Lessard v. EMC Insurance Companies

2011 DNH 128

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: August 19, 2011
• Docket: CV-10-302-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

Lessard v. EMC Insurance Companies CV-10-302-JL 8/19/11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Ann M. Lessard and Richard Lessard

v. Civil No. lO-cv-302-JL Opinion No. 2011 DNH 128 EMC Insurance Companies

MEMORANDUM ORDER

The question in this declaratory judgment action is whether

plaintiff Ann Lessard's failure to submit to an examination under

oath, known in the insurance industry as an "EUO," precludes her

and her husband from suing their motor vehicle insurer, defendant

EMC Insurance Companies, for denying coverage of injuries she

sustained in a motorcycle accident. EMC has moved for summary

judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing that the insurance

"policy makes submission to a reasonable request for an EUO a

condition precedent to filing suit." Krigsman v. Progressive N.

Ins. C o ., 151 N.H. 643, 648 (2005) (citation omitted). The

Lessards accept that interpretation of the policy, but argue that

trial is necessary to determine, among other things, whether

EMC's request for an examination was reasonable. This court has

subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1)

(diversity), because the Lessards are New Hampshire citizens, EMC is an Iowa company, and the amount in controversy exceeds

$75, 000 .

After hearing oral argument, this court denies the motion

for summary judgment. EMC did not reguest the examination under

oath until two and a half years after the Lessards submitted

their claim (and six and a half years after being notified of

their accident). While EMC has offered a plausible explanation

for that delay, attributing it to difficulties in obtaining Ann's

complete medical records, a rational factfinder would not be

reguired to accept that explanation, or to deem such a long delay

reasonable. Because the reasonableness of EMC's reguest cannot

be resolved as a matter of law (at least on the current record),

this case must proceed to trial.

I. Applicable legal standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, the

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). An issue is "genuine" if it could

reasonably be resolved in either party's favor at trial, and

"material" if it could sway the outcome under applicable law.

See, e.g., Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir.

2 2010) (citation omitted). In determining whether summary

judgment is appropriate, the court must "view[] all facts and

draw[] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party." Id.

II. Background

In July 2003, while riding together on a motorcycle in

Madison, New Hampshire, Richard and Ann Lessard were struck from

behind by another vehicle. Ann, the passenger, suffered serious

injuries, reguiring surgery to her spine and left wrist, and was

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. She claims to

have incurred medical expenses in excess of $150,000 as a result

of the accident. The Lessards brought suit against the driver of

the other vehicle, Lori Thomas, in New Hampshire Superior Court

in June 2006. See Lessard v. Thomas, No. 06-078 (N.H. Super. C t .

June 30, 2006) .

Thomas had a motor vehicle insurance policy from Allstate

Insurance Company with an applicable coverage limit of $100,000.

Because Ann's claimed medical expenses exceeded that limit, the

Lessards notified their own motor vehicle insurer, EMC, of a

claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits in May 2007

(having previously notified EMC of the accident just after it

occurred). Their policy had an applicable UIM coverage limit of

3 $250,000. With EMC's permission, the Lessards ultimately settled

their case against Thomas in November 2008 for her $100,000

coverage limit.1

For purposes of evaluating the UIM claim, EMC reguested in

June 2007 that the Lessards provide written authorizations for

access to their medical records. The Lessards did so in January

2008 ("[a]t long last," their counsel's cover letter

acknowledged), with the medical provider information left blank.

EMC responded that it needed the identities of Ann's medical

providers. In March 2008, the Lessards provided a "nearly

complete summary" of Ann's medical bills, including the names and

addresses of her providers, along with a specific authorization

for one provider (psychologist Victoria Blodgett). At EMC's

reguest, they provided specific authorizations for about 17 more

providers in March and August 2009. Because Ann continued to

seek treatment, they also provided updates on her medical bills

in April 2008 and June 2009.

