COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Athey and White
LETONYA LESHELLE ROANE MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 0950-22-2 PER CURIAM JULY 5, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND W. Reilly Marchant, Judge
(Kelsey Bulger, Senior Appellate Attorney; Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Letonya Leshelle Roane (“Roane”) pled no contest to carnal knowledge, in violation of
Code § 18.2-63, under the terms of a written plea agreement. The Circuit Court for the City of
Richmond (“trial court”) sentenced Roane to ten years of suspended incarceration, consistent with
the terms of the plea agreement. On appeal, Roane contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying her request to take the matter under advisement and withhold a finding of guilt. After
examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is
unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).
I. BACKGROUND
The facts underlying Roane’s conviction in this case are undisputed. The Commonwealth
proffered that Roane engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with I.F., a 12 year old who had
run away from home. I.F. went to “extreme lengths” to hide her true age from Roane; she showed
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). Roane fake credit cards, fake identification, and enlisted third parties to confirm her false assurances
to Roane that she was 20 years old. As soon as Roane discovered that I.F. had been reported
missing, Roane took her to the police station, where Roane made a “full confession” about her
relationship with I.F. Following Roane’s arrest, I.F. made “numerous” and “concerning statements”
in apparent attempts to get Roane out of trouble, including that she had “put a knife to” Roane’s
throat.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend that Roane be
sentenced to ten years’ incarceration, with all ten years suspended. After entering her plea, Roane’s
counsel interrupted the plea colloquy and motioned for the trial court to take the case under
advisement and withhold a guilty finding. Roane acknowledged that the written plea agreement did
not provide for a deferred disposition, and the Commonwealth objected to her motion. Roane
argued that the trial court should take the case under advisement because of the “extenuating
circumstance[s]” surrounding the offense. These circumstances included I.F.’s false representations
“about her age,” and Roane’s immediate actions in taking I.F. to the police and making a full
confession when she learned the truth. Roane emphasized her low risk of recidivism based on a
psychosexual evaluation she fully cooperated with completing. She stated that her “main concern
with the conviction” was the mandatory, lifetime registration requirement on the sex offender
registry. Roane maintained that she had been “consistently compliant” with the trial court’s orders
and asked that the trial court place “whatever conditions” were necessary to “have a different
outcome in this case.”
The trial court found it incredible that Roane could have believed that the 12-year-old victim
was 20 years old. The trial court acknowledged that Roane had made “valid points” regarding the
circumstances of the case but also noted the objections of the Commonwealth and I.F.’s parents.
-2- The trial court found that there was “too great of an age disparity” between I.F. and Roane,1 and
therefore denied her motion to take the case under advisement. The trial court resumed its plea
colloquy to ensure that Roane understood the implications of her no contest plea. After completing
the plea colloquy and reviewing the plea agreement with Roane, the trial court found that Roane
entered her plea “freely, intelligently, and voluntarily” and understood its consequences.
Accordingly, the trial court accepted Roane’s plea of no contest and convicted her of carnal
knowledge.2 Before pronouncing the sentence provided in the plea agreement, the trial court found
that Roane had received “some consideration” under the plea agreement, which recommended a
fully suspended sentence, notwithstanding that the discretionary sentencing guidelines
recommended a minimum of seven months’ incarceration.3 Roane appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s inherent authority to defer dispositions in criminal cases is “narrow” and
whether to exercise that judicial authority is discretionary. Harris v. Commonwealth, 63
Va. App. 525, 533 (2014). Thus, we review a trial court’s decision not to grant a deferred
disposition under its inherent authority under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Id.
We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing
party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard the
evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the
1 Roane was 28 years old at the time of the offense. 2 The Commonwealth had amended the original charge of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than 13 years of age to carnal knowledge in violation of Code § 18.2-63. 3 The discretionary sentencing guidelines recommended between seven months to one year and four months’ incarceration, with a midpoint of nine months. -3- credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
B. The trial court did not err by refusing to take the case under advisement.
Roane argues that the trial court abused its discretion. By convicting her rather than taking
the case under advisement, Roane claims the trial court “failed to give weight to the mitigating
circumstances of the offense” and the “devastating effect this conviction would have on [her] life.”
