Levin v. Levin

New York Supreme Court

Levin v. Levin

159 Misc. 230, 288 N.Y.S. 820, 1936 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1317

CourtNew York Supreme Court

DecidedFebruary 18, 1936

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 159 Misc. 230 (Levin v. Levin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Levin v. Levin, 159 Misc. 230, 288 N.Y.S. 820, 1936 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1317 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1936).

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Opinion

Close, J.

The defendants’ notice of motion is based upon the pleadings, the demand for the bill of particulars and the bills of particulars furnished. Consequently, they are not limited to the bare allegations of the complaint. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 476; Rules Civ. Prac. rule 112; Russell v. Societe Anonyme, etc., 268 N. Y. 173.) This being true, it is clear that the consideration for the alleged contract is indivisible. There is only one contract, viz., a contract to enter into a marriage that would concededly be void, as one of the parties was already legally married to another. There was no separate contract for society and companionship. Assuming this to be true, such a contract would under the circumstances here, be against public policy and, therefore, void. It is not necessary to spread the facts involved upon the record. The plaintiff’s position is untenable. Motion is granted.

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Close, J.

The defendants’ notice of motion is based upon the pleadings, the demand for the bill of particulars and the bills of particulars furnished. Consequently, they are not limited to the bare allegations of the complaint. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 476; Rules Civ. Prac. rule 112; Russell v. Societe Anonyme, etc., 268 N. Y. 173.) This being true, it is clear that the consideration for the alleged contract is indivisible. There is only one contract, viz., a contract to enter into a marriage that would concededly be void, as one of the parties was already legally married to another. There was no separate contract for society and companionship. Assuming this to be true, such a contract would under the circumstances here, be against public policy and, therefore, void. It is not necessary to spread the facts involved upon the record. The plaintiff’s position is untenable. Motion is granted.

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Bluebook (online)

159 Misc. 230, 288 N.Y.S. 820, 1936 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/levin-v-levin-nysupct-1936.

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