Lester Packer, Sr., Lester Packer, II and Shawn Dyroff, individually and on behalf of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plan v. Glenn O Hawbaker, Inc., Board of Directors of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., Plan Administrator of the Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plant, and John Does 1-20

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 28, 2026
Docket4:21-cv-01747
StatusUnknown

This text of Lester Packer, Sr., Lester Packer, II and Shawn Dyroff, individually and on behalf of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plan v. Glenn O Hawbaker, Inc., Board of Directors of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., Plan Administrator of the Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plant, and John Does 1-20 (Lester Packer, Sr., Lester Packer, II and Shawn Dyroff, individually and on behalf of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plan v. Glenn O Hawbaker, Inc., Board of Directors of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., Plan Administrator of the Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plant, and John Does 1-20) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lester Packer, Sr., Lester Packer, II and Shawn Dyroff, individually and on behalf of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plan v. Glenn O Hawbaker, Inc., Board of Directors of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., Plan Administrator of the Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plant, and John Does 1-20, (M.D. Pa. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LESTER PACKER, SR., No. 4:21-CV-01747 LESTER PACKER, II and SHAWN DYROFF, individually and (Chief Judge Brann) on behalf of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plan,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GLENN O HAWBAKER, INC., BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GLENN O. HAWBAKER, INC., PLAN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE GLENN O. HAWBAKER, INC. BENEFIT PLANT, and JOHN DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JANUARY 28, 2026 I. BACKGROUND Defendants Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., Board of Directors of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., the Plan Administrator of the Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plan, and John Does 1-20 (collectively, “Defendants”) served four subpoenas to employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Labor Law Compliance (“the Bureau”) to depose the employees regarding information related to their investigation of a separate, criminal matter against Defendants.

The Bureau indicated their intent to fight the subpoenas,1 and Defendants filed the instant motion, moving to compel the third-party depositions.2 The Bureau responds to the motion by arguing that the information is not fit for discovery pursuant to the “Deliberative Process Privilege.”3 The issue is ripe for disposition.

For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion to compel is granted. II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard

1. Discovery Standard Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”4 Such discovery must take into

account “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the

burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs the likely benefit.”5

1 Doc. 103 (Letter from the Bureau). 2 Doc. 107 (Mot.). 3 Doc. 109 (Br. in Opp.) at 3. 4 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 5 Id. “Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the

action.”6 The party filing a motion to compel bears the initial burden of “‘demonstrat[ing] the relevance of the information sought to a particular claim or defense. The burden then shifts to the opposing party, who must demonstrate in

specific terms why a discovery request does not fall within the broad scope of discovery or is otherwise privileged or improper.’”7 “Generally, courts afford considerable latitude in discovery in order to ensure that litigation proceeds with the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts

before trial.”8 “‘[T]he discovery rules are meant to be construed quite liberally so as to permit the discovery of any information which is relevant and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’”9

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 also applies here; this Rule is the vehicle for seeking discovery from a nonparty through a subpoena.10 Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A), a court must quash or modify a subpoena if it requires disclosure of

6 FED. R. EVID. 401. 7 Osagie v. Borough of State College, 586 F. Supp. 3d 314, 321 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (Brann, J.) (quoting Miller v. McGinley, No. 1:20-CV-2270, 2022 WL 212709, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2022)). 8 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 9 Westfield Ins. Co. v. Icon Legacy Custom Modular Homes, 321 F.R.D. 107, 111 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (Brann, J.) (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Felicetti, 148 F.R.D. 532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 10 FED. R. CIV. P. 45; see also Jackson v. Aragon Advertising, LLC, No. 4:23-MC-00812, 2023 WL 7413332, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2023) (Brann, J.). privileged material or subjects a person to undue burden.11 “When analyzing whether a civil subpoena places an undue burden on a nonparty, the court considers issues

such as relevance, the requesting party's need, the breadth of the request, and the burden imposed.”12 2. The Deliberative Process Privilege

The Bureau has raised the deliberative process privilege to attempt to quash the subpoenas. “The deliberative process privilege is an executive privilege that applies to ‘confidential deliberations of law or policymaking, reflecting opinions, recommendations or advice.’”13 “The purpose of the privilege is to prevent injury to

the quality of agency decisions which could result from premature or indiscriminate disclosure of such deliberations.”14 To assert the deliberative process privilege, three procedural requirements

must be satisfied: “‘[t]here must be a (1) formal claim of privilege (2) lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, (3) after actual personal consideration by that officer.’”15 “The requirement that the privilege be asserted solely by the head of a department or agency . . . is not merely technical. . . . Rather,

it is intended to ensure that the privilege is invoked by an informed executive official

11 Id. 12 United States v. Massimino, 368 F. Supp. 3d 852, 855 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 13 Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-05287, 2006 WL 2945226, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2006) (quoting In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 959 (3d Cir. 1987)). 14 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. 749, 751 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 15 Yang v. Reno, 157 F.R.D. 625, 632 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)). of sufficient authority and responsibility to warrant the court relying on his or her judgment.”16 To satisfy this requirement, courts have held that, “the [executive

official] asserting the privilege must, at a minimum, make an explicit representation that he or she has personally seen and considered the material.”17 Substantively, to invoke the privilege, the privilege proponent must show the

information sought is both predecisional and deliberative.18 Accordingly, the information sought must be “‘actually related to the process by which the policy was formulated or decision reached.’”19 The privilege protects only predecisional communications, not communications “made after the decision and designed to

explain it.”20 “Factual material is not protected as long as it is severable from the deliberative information, even if the factual information is located in an otherwise privileged document.”21 This privilege “‘should be narrowly construed,’”22 and the

government must show the privilege applies by presenting “more than a bare conclusion or statement that the documents are privileged.”23

16 Id. (quoting Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2000)). 17 Id. (collecting cases). 18 Wayne Land and Mineral Group v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n, No. 3:16-CV-00897, 2020 WL 762835, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2020). 19 Id. (quoting Rothstein & Crump, Federal Testimonial Privileges Relating to Witnesses & Documents in Federal-Law Case § 5:3 (2d ed. 2006)). 20 Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. at 751. 21 Redland Soccer Club Inc. v.

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Related

United States v. Reynolds
345 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1953)
Pearson v. Miller
211 F.3d 57 (Third Circuit, 2000)
First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring
21 F.3d 465 (D.C. Circuit, 1994)
United States v. Massimino
368 F. Supp. 3d 852 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2019)
Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Authority
203 F.R.D. 195 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2001)
Westfield Insurance Co. v. Icon Legacy Custom Modular Homes
321 F.R.D. 107 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 2017)
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo
97 F.R.D. 749 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1983)
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Felicetti
148 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1993)
Yang You Yi v. Reno
157 F.R.D. 625 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1994)

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Lester Packer, Sr., Lester Packer, II and Shawn Dyroff, individually and on behalf of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plan v. Glenn O Hawbaker, Inc., Board of Directors of Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., Plan Administrator of the Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. Benefit Plant, and John Does 1-20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lester-packer-sr-lester-packer-ii-and-shawn-dyroff-individually-and-on-pamd-2026.