Lester v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Lester v. State

179 S.E. 869, 51 Ga. App. 146, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 602

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedApril 19, 1935

Docket24572

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 179 S.E. 869 (Lester v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lester v. State, 179 S.E. 869, 51 Ga. App. 146, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935).

Pincite

Opinion

MacIntyre, J.

There is no special demurrer to the indictment, and, reduced to its last analysis, the sole question presented by the general demurrer is whether or not the following part of the motor-vehicle law (Ga. L. 1927, p. 237, section 12 (d), Code of 1933, § 68-303 (d)) is so vague and indefinite as to be void: “An operator of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle going in the same direction, and desiring to pass the same, shall pass to the left of the vehicle overtaken, provided that the way ahead is clear of approaching traffic, but if the way is not clear, he shall not pass unless the width of the roadway is sufficient to allow his vehicle to pass to the right of the centre thereof in the direction in which his vehicle is moving.” Held, that the only part of the statute subject to attack for indefiniteness, to wit, the phrase “clear of approaching traffic,” is not so vague and indefinite as to invalidate the statute, and that the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the indictment. Ray v. State, 47 Ga. App. 22 (169 S. E. 538).

Judgment affirmed.

Broyles, O. J., and Gu&rry, J., eoneur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MacIntyre, J.

There is no special demurrer to the indictment, and, reduced to its last analysis, the sole question presented by the general demurrer is whether or not the following part of the motor-vehicle law (Ga. L. 1927, p. 237, section 12 (d), Code of 1933, § 68-303 (d)) is so vague and indefinite as to be void: “An operator of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle going in the same direction, and desiring to pass the same, shall pass to the left of the vehicle overtaken, provided that the way ahead is clear of approaching traffic, but if the way is not clear, he shall not pass unless the width of the roadway is sufficient to allow his vehicle to pass to the right of the centre thereof in the direction in which his vehicle is moving.” Held, that the only part of the statute subject to attack for indefiniteness, to wit, the phrase “clear of approaching traffic,” is not so vague and indefinite as to invalidate the statute, and that the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the indictment. Ray v. State, 47 Ga. App. 22 (169 S. E. 538).

Judgment affirmed.

Broyles, O. J., and Gu&rry, J., eoneur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

179 S.E. 869, 51 Ga. App. 146, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 602, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lester-v-state-gactapp-1935.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack