Levine v. Levine

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Levine v. Levine

302 A.D.2d 369, 753 N.Y.S.2d 897

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 3, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 302 A.D.2d 369 (Levine v. Levine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Levine v. Levine, 302 A.D.2d 369, 753 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Woodard, J.), dated March 25, 2002, as granted the defendant’s motion for an award of an interim counsel fee in the sum of $200,000 and ordered that such fee be paid from a specified account.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and the motion is denied.

The Supreme Court should not have granted the defendant’s motion for an award of an interim counsel fee given the lack of adequate documentation regarding legal services already rendered (see Domestic Relations Law § 237; Darvas v Darvas, 242 AD2d 554; Cronin v Cronin, 158 AD2d 447; Goodson v Goodson, 135 AD2d 604).

In light of our determination, the plaintiffs remaining contention concerning the source of payment for the fee is academic. Ritter, J.P., Goldstein, Luciano and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

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In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Woodard, J.), dated March 25, 2002, as granted the defendant’s motion for an award of an interim counsel fee in the sum of $200,000 and ordered that such fee be paid from a specified account.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and the motion is denied.

The Supreme Court should not have granted the defendant’s motion for an award of an interim counsel fee given the lack of adequate documentation regarding legal services already rendered (see Domestic Relations Law § 237; Darvas v Darvas, 242 AD2d 554; Cronin v Cronin, 158 AD2d 447; Goodson v Goodson, 135 AD2d 604).

In light of our determination, the plaintiffs remaining contention concerning the source of payment for the fee is academic. Ritter, J.P., Goldstein, Luciano and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

302 A.D.2d 369, 753 N.Y.S.2d 897, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/levine-v-levine-nyappdiv-2003.

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