Leterman v. Pink

249 A.D. 164, 291 N.Y.S. 249, 1936 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5062
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedNovember 27, 1936
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 249 A.D. 164 (Leterman v. Pink) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leterman v. Pink, 249 A.D. 164, 291 N.Y.S. 249, 1936 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5062 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

Cohn, J.

The petitioners Stebbins, Leterman & Gates, Inc., Elmer G. Leterman and Herbert R. Ebenstein each instituted separate certiorari proceedings to review and annul determinations [166]*166made by the Superintendent of Insurance dated October 29, 1935, amending nunc pro tunc earlier determinations dated December 28, 1933, which respectively revoked the licenses of each of these three petitioners to act as insurance brokers and denied their applications to act as insurance agents. The charge against Stebbins, Leterman & Gates, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) was that it had been guilty of fraudulent or dishonest practices and had demonstrated its incompetency or untrustworthiness to transact business as an insurance broker or agent. As against Ebenstein and Leterman, it was charged that, as vice-presidents of the corporation, they were directly responsible for the improper acts of the corporation. The charges against the petitioners and those of like character filed against the two other directors of the corporation, were heard together.

After extended hearings, the Superintendent of Insurance, on December 28, 1933, found the charges sustained and accordingly revoked the licenses issued to the corporation as a public adjuster, under section 138-a of the Insurance Law, as a broker under section 143 of the said law, and denied the requests of certain insurance companies to have the corporation represent them under the same statute, for the reason that the corporation was guilty of dishonest practices and was untrustworthy, “ in that it has failed to properly account for insurance premiums collected or received by it.” Simultaneously, the Superintendent revoked licenses issued to Leterman under sections 91, 91-a and 143 of the Insurance Law, upon the ground that he, as a vice-president and director of the corporation, was “ regarded as responsible for its irregularities,” and, upon the same ground, the Superintendent revoked the licenses issued to Ebenstein, to act as agent under section 91 of the Insurance Law and denied his application for a license under section 143 of the Insurance Law.

At the request of the petitioners, the Superintendent, on August 9, 1935, granted a rehearing, it having been stipulated that such proceedings were to supplement the original hearings. Additional testimony was taken and after the completion of the supplemental examination, the Superintendent on October 30, 1935, amended his earlier finding as to the corporation “ by striking out the * * * conclusion that the corporation was guilty of dishonest practices and is untrustworthy within the contemplation of the Insurance Law and allowing the revocation to stand and continue on the premise that the corporation has demonstrated its incompetency to transact the business of-an insurance broker, the business of a public adjuster of fire losses and the representation of insurance companies as an agent in this State, on the ground that it has failed to properly [167]*167account for insurance premiums collected or received by it.” As to Leterman and Ebenstein, the Superintendent’s amended finding Was the same as his original one save that the language as to the guilt of the corporation for which they were held personally responsible was modified as indicated.

These are the three determinations now under review. The petitioners contend that the evidence adduced before the Superintendent of Insurance is insufficient to sustain his final determinations. The individual petitioners raise the further contention that, in support of his determination as to them, the Superintendent failed to find, as required by subdivision 11 of section 143 of the' Insurance Law, that each was “ personally at fault ” in connection with the derelictions of the corporation of which they were officers.

In considering the claims of the petitioners, it becomes necessary to make brief reference to the salient facts.

Stebbins, Leterman & Gates, Inc., was organized in this State in 1928 for the purpose of engaging in the general insurance business; Arthur W. Stebbins, Albert hi. Gates and Leterman, one of the petitioners herein, were its original stockholders, officers and directors. In August, 1930, Ebenstein effected a merger of the insurance business of H. R. Ebenstein & Co. with that of Stebbins, Leterman & Gates, Inc.; he then became a stockholder of the latter corporation, was made a vice-president and a member of its board of directors. These four, Stebbins, Gates, Leterman and Ebenstein, as officers and sole directors, managed and directed the affairs of the corporation from August, 1930, until October 3, 1932, when Leterman and Ebenstein retired, although Ebenstein returned at a later time. It appears that the corporation attracted a very large clientele and developed a prosperous insurance business. However, after August, 1930, the general business depression, coupled with a lack of harmony among these officers, caused a perceptible diminution of its income. The dwindling assets of the corporation were further depleted by reason of payment to these officers of large sums for salaries, expenses and overdrafts. The testimony is that in July, 1932, there was due from the corporation to insurance companies the sum of $300,000, and that, as of December 31,1932, there was a deficit in the funds of the corporation of $239,685.93, that is, the current liabilities exceeded the current assets by that sum. It appears from the evidence, too, that premiums which had been collected from policyholders, prior to October 3, 1932, had not been transmitted by the corporation to the companies entitled to the moneys so collected. This condition of affairs precipitated an arrangement between the corporation and the insurance companies, evidenced by an agreement in writing executed on January 31, [168]*1681933, wherein provision was made by the corporation for a gradual payment of the moneys withheld from the insurance companies. The plight of the corporation is forcefully portrayed by the language of the opening recitals of this funding agreement, which was signed on behalf of the corporation by Arthur W. Stebbins as its president and L. D. Beechler, its treasurer. The introductory portion of the agreement reads as follows:

Whereas, as a result of the present depression, overdrafts on the part of two of the officers of the said corporation and the use of premium funds in the payment of salaries and expenses over a period of the last two years, the corporation has reached a point of substantial insolvency and
Whereas, there are large sums of money due to the Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Company, the National Liberty Insurance Company and the Home Indemnity Company on account of premiums collected prior to October 3, 1932,
Whereas, there are substantial sums though in smaller amounts due to approximately twenty-five insurance companies on account of premiums collected prior to October 3, 1932, by Stebbins, Leterman & Gates, Inc.”

These statements and others set forth in the document are a clear and frank admission of guilt by the corporation of the charge made against it.

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Bluebook (online)
249 A.D. 164, 291 N.Y.S. 249, 1936 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5062, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leterman-v-pink-nyappdiv-1936.