Roane also contends that because I.F. “wanted to avoid Roane getting in trouble” and I.F.’s parents’
“primary goal was to avoid” I.F. having to testify, “deferring disposition would have been a just
result for [both] Roane and I.F.” In Roane’s estimation, “[t]he trial court’s refusal” to take the case
under advisement “is reversible error.” We disagree.
A trial court that has not entered a conviction order has the authority “to defer the
disposition of a criminal trial until a later date.” Harris, 63 Va. App. at 533. “But that discretion is
not limitless.” Id. It provides “neither a gateway nor a loophole for acquitting or refusing to
convict a defendant whose guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” White v.
Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 599, 615 (2017) (quoting Harris, 63 Va. App. at 537). Thus, a trial
court “cannot simply acquit a defendant through an act of judicial clemency (or judicial
nullification), where the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and
where no statutory authority exists to allow the trial court to dismiss the charge.” Harris, 63
Va. App. at 537.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Athey and White
LETONYA LESHELLE ROANE MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 0950-22-2 PER CURIAM JULY 5, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND W. Reilly Marchant, Judge
(Kelsey Bulger, Senior Appellate Attorney; Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Letonya Leshelle Roane (“Roane”) pled no contest to carnal knowledge, in violation of
Code § 18.2-63, under the terms of a written plea agreement. The Circuit Court for the City of
Richmond (“trial court”) sentenced Roane to ten years of suspended incarceration, consistent with
the terms of the plea agreement. On appeal, Roane contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying her request to take the matter under advisement and withhold a finding of guilt. After
examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is
unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).
I. BACKGROUND
The facts underlying Roane’s conviction in this case are undisputed. The Commonwealth
proffered that Roane engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with I.F., a 12 year old who had
run away from home. I.F. went to “extreme lengths” to hide her true age from Roane; she showed
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). Roane fake credit cards, fake identification, and enlisted third parties to confirm her false assurances
to Roane that she was 20 years old. As soon as Roane discovered that I.F. had been reported
missing, Roane took her to the police station, where Roane made a “full confession” about her
relationship with I.F. Following Roane’s arrest, I.F. made “numerous” and “concerning statements”
in apparent attempts to get Roane out of trouble, including that she had “put a knife to” Roane’s
throat.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend that Roane be
sentenced to ten years’ incarceration, with all ten years suspended. After entering her plea, Roane’s
counsel interrupted the plea colloquy and motioned for the trial court to take the case under
advisement and withhold a guilty finding. Roane acknowledged that the written plea agreement did
not provide for a deferred disposition, and the Commonwealth objected to her motion. Roane
argued that the trial court should take the case under advisement because of the “extenuating
circumstance[s]” surrounding the offense. These circumstances included I.F.’s false representations
“about her age,” and Roane’s immediate actions in taking I.F. to the police and making a full
confession when she learned the truth. Roane emphasized her low risk of recidivism based on a
psychosexual evaluation she fully cooperated with completing. She stated that her “main concern
with the conviction” was the mandatory, lifetime registration requirement on the sex offender
registry. Roane maintained that she had been “consistently compliant” with the trial court’s orders
and asked that the trial court place “whatever conditions” were necessary to “have a different
outcome in this case.”
The trial court found it incredible that Roane could have believed that the 12-year-old victim
was 20 years old. The trial court acknowledged that Roane had made “valid points” regarding the
circumstances of the case but also noted the objections of the Commonwealth and I.F.’s parents.
-2- The trial court found that there was “too great of an age disparity” between I.F. and Roane,1 and
therefore denied her motion to take the case under advisement. The trial court resumed its plea
colloquy to ensure that Roane understood the implications of her no contest plea. After completing
the plea colloquy and reviewing the plea agreement with Roane, the trial court found that Roane
entered her plea “freely, intelligently, and voluntarily” and understood its consequences.
