Filed 9/10/26 Lettini v. Cherry Bekaert Advisory CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
NICOLIE LETTINI, B350508
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STCV33806)
CHERRY BEKAERT ADVISORY LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
LOIA and Ilya Alekseyeff for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Littler Mendelson, Derek S. Hecht, and James A. Becerra for Defendant and Respondent.
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For 20 years, attorney Ilya Alekseyeff has been representing private clients in civil matters while employed as a deputy alternate public defender in Los Angeles County. In so doing, he has persistently violated the law. Worse yet, he has repeatedly lied about it, reporting to the Alternate Public Defender’s Office that he was not engaged in outside employment. In this matter, Alekseyeff represents a private client in a civil case against her former employer. Upon discovering Alekseyeff’s legally prohibited dual employment, the former employer applied ex parte to disqualify Alekseyeff as the client’s counsel. The trial court “[g]ranted” the application, but did not purport to exercise its authority to disqualify counsel on its own motion. We conclude that the employer lacked standing to seek Alekseyeff’s disqualification. We nevertheless recognize that Alekseyeff’s violation of the per se prohibition against representing civil clients provides a basis for the trial court to disqualify him even without an application or motion, and remand for the trial court to determine whether to exercise that authority should it determine that Alekseyeff’s subsequent resignation as a deputy alternate public defender does not render the issue moot.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Alekseyeff Violates the Law and Lies to Conceal That Violation Since 2006, Alekseyeff has been employed by Los Angeles County (the County) as either a deputy public defender (between 2006 and 2008) or a deputy alternate public defender (between 2008 and the date of the disqualification order challenged in this appeal). The County’s Charter provides that the Public Defender and their deputies “shall not engage in any private law practice, and they shall devote all their time and attention during business hours, to the duties of their respective offices.” (L.A. County Charter, § 55; see also Gov. Code, § 27705.) The County’s Code further provides that the Alternate Public Defender shall “serve in the same manner as the public defender,” and that its deputies “shall have the same qualifications required by law for comparable deputy public defenders.” (L.A. County Mun. Code, § 2.11.020.)
Notwithstanding these restrictions, Alekseyeff has since 2006 also been representing private clients in a variety of civil matters, and has actively concealed those representations by repeatedly certifying to his public employer, in documents titled “Employee Report on Outside Employment Activities,” that he was “not presently engaged . . . in outside employment.” (Capitalization and underscoring omitted, italics added.) He executed two of those documents in February 2024 and September 2025—the latter of which was executed while representing a party in this civil case. II. Alekseyeff Represents Nicolie Lettini in This Case On December 20, 2024, Nicolie Lettini sued her former employer, Cherry Bekaert Advisory LLC (Cherry Bekaert), for
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fraud and unfair business practices.1 At all times, Lettini has been represented by Alekseyeff and his law corporation, LOIA, Inc. III. Cherry Bekaert Files an Ex Parte Application to Disqualify Alekseyeff On October 15, 2025, Cherry Bekaert filed an ex parte application to disqualify Alekseyeff on the ground that his employment as a deputy alternate public defender disqualified him from simultaneously representing civil clients. Cherry Bekaert argued that Alekseyeff had repeatedly cited the needs of his criminal clients when delaying litigation of this case.2 Lettini filed an opposition the same day,3 arguing, among other things, that the bar on outside employment did not apply to
1 Lettini also sued Cherry Bekaert’s partners, Christian Fuellgraf and Collin Hill, neither of whom are parties to this appeal. Cherry Bekaert cross complained against Lettini and several others, including Alekseyeff’s domestic partner Artur Elizarov as well as Elizarov’s company Capital Accounting Partners, LLC, neither of whom are parties to this appeal.
2 Cherry Bekaert also observed that the suspension of Alekseyeff’s law corporation by the Franchise Tax Board for failing to pay its taxes “highlight[ed]” the “impropriety” of his continued representation of Lettini in this case.
3 Lettini’s opposition is file-stamped October 15, 2025, but Lettini submits a request asking us to judicially notice a printout showing that the payment of fees for the opposition was not processed until October 21, 2025. As discussed below, we reject both parties’ requests to expand the record by which we evaluate the propriety of the disqualification order. More to the point, because we conclude that the disqualification order must be reversed on its merits, any procedural defect is of no consequence.
