Lester v. Percudani

556 F. Supp. 2d 473, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33427, 2008 WL 763591
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 21, 2008
DocketCivil Action 3:01-CV-1182, 1:04-CV-0832
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 556 F. Supp. 2d 473 (Lester v. Percudani) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lester v. Percudani, 556 F. Supp. 2d 473, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33427, 2008 WL 763591 (M.D. Pa. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs bring the above-captioned cases 1 alleging that defendants perpetrated a pattern of racketeering and mail fraud that caused plaintiffs to purchase homes at inflated prices. Plaintiffs advance claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 201-1 to -9.3; and Pennsylvania common law. Defendants Gene Percudani and the corporate entities he controls (hereinafter “the Percudani defendants”) 2 have filed a motion (Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1182, Doc. 306; Civil Action No. l:04-CV-0832, Doc. 107) seeking partial summary judgment on the RICO claim against them. Defendants William Spaner and Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter “the Chase defendants”) have filed a separate motion (Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1182, Doc. 360; Civil Action No. 1:04-CV-0832, Doc. 232) 3 for summary judgment on the RICO conspiracy claim to which they are subject. For the reasons that follow, both motions will be denied. 4

I. Statement of Facts 5

Plaintiffs contend that defendant real-estate developer Gene Percudani (“Percu-dani”) orchestrated a scheme to overvalue residential real estate in the Pocono Mountains, located in Monroe County, Pennsylvania. He allegedly enticed plaintiffs into home purchases using fraudulent advertisements broadcast along the East Coast. When plaintiffs contacted Percudani, he *476 arranged home sales utilizing appraisals performed by defendant Dominick Strani-eri (“Stranieri”) that valued the homes at inflated rates. Defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation (“Chase”) purportedly enabled the scheme by financing mortgages for many plaintiffs in noncompliance with lending standards applicable to residential mortgages. Chase then sold the mortgages on the secondary market, shifting the risk of default to remote purchasers, while frequently retaining contracts to service the loans. This scheme allegedly left plaintiffs with mortgages that eclipsed the market values of their properties, homes in which they owned negative equity, and monthly payments that they were simply unable to afford.

A. The Advertisements and Incentive Programs

Percudani and his former business partner, Gerard Powell (“Powell”), 6 created the alleged scheme to assist low- and moderate-income individuals in purchasing homes. Percudani, through defendants Y-Rent and Raintree Homes, marketed new residences located in the Pocono Mountains via television, radio, and direct mailings. (Doc. 387, Ex. A; Doc. 387, Ex. K at 43.) Many of these advertisements targeted the greater New York City metropolitan area, though they also appeared in various locales along the eastern seaboard. (Doc. 387, Ex. K at 43.) The advertisements informed recipients that they could purchase a home for “$1,000 DOWN [and] $685.00 PER MONTH.” (Doc. 387, Ex. A.) They also represented that “From the moment you put your $1,000 down WE WILL PAY YOUR RENT AT YOUR CURRENT APARTMENT until the day you move into your new home!” and that “The Only Thing You Have To Lose Is Your Landlord!” (Id.) Plaintiffs responded by calling a toll-free telephone number, which directed them to either defendant Raintree Homes, Inc. (“Raintree”) or defendant Chapel Creek Homes, Inc. (“Chapel Creek”), both of which either built or sold homes within Percudani’s construction network. (Doc. 387, Ex. K at 62-64.) Percudani controlled both Raintree and Chapel Creek. 7 (Id. at 34, 62.)

Many homebuyers lacked the financial reserves necessary for a down payment, and Percudani and Powell worked with non-defendant Gerald Tegethoff (“Tege-thoff’), an account executive for Chase, 8 to create a savings opportunity for buyers with tight budgets. (Doc. 387, Ex. L at 93; Doc. 387, Ex. N at 153, 158.) These discussions produced the Gold Key program and the Silver Key program (collectively the “Gold Key programs”). (Doc. 309 at 17a.) The Gold Key programs functioned as preliminary savings plans into which prospective homebuyers paid an initial *477 $1,000 deposit 9 and subsequent monthly-payments until they accumulated sufficient funds to cover a down payment. (Doc. 309 at 17a; Doc. 387, Ex. K at 164.) During the savings period, the Percudani defendants offered buyers monetary incentives up to $700 in monthly rent for one year, with a maximum total incentive of $8,400. (See Doc. 387, Ex. K at 164; Doc. 387, Ex. L at 72; see also, e.g., Doc. 385, Exs. 2-5.) The Percudani defendants regularly supplied documentation regarding the rent-payment incentives to Chase as a component of plaintiffs’ mortgage applications. (Doc. 387, Ex. K at 144-46.) Employees of the Percudani defendants explained the operation of the Gold Key programs to Chase underwriters on several occasions. (See, e.g., Doc. 387, Ex. M at 145; Doc. 387, Ex. P at 46-47, 49.)

Plaintiffs’ expert report explains that purchase incentives programs are common in the real estate industry. The payment of rent, however, is prohibited by industry practice because it casts doubt on a buyer’s ability to engage in the savings habits necessary to accumulate assets for a down payment and to meet monthly mortgage obligations. (See Doc. 387, Ex. D at 9; Doc. 388, Ex. VII; Doc. 388, Ex. X at 122; Doc. 388, Ex. XIV at 96-97.) According to plaintiffs’ expert, Chase’s lending guidelines as well as industry lending standards place limits on the amount of purchase incentives. These limits vary depending upon the value of the home and the amount of the buyer’s down payment. A buyer who is capable of making a down payment of fifteen percent of the purchase price may receive incentives worth six percent of that price. (Doc. 387, Ex. D at 9; Doc. 388, Ex. XIV at 96-97.) A buyer who contributes a down payment in an amount between ten and fifteen percent 10 may receive incentives of up to three percent of the price. (Doc. 387, Ex. D at 9; Doc. 388, Ex. XIV at 96-97.) The value of a buyer’s incentives directly affects the principal amount of the buyer’s mortgage loan. If a seller wishes to provide purchase incentives in excess of applicable limits, that excess must be used to reduce the purchase price of the home and, in turn, to reduce the value of the loan the buyer will receive. (Doc. 388, Ex. VII.) Failure to adhere to these guidelines can result in a buyer incurring debt service which the buyer is ill-equipped to manage in light of his or her income level and credit history. (Doc. 387, Ex. D at 9,12.)

In the cases sub judice,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
556 F. Supp. 2d 473, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33427, 2008 WL 763591, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lester-v-percudani-pamd-2008.