Leslie Scott Boston, Jr. v. Roanoke City Department of Social Services

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: May 20, 2025
• Docket: 1390243
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED

Present: Judges Malveaux, Athey and Senior Judge Humphreys

LESLIE SCOTT BOSTON, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1390-24-3 PER CURIAM MAY 20, 2025 ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE Leisa K. Ciaffone, Judge

(Wilson C. Pasley; Wilson C. Pasley, PLC, on brief), for appellant.

(Timothy R. Spencer, City Attorney; Jennifer Crook Braxton, Assistant City Attorney; Peter H. Edwards, Guardian ad litem for the minor child; Law Offices of Peter H. Edwards, on brief), for appellee.

Leslie Scott Boston, Jr. (“Boston”) appeals the order of the Circuit Court of the City of

Roanoke (“circuit court”) terminating his parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) and

16.1-283(C)(2). On appeal, Boston’s sole assignment of error is that because L.D.1 came into

foster care due to Boston’s difficulties maintaining stable housing and Boston has since obtained

housing with his mother, the circuit court should not have terminated his parental rights. For the

following reasons, we disagree and affirm.2

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 We use initials to protect the identity of the minor child. 2 After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). I. BACKGROUND3

The Roanoke City Department of Social Services (“the Department”) first became aware

of Boston and his son, L.D., in June of 2015 when L.D. was born. At birth, L.D. was determined

to have been exposed to numerous illegal substances including cocaine, benzodiazepines,

oxycodone, and marijuana. The Department continued to have numerous contacts involving

Boston and L.D. over the ensuing years. For example, during November of 2022, the

Department learned that Boston and L.D. lacked stable housing while L.D.’s mother was found

to be actively abusing illegal substances. In response, the Department initiated a safety plan for

L.D. that included increased supervision and additional financial resources to assist with

maintaining housing. These efforts by the Department were ultimately unsuccessful and as a

result, L.D. was placed elsewhere with relatives. After removing L.D. from the family home, the

Department discovered that L.D. had failed to receive any medical or dental care since 2018 and

had not been enrolled in school since kindergarten in 2019.

From 2018 to 2023, Boston consistently refused to participate in services offered by the

Department. The Department was also unable to reliably locate Boston, and even when the

Department was able to contact Boston, he was noncompliant with the Department’s requests.

For example, Boston failed to submit any necessary background information to the Department,

nor did he participate in counseling services. Similarly, Boston also failed to comply with the

Department’s request that he be fingerprinted, stating “[I’m] not a sex offender” and the

3 “On appeal, ‘we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case the Department.’” Joyce v. Botetourt Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 75 Va. App. 690, 695 (2022) (quoting Farrell v. Warren Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386 (2012)). “For purposes of appellate review, a [circuit] court’s determination is considered to have settled all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party, and the prevailing party’s evidence is entitled to all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328 (1990). “To the extent that this opinion discusses facts found in sealed documents in the record, we unseal only those facts.” Brown v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Sixth Dist. Comm., 302 Va. 234, 240 n.2 (2023). -2- Department did not “need to know” anything else about his criminal record. In addition, public

records obtained by the Department reflected that Boston had an extensive record of domestic

violence and violent criminal convictions. During the five-year period from 2018 to 2023,

Boston also failed to participate in any psychological evaluations, parenting classes, substance

abuse treatment, mental health counseling, anger management treatment, or attend L.D.’s mental

health evaluations. He further failed to maintain employment, stable housing, or maintain

contact with the Department. Boston also repeatedly failed to submit to drug testing by the

Department. For example, on one occasion when Boston presented himself for a drug screen, he

had shaved all the hair from his body and clipped his fingernails so short that any follicle or nail

clipping testing was impossible. The sole drug screen that Boston participated in during this

period was a urine screen, in which Boston tested positive for marijuana.

Finally, in April of 2023, L.D. was placed into foster care, where he received necessary

medical treatment and was enrolled in school. Despite existing diagnoses of PTSD and other

psychological conditions, L.D. showed excellent academic progress, completing summer school

and catching up to a second-grade level. After three extractions of various teeth, L.D.’s dental

hygiene was also dramatically improved. He was also fitted for eyeglasses to assist with vision

difficulties. Ultimately, L.D. had eight of his teeth extracted, along with multiple root canals and

crowns to save several of his remaining teeth. His tonsils and adenoids also had to be removed.

