COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00142-CR
LETICIA MCWILLIAMS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 1174887D
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Leticia McWilliams appeals from the revocation of her
community supervision. In her sole point, McWilliams argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by revoking her community supervision and by sentencing
her to four years’ imprisonment. We will affirm.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 19, 2010, McWilliams pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to the third-degree felony of intoxication assault. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 49.07 (West 2011). The trial court sentenced McWilliams to ten
years’ confinement; imposed a $1,000 fine; suspended the sentence; and placed
McWilliams on community supervision for a period of ten years. On July 22,
2011, the State filed a petition to revoke McWilliams’s community supervision.
Three months later, the State filed a motion to dismiss its petition to revoke, and
the trial court dismissed the petition, continued McWilliams’s community
supervision, and imposed additional conditions of community supervision.
The State filed a second petition to revoke McWilliams’s community
supervision on February 4, 2014, alleging that McWilliams had violated multiple
conditions of her community supervision. Specifically, the State alleged that
McWilliams was ordered by the trial court to submit to supervision by the
Supervision with Immediate Enforcement (SWIFT) Court and that she had
violated that condition when she was discharged from the SWIFT Court for
noncompliance, as follows:
a. The Defendant failed to install the In-Home monitoring device as court ordered and directed by Tarrant County CSCD in the month of January 2014.
b. The Defendant failed to submit a urine specimen or a non-diluted urine specimen on or about January 30, 2014 as directed by Tarrant County CSCD.
2 The State also alleged that McWilliams had violated additional conditions of her
community supervision when she failed to pay the supervision fee of $60 or any
other amount on the fifteenth day for the various months during the period from
April 2010 to January 2014, as listed in the petition (Paragraph 2); failed to install
the in-home monitoring device in January 2014 (Paragraph 3);2 failed to pay for
urine testing for eight months during the period from 2012 to 2014 (Paragraph 4);
failed to pay for electronic monitoring fees and owed a total balance of $2,425
(Paragraph 5); and failed to obtain or verify employment for July 2012 through
January 2014 (Paragraph 6).
At the revocation hearing, McWilliams pleaded “not true” to the allegations
in the State’s second petition to revoke. After hearing testimony from
McWilliams’s community supervision officer, McWilliams’s SWIFT community
supervision officer, and McWilliams, the trial court found the allegations in
Paragraphs 1a, 1b, 2, 3, and 4 of the State’s second petition to revoke to be true
and sentenced McWilliams to four years’ confinement.3
III. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In her sole point, McWilliams argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by revoking her community supervision and by sentencing her to four
2 The State notes in its brief that the allegation in Paragraph 1a is repeated in Paragraph 3. 3 The judgment does not contain findings related to the allegations in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the State’s second petition to revoke.
3 years’ imprisonment. McWilliams argues that all of the violations alleged in the
State’s second petition to revoke, other than a single act of failing to submit a
urine specimen, were based on her failure to do acts that were founded on
financial obligations and that there was no proof that she had the ability to meet
those financial obligations.
We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of
discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a
revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision.
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172,
174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of
proof, the trial court abuses its discretion by revoking the community supervision.
Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94.
The record reveals that the trial court added supplemental conditions of
community supervision on September 24, 2012, requiring McWilliams to submit
to supervision by the SWIFT Court and to submit a valid, nondiluted, and
nonadulterated urine, hair, blood, breath, or saliva sample for testing according to
the time and manner directed by the supervision officer. Two weeks later,
4 McWilliams signed a document entitled “SWIFT Court Warning,” which stated
that she was required to call the drug-test hotline every weekday and, if selected,
to report for testing before 3:00 p.m. that same day. In bold at the bottom of the
warning, it stated, “I have read or have had the S.W.I.F.T. program explained to
me. I understand also that my probation can be revoked for any violation of
probation.”
During the revocation hearing, McWilliams’s SWIFT community
supervision officer testified that McWilliams was discharged from SWIFT for
noncompliance, which included failing to submit a urine specimen on January 30,
2014.4 McWilliams testified that she presented on January 30, 2014, to give a
urine specimen but that she left at 1:35 or 1:40 p.m. before giving a sample
because her mother had to be at work. On cross-examination, McWilliams
admitted that she did not give a urine specimen on January 30, 2014, and that
she understood that was a condition of her probation and a condition of the
SWIFT order. On appeal, McWilliams does not deny that she failed to submit a
urine sample on January 30, 2014. Instead, she argues that “her failure to
submit a urine sample was beyond [her] control and [that] she was in fact present
and able to submit a sample[;] she just could not stay all afternoon due to her
mother[’]s work.”
4 The record includes a letter from McWilliams’s community supervision officer to the trial court stating that McWilliams was discharged from the SWIFT Court for “noncompliance” on January 31, 2014—the day following her failure to provide a urine specimen.
5 Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
we hold that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00142-CR
LETICIA MCWILLIAMS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 1174887D
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Leticia McWilliams appeals from the revocation of her
community supervision. In her sole point, McWilliams argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by revoking her community supervision and by sentencing
her to four years’ imprisonment. We will affirm.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 19, 2010, McWilliams pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to the third-degree felony of intoxication assault. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 49.07 (West 2011). The trial court sentenced McWilliams to ten
years’ confinement; imposed a $1,000 fine; suspended the sentence; and placed
McWilliams on community supervision for a period of ten years. On July 22,
2011, the State filed a petition to revoke McWilliams’s community supervision.