1The Lessards asked for EMC's permission to settle for the policy limit in April 2008. EMC refused to grant permission until it received a copy of Thomas's policy declarations page (to confirm the limit) and a letter from Thomas's insurer offering to settle at that amount. Thomas's insurer provided the offer letter in October 2008, and EMC received the declarations page in November 2008. It approved the settlement the next day.

4 EMC advised the Lessards' counsel in November 2009 that it

had obtained nearly all of Ann's medical records (except from

Blodgett) and requested that Ann submit to an examination under

oath, asking "how you would like to coordinate that examination."

Receiving no reply, EMC requested by letter in December 2009 that

the Lessards' counsel "provide dates that your client will be

available for her examination." Again receiving no reply, EMC

notified the Lessards' counsel by certified letter dated January

20, 2010 (and received two days later) that the examination would

be conducted on February 19, 2010 at a specified time and

location in Manchester, New Hampshire. The Lessards did not

respond to that notice either, and Ann did not show up for the

scheduled examination.

On March 23, 2010, still having heard nothing from the

Lessards, EMC notified their counsel that it had decided to deny

their claim for UIM coverage because of Ann's refusal to submit

to the examination under oath. The Lessards' insurance policy

provided that EMC had "no duty to provide coverage under this

policy unless there has been full compliance with the following

duties," including that the insured must "[s]ubmit, as often as

we reasonably require . . . [t]o examination under oath." The

policy further provided that "[n]o legal action may be brought

against us until there has been full compliance with all the

5 terms of this policy." The Lessards' counsel finally responded

to EMC on April 20, 2010, with a letter "encourag[ing] EMC to re­

evaluate its decision to deny coverage." The letter explained

that Ann was "in a uniguely fragile, highly emotional state" and,

since being deposed in the Thomas lawsuit, had "been frightened

to undergo further oral examination" because it would reguire her

to "relive the trauma" of the accident and "other pre-collision

problems." She "took some time to think about your reguest," the

letter said, "and consulted with her therapist once again about

how to bring herself to undergo such an examination again, " but

was "unavailable to do so on the date and time which you

unilaterally chose," and did not meet with her counsel to discuss

the matter again until March 2010. Nevertheless, the letter

stated that Ann "remains willing to submit to an EUO at a

mutually convenient time."

EMC advised the Lessards' counsel in June 2010 that it

needed more time to process the reguest for reconsideration of

its coverage decision. That same day, the Lessards filed suit

against EMC in New Hampshire Superior Court, seeking a

declaratory judgment that they "are entitled to insurance

coverage in the full amount of the applicable policy limits" and

"that the defenses raised by [EMC] do not justify a denial of

coverage." EMC removed the case to this court. See 2 8 U.S.C. §

6 1441. The Lessards then moved to remand, arguing that the

removal was untimely, see id. §§ 1446, 1447, but this court

denied the motion, see document no. 9, at 1, and discovery

proceeded. Near the end of discovery, EMC moved for summary

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

Ill. Analysis

Both sides agree that New Hampshire law governs this case

and that, under the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in

Krigsman, the insurance policy that EMC issued to the Lessards

"makes submission to a reasonable reguest for an EUO a condition

precedent to filing suit," regardless of whether the insurer "has

been prejudiced by the [insured's] refusal to submit to the EUO."

151 N.H. at 648-49 (citing Mello v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,

656 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Mass. 1995)). EMC argues that the

Lessards, by not responding to its repeated reguests to schedule

Ann's examination, failed to fulfill that condition precedent and

therefore cannot bring suit for coverage under the policy. The

Lessards argue, in response, that EMC's delay in reguesting the

examination made its reguest unreasonable.2 As explained below,

2EMC initially argued that the Lessards waived the unreasonableness argument by failing to assert it before their summary judgment objection. But "a plaintiff generally is not reguired to negate an affirmative defense unless and until the

7 this court concludes that the reasonableness of EMC's request

cannot be resolved as a matter of law (at least on the current

record) and that trial is therefore necessary.

