elects to decide the Motion to Dismiss without oral argument. See M .R. Civ.

P. 7(b)(7).

The material allegations of the Plaintiffs' complaint are as follows:

The Plaintiffs are the step-grandchildren of Eleanor Potter. They challenge a will in

which Eleanor Potter named Annemarie Germain, who was her caregiver, her sole beneficiary.

The complaint specifically asserts that Annemarie Germain engaged in undue influence and

tortious interference with the Plaintiffs' expectancy of inheriting some of their step­

grandmother's estate, with the rest going to various charities or institutions.

Counts I through VI of the complaint seek actual and punitive damages on behalf of

each of the Plaintiffs against AnneMarie Germain in her individual capacity. Count VII asserts

1 a damages claim against her as Personal Representative, and also alleges that to the extent the

Personal Representative holds and thereby retains control over asserts of the Eleanor Potter

Estate, she holds them in trust for the Plaintiffs.

The Motion to Dismiss argues that the complaint fails to state a claim as to the

Personal Representative because the Personal Representative could not have engaged in undue

influence or tortious interference with Plaintiffs' alleged expectancy because she became

Personal Representative only after Eleanor Potter's death. Based on the same reasoning, she

argues that she cannot be liable on a constructive trust theory because she could not have

exploited any confidential relationship with Eleanor Potter. The Plaintiffs acknowledge that

Annemarie Germain as Personal Representative could not have engaged in undue influence or

tortious interference, but contend that the Personal Representative can be liable for

constructive trust to the extent she retains control over the assets that are the subject of the

Plaintiffs' claims.

The standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss calls for the court

to determine whether the pleading to which the motion is directed, viewed in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party, states any cognizable claim for relief. See Town of

Eddington v. University oflY!aine Foundation.,_2007 ME 74,, §5, 926 A.2d 183, 184; Heber v.

Lucerne-in-1vfe. Vil!. Corp., 2000 ME 137, 17, 755 A.2d 1064, 1066.

It is a basic principle of the law of constructive trust that the res of a constructive trust

can be traced beyond the original wrongdoer into the hands of third parties . See Spickler v.

Flynn, 494 A.2d 1369, 1373 n.4 (Me. 1985); Forbes v. JVells Beach Casino, Inc., 646, 653 (Me.

1979). If Annemarie Germain as Personal Representative has already distributed all of the

res-the Estate assets on which Plaintiffs seek to impose a constructive trust (presumably to

herself in her individual capacity), then there may be no basis for asserting a constructive trust

2 claim against her as Personal Representative. If she has not distributed all of the res, then,

based on the fact that the alleged wrongdoer and the Personal Representative are the same

person, the Personal Representative is a proper party defendant. At this stage of the case,

viewing the complaint in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the court cannot say they have

no cognizable claim against Annemarie Germain in her Personal Representative capacity.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: The Personal Representative's Motion to

Dismiss is denied.

Pursuant to M .R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this Order by

reference in the docket. .~~ DatedJune6,2016 ./ j//1//j/l/~~ A.M. Horton, Justice

,., .)

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Related

Heber v. Lucerne-In-Maine Village Corp.
2000 ME 137 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
Spickler v. Flynn
494 A.2d 1369 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1985)
Town of Eddington v. University of Maine Foundation
2007 ME 74 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Levy v. Germain, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/levy-v-germain-mesuperct-2016.