L.D. became an active participant in football and basketball, having adjusted well to life with his

foster family. He also regularly participated in counseling and therapy.

After L.D. was placed in foster care, Boston sporadically began visitation with L.D.,

however, Boston’s behavior during those visitations he attended continued to give the

Department concern. For example, Boston missed several visitation opportunities with L.D. with

no recorded excuse. When Boston was present for visitation, he encouraged L.D. to engage in

-3- physical altercations with other children if L.D. felt “slight[ed]” by them. Boston also discussed

adult matters with L.D., including a physical altercation where Boston assaulted another man

with a weight plate. Boston also discussed his drug use and accused the Department of

manipulating L.D. As a result of his behavior during visitation, the Department had L.D.’s

counselor attend the next scheduled visitation. However, when Boston entered the Department’s

facility for visitation and realized that the counselor would be present for the visitation, Boston

left the visitation room and belligerently refused to participate. He repeated this behavior during

subsequently scheduled visitation days, refusing to participate in any visitation when the

counselor was present. Despite his behavior, the Department still offered Boston the opportunity

to participate in virtual visitation, however, even in virtual visitation Boston continued to

encourage L.D. to use physical violence. When L.D. choked another child almost to the point of

losing consciousness, merely because the child in question was not paying attention to L.D., the

Department decided that the status quo could not endure.

On November 9, 2023, the Department sent notice to Boston that they intended to seek

termination of his residual parental rights in the Roanoke City Juvenile and Domestic Relations

District Court (“JDR court”). The Department then filed the requisite petition with the JDR

court. At the time the notice was sent out, Boston was incarcerated.4 After continuing the matter

and issuing notices of the hearing by publication, the JDR court terminated Boston’s parental

rights and approved the foster care goal of adoption on March 11, 2024. Boston appealed to the

circuit court.

On July 22, 2024, nearly 15 months after L.D. had been placed in foster care, the circuit

court held a trial de novo to determine whether to terminate Boston’s residual parental rights.

4 The record does not definitively establish the specific criminal charge which led to this period of incarceration. -4- After the introduction of evidence and hearing testimony on behalf of the Department and

Boston, followed by closing arguments from the Department, the guardian ad litem, and Boston,

the circuit court took the matter under advisement. By final order entered on August 21, 2024,

the circuit court subsequently terminated Boston’s residual parental rights under Code

§ 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C)(2). In its letter opinion, the circuit court noted the abuse and

neglect of L.D., including L.D.’s severe lack of dental care, his complete lack of schooling past

kindergarten, Boston’s lack of stable housing, Boston’s complete refusal to cooperate with the

Department, and Boston’s inappropriate behavior during visitation.

The circuit court also found Boston’s statements at the hearing to be particularly

troubling, noting that one of Boston’s reasons for refusing to submit to drug screens was because

he did not trust the drug testing process and would not participate because “[he] can’t pick and

choose which drugs [he] test[s] positive for.” Specifically as to housing, the circuit court noted

that Boston had lived in “approximately seven residences” since the Department most recently

became involved with L.D. in 2022. Although Boston claimed he was staying with his mother in

Appomattox, the circuit court also credited Boston’s testimony that he “often stays with various

friends in the Roanoke area.”

The circuit court further noted that the Department had no contact of any kind with

Boston since September of 2023 and also found that L.D. was a “smart and happy young man”

who was “thriving in his foster care placement.” The circuit court further noted that L.D. was

“afraid of [Boston]” and “does not want to visit [him]” and that it was in L.D.’s best interests to

terminate Boston’s parental rights. Boston appealed.

-5- II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“In matters of a child’s welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making

the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” Castillo v. Loudoun Cnty.

Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of

Hum. Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991)). “On review of a [circuit] court’s decision regarding

the termination of parental rights, we presume the [circuit] court ‘thoroughly weighed all the

evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s

best interests.’” Joyce v. Botetourt Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 75 Va. App. 690, 699 (2022)

(quoting Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Hardy, 42 Va. App. 546, 552 (2004)). “Where, as here,

the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Simms v.

Alexandria Dep’t of Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 74 Va. App. 447, 470 (2022) (quoting Fauquier Cnty.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011)).