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Alekseyeff, and that Cherry Bekaert lacked standing to seek his disqualification. IV. The Trial Court Grants the Application, and Alekseyeff Appeals On October 20, 2025, the trial court “[g]ranted” the application, and Alekseyeff filed a notice of appeal. The text of the court’s minute order referred solely to Cherry Bekaert’s application, and made no mention of the court exercising its own authority to disqualify counsel. V. Alekseyeff Resigns from the Alternate Public Defender’s Office Nine days later, Alekseyeff filed a declaration in the trial court stating that he had resigned from the Alternate Public Defender’s Office, effective October 31, 2025. The trial court stayed the proceedings below pending this appeal.4 DISCUSSION
Lettini appeals the trial court’s order disqualifying Alekseyeff as her attorney. “[O]rders granting . . . attorney disqualification motions are immediately appealable in California state courts.” (URS Corp. v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 872, 878.) We review such orders for an abuse of discretion (People ex rel. Depart. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1143 (SpeeDee Oil)), reviewing for substantial evidence any subsidiary factual findings (ibid.), but reviewing de novo any subsidiary
4 On March 12, 2026, Lettini filed an unopposed motion to augment the record in this appeal with Alekseyeff’s October 29, 2025 declaration, as well as a minute order and reporter’s transcript from the October 29, 2025 hearing. That motion is granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)
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legal issues, such as whether a party has standing to seek disqualification (Great Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1354 (Great Lakes)). Because our focus is on the propriety of the trial court’s ruling at the time it was made (People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 176), we reject the parties’ efforts to have us evaluate the disqualification ruling in this case in the light of additional evidence never presented to the trial court; we accordingly deny the parties’ competing requests for judicial notice.
Trial courts may disqualify an attorney as part of their inherent and statutory authority to control the proceedings before them. (Moreci v. Scaffold Solutions, Inc. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 425, 432 (Moreci); Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5).) In so doing, courts must weigh the competing interests of clients’ right to counsel of their choice against the need “to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.” (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) The latter concern is “paramount” and takes precedence. (Ibid.)
Counsel may be disqualified in response to a party’s noticed motion or ex parte application to disqualify counsel or in the exercise of the court’s own motion. The requirements of each differ. I. Disqualification in Response to a Motion or Ex Parte Application Because disqualification “is a drastic course of action”
(Roush v. Seagate Technology, LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 210, 219), and because disqualification motions and ex parte applications have the potential to become a strategic tool to harass opposing counsel or delay litigation, a party seeking disqualification must establish both a basis for disqualification
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and standing to move for disqualification (Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358).
A party seeking disqualification has standing if they have a “legally protected” or otherwise “sufficient” interest that would be adversely affected if the attorney at issue was not disqualified. (Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356, citing Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 175.) Case law identifies four general situations in which a party has the requisite “legally protected” interest to seek disqualification— namely, (1)where the party has a past or present attorney-client relationship with the attorney to be disqualified (Moreci, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 432; Great Lakes, at p. 1356); (2) where the attorney to be disqualified owes the party a duty of confidentiality, even if that duty does not arise from a past or present attorney-client relationship (DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 829, 832); (3) where the party has a “‘personal stake’ in the motion” because they would suffer “cognizable injury” if the attorney continued his representation in the case (Great Lakes, at pp. 1357-1358; Colyer v. Smith (C.D.Cal. 1999) 50 F.Supp.2d 966, 971; Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 (Kennedy)); and (4) where the attorney’s continued participation in the case “would undermine the integrity of the judicial process” because that participation would permit an “‘ethical breach’” so “‘“‘manifest and glaring’”’” that it would “‘“impact[] the [] party’s interest in a just and lawful determination”’” of the action (Kennedy, at pp. 1204-1205; Conservatorship of Lee C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1083).
We need not address the avalanche of attacks Lettini levels against the trial court’s disqualification order, including Lettini’s contention that it was improper to order disqualification on an ex
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parte basis without holding a hearing, because Cherry Bekaert lacked standing to seek disqualification of Alekseyeff.
It is undisputed that Cherry Bekaert and Alekseyeff have never had an attorney-client relationship (the first scenario).
It is also undisputed that Alekseyeff did not otherwise owe Cherry Bekaert a duty of confidentiality (the second scenario).
Cherry Bekaert has also failed to establish how Alekseyeff’s continued representation of Lettini—in violation of the statutory bar against dual representation—would cause Cherry Bekaert to suffer a “cognizable injury” or “impact” its interest “in a just and lawful determination” of the action (the last two scenarios). Cherry Bekaert articulates two alleged impacts or injuries.
First, it argues that Alekseyeff has in the past cited his criminal caseload as the reason why he has failed to deliver discovery on time, why he has asked to continue hearings, and why he has “rush[ed]” hearings; Cherry Bekaert asserts that allowing the dual caseload to continue will “caus[e further] delay and additional expense.” The delay and expense to one party that arises when the opposing party’s counsel is overly busy is not a cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing to disqualify that counsel; if it were, disqualification motions would be a dime a dozen.