Accordingly, the trial court accepted Roane’s plea of no contest and convicted her of carnal
knowledge.2 Before pronouncing the sentence provided in the plea agreement, the trial court found
that Roane had received “some consideration” under the plea agreement, which recommended a
fully suspended sentence, notwithstanding that the discretionary sentencing guidelines
recommended a minimum of seven months’ incarceration.3 Roane appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s inherent authority to defer dispositions in criminal cases is “narrow” and
whether to exercise that judicial authority is discretionary. Harris v. Commonwealth, 63
Va. App. 525, 533 (2014). Thus, we review a trial court’s decision not to grant a deferred
disposition under its inherent authority under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Id.
We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing
party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard the
evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the
1 Roane was 28 years old at the time of the offense. 2 The Commonwealth had amended the original charge of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than 13 years of age to carnal knowledge in violation of Code § 18.2-63. 3 The discretionary sentencing guidelines recommended between seven months to one year and four months’ incarceration, with a midpoint of nine months. -3- credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
B. The trial court did not err by refusing to take the case under advisement.
Roane argues that the trial court abused its discretion. By convicting her rather than taking
the case under advisement, Roane claims the trial court “failed to give weight to the mitigating
circumstances of the offense” and the “devastating effect this conviction would have on [her] life.”
Roane also contends that because I.F. “wanted to avoid Roane getting in trouble” and I.F.’s parents’
“primary goal was to avoid” I.F. having to testify, “deferring disposition would have been a just
result for [both] Roane and I.F.” In Roane’s estimation, “[t]he trial court’s refusal” to take the case
under advisement “is reversible error.” We disagree.
A trial court that has not entered a conviction order has the authority “to defer the
disposition of a criminal trial until a later date.” Harris, 63 Va. App. at 533. “But that discretion is
not limitless.” Id. It provides “neither a gateway nor a loophole for acquitting or refusing to
convict a defendant whose guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” White v.
Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 599, 615 (2017) (quoting Harris, 63 Va. App. at 537). Thus, a trial
court “cannot simply acquit a defendant through an act of judicial clemency (or judicial
nullification), where the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and
where no statutory authority exists to allow the trial court to dismiss the charge.” Harris, 63
Va. App. at 537.
Roane’s plea of no contest admitted, “for the purposes of the case, all facts supporting the
accusation.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 710, 723 (2012). In fact, the written plea
agreement expressly provided, “[t]he defendant hereby stipulates that the Commonwealth’s
evidence is sufficient to find her guilty of above stated offense[ ].” Roane acknowledged to the
trial court that her “main concern” was the mandatory, “lifetime registration” requirement
-4- actuated by the conviction. See Code §§ 9.1-902, 9.1-903 (establishing registration requirements
for the Sex Offender Registry). She therefore asked the trial court “to consider using its inherent
authority to take [the case] under advisement” to monitor Roane’s “compliance” and “possibly
have a different outcome.” But given her stipulation to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s
evidence and the mandatory registration requirement for a violation of Code § 18.2-63(A), the
motion’s only purpose was “to delay an unavoidable guilty verdict or to persuade the trial court
to acquit” Roane “purely as an act of judicial clemency.” Harris, 63 Va. App. at 537. The record
demonstrates that the trial court considered Roane’s proffered extenuating circumstances and the
lasting consequences of a conviction and acknowledged that Roane had made “good” and “valid
points.” The trial court found, however, that the proffered evidence and Roane’s plea supported
a finding of guilt and that it was inappropriate under the circumstances to “override” the
Commonwealth’s objections and those of I.F.’s parents. On this record, we cannot say that every
reasonable jurist would have granted Roane’s motion; thus, we are not permitted to second-guess
the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying it. Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 1,
10-11 (2019).
III. CONCLUSION
Finding no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.
-5-