B. The circuit court did not err by terminating Boston’s parental rights.

Boston contends that the circuit court erred when it terminated his parental rights because

“the evidence presented at trial proves only that [L.D.] came into foster care due to [Boston]’s

issues with maintaining stable housing and that these issues have been remedied by [Boston]

moving in with [Boston]’s mother.” We disagree.

To proceed with the termination of parental rights, Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof

by clear and convincing evidence that (1) termination is in the best interests of the child, (2)

“reasonable and appropriate” services have been offered to help the parent “remedy substantially

the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” and (3)

despite those services, the parent has failed, “without good cause,” to remedy those conditions

-6- “within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date the child was placed

in foster care.” “[S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of

the problem that created the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated failure of the

parent to make reasonable changes.” Yafi v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 539, 552

(2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257,

271 (2005)). “Subsection C(2) specifically requires a showing that DSS has provided

‘reasonable and appropriate’ services to a delinquent parent prior to terminating his rights.”

Toms, 46 Va. App. at 269. “In this way, the statute establishes a time frame after the child has

entered foster care for the parents ‘to receive rehabilitative services to enable them to correct the

conditions that led to foster care placement.’” Id. (quoting L.G. v. Amherst Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 41 Va. App. 51, 57 (2003)).

Here, the circuit court found multiple factual bases to support its conclusion that Boston

caused L.D. to be abused and neglected. The evidence of abuse and neglect included L.D.’s

severely deficient dental care—requiring eight extractions and multiple root canals—and L.D.’s

lack of schooling past kindergarten. Additionally, the circuit court heard sufficient evidence

regarding Boston’s utter lack of cooperation and compliance with the Department’s numerous

offerings of services, including Boston failing to meaningfully participate in any of the almost

dozen services that were offered to him over a period of more than five years. Furthermore,

Boston repeatedly failed to attend visitation with L.D., and when visitation did occur, Boston

encouraged L.D. to act violently and otherwise inappropriately conversed with L.D. on adult

subjects. The circuit court also noted that Boston’s difficulties in maintaining stable housing

were not automatically remedied merely because Boston was now staying with his mother in

Appomattox, but Boston’s housing may yet remain unstable because he “often stayed” in the

Roanoke area. Accordingly, the record supports the circuit court’s determination under Code

-7- § 16.1-283(C)(2) that Boston had been offered numerous services by the Department but still

failed to remedy the conditions which led to L.D. having to be placed in foster care.

Although Boston claims that a lack of stable housing was the “the main condition that

required [L.D.] to be placed in foster care,” the record demonstrates that numerous additional

reasons existed for the circuit court’s termination of Boston’s parental rights, as noted above.

Boston concurs with many of these additional bases but attempts to rationalize or explain them

away. For example, Boston acknowledges that he did not comply with drug testing but claims

that such testing violates his rights. Similarly, he admits that he did not comply with the

Department’s services but argues that if he had complied, it would have been an admission of his

own disqualification as a parent. He further asserts that his lack of attention to L.D.’s dental care

should be excused due to complications relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. Boston’s

rationalizations concerning how his actions or inactions may have been justifiable were

presented to the circuit court as factual matters to be determined by the circuit court as trier of

fact. As it is the circuit court’s role to evaluate and weigh the facts presented before it, we will

not do so again on appeal. Canales v. Torres Orellana, 67 Va. App. 759, 787-88 (2017) (en

banc) (“[T]his Court cannot re-weigh the evidence or alter the circuit court’s credibility

determinations.”).

The circuit court also found that L.D. was “thriving” in his foster placement and that L.D.

had no desire to visit Boston because L.D. was afraid of him. L.D. has spent approximately 15

months in foster care, and it is not in L.D.’s best interests to remain in such a state of uncertainty.

Harrison v. Tazewell Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 162 (2004) (“It is clearly not

in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even

if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities.” (quoting Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty.

-8- Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540 (1990))). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s

termination of Boston’s residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).5

III. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

5 Having found that the circuit court did not err in terminating Boston’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), we need not address whether his parental rights were also subject to termination under Code § 16.1-283(B). Castillo, 68 Va. App. at 574 n.9 (“When a lower court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, this Court need only determine whether any of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment.”); see also Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8 (2005) (affirming termination of parental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and declining to address termination of parental rights under another subsection). -9-