Second, Cherry Bekaert argues Alekseyeff’s simultaneous handling of civil cases while working as a deputy alternate public defender undermines the integrity of the judicial process. We agree that Alekseyeff’s outside representation and concerted efforts to conceal that prohibited representation from the alternate public defender’s office was inconsistent with the statutory requirements of his oath of office. In so concluding, we necessarily reject, as bordering on frivolous, Alekseyeff’s
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statutory construction-based assertion that the limitations on outside representation do not apply to deputy alternate public defenders because one section of the County’s Code provides that the “alternate public defender” “serve[s] in the same manner as the public defender” but does not impose the identical “same manner” requirement for the alternate public defender’s deputies (L.A. County Mun. Code, § 2.11.020); given that the public defender, deputy public defenders, and the alternate public defender are all subject to the bar on outside practice, we see no reason in logic or linguistics to exempt deputy alternate public defenders from that bar, particularly when those deputy alternate public defenders must share the “same qualifications” as their fellow deputy public defenders (ibid.). We also necessarily reject Alekseyeff’s fact-based argument that, even if the prohibition on outside employment applied to him, he never violated it because he only took on civil cases in which his spouse’s (and, by extension, his own) interests were at stake. The prohibition contains no such personal interest exception, and even if it did, Alekseyeff surely violated it in this case when Lettini sued Cherry Bekaert. Although Alekseyeff’s conduct in violating the statutory prohibition and then lying about it impugns the judicial process, standing exists only if that besmirchment impacts the movant’s interests—and Cherry Bekaert has shown no adverse impact beyond the dismay felt by any other member of the legal profession upon learning of Alekseyeff’s brazen conduct.
Cherry Bekaert makes two further arguments in support of its assertion that it has standing to seek disqualification of Alekseyeff.
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First, it asserts that the fourth scenario—for situations in which an attorney’s continued involvement in the case “would undermine the integrity of the judicial process”—does not require proof of adverse impact to Cherry Bekaert because language in Kennedy, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1204-1205 states that a trial court may sua sponte disqualify an attorney based on “‘[t]he court[’s] independent interest in ensuring trials are conducted within ethical standards of the profession.’” Regardless of the Kennedy opinion’s broad language, Kennedy and the other cases Cherry Bekaert cites for this point all arose in scenarios where the attorney’s continued representation had a cognizable impact on the opposing party in that case. (Kennedy, at p. 1200 [disqualifying attorney from representing his son in custody dispute over grandchild, where he could potentially misuse confidential information and would likely be called as a witness]; Jarvis v. Jarvis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 113, 120-121 [disqualifying attorney from representing limited partnership in one partner’s action against the other partner and the partnership, based on concerns that the attorney, whose representation was not approved by both partners, was adverse to the partnership’s best interests]; People v. Peoples (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1592, 1599 (Peoples) [disqualifying attorney from representing her brother in criminal case in which brother was accused of assaulting her exhusband with a deadly weapon and to which her children were percipient witnesses]; Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 912 [disqualifying attorney who was potential witness at trial], superseded by statute as stated in Eaton v. Siemens (E.D.Cal. 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 58621.) We decline to decouple the broad language in these cases from their facts. Doing so would effectively eradicate the standing requirement
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anytime a court disqualifies counsel at a party’s suggestion (whether formally by motion or application, or informally), thereby undermining the standing requirement’s purpose of preventing litigants from bringing disqualification motions and applications for strategic gain.
Second, Cherry Bekaert argues that Alekseyeff’s continued representation negatively impacts Cherry Bekaert because, if Cherry Bekaert prevails in this case, Lettini can cite Alekseyeff’s violation of the statutory prohibition against outside employment as a basis to overturn Cherry Bekaert’s victory under the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.7 (Rule 1.7), which precludes a client—here, Lettini—from consenting to representation that is “prohibited by law.” (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.7(d)(2).) It is unclear whether Rule 1.7’s bar on consent applies here because the rule applies when a lawyer’s representation “is directly adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter,” and there is no such directly adverse representation in this case. (Id., rule 1.7(a).) And even if Rule 1.7 applies, its violation does not provide Lettini with a basis to collaterally attack a judgment; her remedy might instead lie in a malpractice claim. (Accord, Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 602, 621 [“‘the California State Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct govern attorney discipline; they do not create standards for disqualification in the courts’”].) II. Disqualification on the Court’s Own Motion In recognition of the judiciary’s “‘independent interest in ensuring that criminal [and civil] trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them’” (Peoples, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1599, quoting Wheat v. United States (1988) 486
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U.S. 153, 160), trial courts have the authority to disqualify an attorney on their own motion (People v. Superior Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 261, fn. 4, superseded on other grounds by Pen. Code, § 1424; Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 27, fn. 6). This sua sponte authority to disqualify is necessarily narrow; were that authority much broader, it could swallow the standing requirement whole, for a party lacking standing could simply ask the court to exercise its own authority to disqualify and, if exercised, sidestep any need to show standing. Thus, a court’s authority to disqualify may well reach no further than those very rare situations where a positive statutory provision erects a per se prohibition on counsel’s representation in a case, for it is in those situations that continued representation is an unassailable affront to the integrity of the court. This would include the statutory bar on practicing law without a license. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6125.) It would also include the situation present in this case, where state and County law together prohibit deputy alternate public defenders from representing civil litigants.
In this case, the trial court did not purport to sua sponte exercise its authority to disqualify Alekseyeff; the court’s order referred solely to Cherry Bekaert’s application. We accordingly remand for the trial court to consider whether it wishes to exercise its inherent authority after giving the parties an opportunity to respond, and, possibly, to consider whether Alekseyeff’s resignation from the Alternate Public Defender’s Office renders any basis for disqualification moot.
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Each party is to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J. HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J. BAKER
_________________________, J. MOOR