Three months later, the State filed a motion to dismiss its petition to revoke, and
the trial court dismissed the petition, continued McWilliams’s community
supervision, and imposed additional conditions of community supervision.
The State filed a second petition to revoke McWilliams’s community
supervision on February 4, 2014, alleging that McWilliams had violated multiple
conditions of her community supervision. Specifically, the State alleged that
McWilliams was ordered by the trial court to submit to supervision by the
Supervision with Immediate Enforcement (SWIFT) Court and that she had
violated that condition when she was discharged from the SWIFT Court for
noncompliance, as follows:
a. The Defendant failed to install the In-Home monitoring device as court ordered and directed by Tarrant County CSCD in the month of January 2014.
b. The Defendant failed to submit a urine specimen or a non-diluted urine specimen on or about January 30, 2014 as directed by Tarrant County CSCD.
2 The State also alleged that McWilliams had violated additional conditions of her
community supervision when she failed to pay the supervision fee of $60 or any
other amount on the fifteenth day for the various months during the period from
April 2010 to January 2014, as listed in the petition (Paragraph 2); failed to install
the in-home monitoring device in January 2014 (Paragraph 3);2 failed to pay for
urine testing for eight months during the period from 2012 to 2014 (Paragraph 4);
failed to pay for electronic monitoring fees and owed a total balance of $2,425
(Paragraph 5); and failed to obtain or verify employment for July 2012 through
January 2014 (Paragraph 6).
At the revocation hearing, McWilliams pleaded “not true” to the allegations
in the State’s second petition to revoke. After hearing testimony from
McWilliams’s community supervision officer, McWilliams’s SWIFT community
supervision officer, and McWilliams, the trial court found the allegations in
Paragraphs 1a, 1b, 2, 3, and 4 of the State’s second petition to revoke to be true
and sentenced McWilliams to four years’ confinement.3
III. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In her sole point, McWilliams argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by revoking her community supervision and by sentencing her to four
2 The State notes in its brief that the allegation in Paragraph 1a is repeated in Paragraph 3. 3 The judgment does not contain findings related to the allegations in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the State’s second petition to revoke.
3 years’ imprisonment. McWilliams argues that all of the violations alleged in the
State’s second petition to revoke, other than a single act of failing to submit a
urine specimen, were based on her failure to do acts that were founded on
financial obligations and that there was no proof that she had the ability to meet
those financial obligations.
We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of
discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a
revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision.
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172,
174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of
proof, the trial court abuses its discretion by revoking the community supervision.
Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94.
The record reveals that the trial court added supplemental conditions of
community supervision on September 24, 2012, requiring McWilliams to submit
to supervision by the SWIFT Court and to submit a valid, nondiluted, and
nonadulterated urine, hair, blood, breath, or saliva sample for testing according to
the time and manner directed by the supervision officer. Two weeks later,
4 McWilliams signed a document entitled “SWIFT Court Warning,” which stated
that she was required to call the drug-test hotline every weekday and, if selected,
to report for testing before 3:00 p.m. that same day. In bold at the bottom of the
warning, it stated, “I have read or have had the S.W.I.F.T. program explained to
me. I understand also that my probation can be revoked for any violation of
probation.”
During the revocation hearing, McWilliams’s SWIFT community
supervision officer testified that McWilliams was discharged from SWIFT for
noncompliance, which included failing to submit a urine specimen on January 30,
2014.4 McWilliams testified that she presented on January 30, 2014, to give a
urine specimen but that she left at 1:35 or 1:40 p.m. before giving a sample
because her mother had to be at work. On cross-examination, McWilliams
admitted that she did not give a urine specimen on January 30, 2014, and that
she understood that was a condition of her probation and a condition of the
SWIFT order. On appeal, McWilliams does not deny that she failed to submit a
urine sample on January 30, 2014. Instead, she argues that “her failure to
submit a urine sample was beyond [her] control and [that] she was in fact present
and able to submit a sample[;] she just could not stay all afternoon due to her
mother[’]s work.”
4 The record includes a letter from McWilliams’s community supervision officer to the trial court stating that McWilliams was discharged from the SWIFT Court for “noncompliance” on January 31, 2014—the day following her failure to provide a urine specimen.
5 Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
we hold that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
McWilliams violated the condition of her community supervision that required her
to submit to supervision by the SWIFT Court when she failed to submit a urine
specimen on January 30, 2014. See Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 873; see also
Sanchez v. State, No. 01-13-00631-CR, 2014 WL 3107659, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] July 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking
appellant’s community supervision on the ground that he had failed to submit
urine samples on four occasions). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by revoking McWilliams’s community supervision and
sentencing her to four years’ confinement. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763; see
also Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)
(holding that proof of any one violation is sufficient to support revocation order).
We overrule McWilliams’s sole point.
6 IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled McWilliams’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Sue Walker SUE WALKER JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 18, 2014