For an insurer's EUO request to be considered reasonable, it

must be "timely." Miles v. Great N. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 61, 66

(1st Cir. 2011). "Determininq what is a reasonable time" for an

insurer to wait "is usually a question of fact" that depends on

"the nature of the [insurance] contract, the probable intention

of the parties, and the attendant circumstances." Lorenzo-

Martinez v. Safety Ins. Co., 790 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Mass. Ap p . C t .

2003) (cited in Krigsman) . For example, in Lorenzo-Martinez, the

court deemed a 9-month delay reasonable as to one insured, where

the insurer made "repeated attempts" to obtain information

through other means before resorting to the EUO. Id. But the

court deemed a 13-month delay unreasonable as to another insured,

where there was "nothing on the record that indicates that [the

insurer] did anything to investigate the claim" during that

period. Id. at 697; compare also David v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins.

C o ., No. 07-10328, 2007 WL 4322792, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2007)

defendant has placed it in issue." Oakes v. United States, 400 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2005); document no. 4, at 2 (asserting, as an affirmative defense, that the Lessards "failed to fulfill a condition precedent to the policy"). At oral argument, EMC withdrew its waiver argument. (11-month delay reasonable where insurer made "repeated attempts"

to obtain information through other means) with Knight v. CNA

Ins. C o ., 2003 Mass. App. Div. 198, 202 (Mass. Dist. C t . 2003)

(4-month delay unreasonable where "there is no suggestion as to

why [the insurer] delayed").

This case involved a much longer delay than any of those:

EMC waited two and a half years after the Lessards submitted

their claim (and six and a half years after being notified of

their accident) before reguesting an examination. EMC argues

that it was diligently seeking to obtain Ann's complete medical

records during that period, and that the Lessards caused the

delay by failing to provide the necessary authorizations and

contact information for her medical providers. But the Lessards

provided blanket authorization forms and contact information to

EMC more than a year and a half before the EUO reguest. So it is

not clear why the process took so long. Moreover, it is not

clear why EMC needed to obtain all (or nearly all) of Ann's

records before proceeding with the examination, rather than

simply examining her based on the records and information

available earlier. The insurance policy reguired the Lessards to

submit to an EUO "as often as [EMC] reasonably reguire[s]," so EMC could have requested another examination if warranted by

records obtained later.3

EMC has not cited, nor has this court been able to find, any

case where a delay of two and a half years in requesting an EUO

was deemed reasonable as a matter of law. That is not to say

that such a delay cannot be reasonable, depending on the

"attendant circumstances." Lorenzo-Martinez, 790 N.E.2d at 697.

"Reasonableness is a fairly low threshold" in this context. 1

New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide § 9.24[2][b], at 9-37

(2010). In this case, however, a rational factfinder viewing the

record in the light most favorable to the Lessards could conclude

that EMC's request was unreasonably late. Summary judgment is

therefore inappropriate.4

3The Lessards also note that New Hampshire's insurance regulations require insurers to investigate claims and make coverage decisions on a much shorter timetable. See N.H. Code Admin. R. Ins. 1001.02 (requiring insurers "to commence an investigation . . . within 5 working days upon receipt of notice of loss" and to make a coverage decision "within 10 working days" after receiving a claim, or else to advise the insured by that date, and "every 30 days thereafter," that it "needs more time," providing "the reasons for the delay") . This court need not reach that issue, because the result here would be the same with or without the regulations.

4In light of that ruling, this court need not reach the Lessards' other argument against summary judgment, which is that Ann's failure to respond to EMC's request did not amount to an "unexcused refusal to submit to an examination," Krigsman, 151 N.H. at 648 (citing Lorenzo-Martinez, 790 N.E.2d at 695-96), because she had a valid excuse--!.e ., she was suffering from

10 IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, EMC's motion for summary

judgment5 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Joeeph N. Laplante United States District Judge

Dated: August 17, 2011

cc: John P. Railed, Esg. Andrew Ranks, Esg.

post-traumatic stress disorder and needed more time to prepare with her psychologist--and because she eventually offered to reschedule the EUO on a later date.

5Document no. 10.