Leslie Randolph v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission and Hoffman-Struever Waterfront, LLC

83 A.3d 756, 2014 WL 260068, 2014 D.C. App. LEXIS 6
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 23, 2014
Docket13-AA-262
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 83 A.3d 756 (Leslie Randolph v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission and Hoffman-Struever Waterfront, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leslie Randolph v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission and Hoffman-Struever Waterfront, LLC, 83 A.3d 756, 2014 WL 260068, 2014 D.C. App. LEXIS 6 (D.C. 2014).

Opinion

*758 FISHER, Associate Judge:

On February 13, 2013, the Zoning Commission for the District of Columbia granted second-stage approval of a planned unit development (PUD) for the property known as parcel 11 at the Southwest Waterfront. Intervenor Hoffman-Struever plans to redevelop a twenty-two acre section of the waterfront and, as part of this project, intends to build a large building on parcel 11. Constructed primarily on land owned by the Vestry of St. Augustine’s Church, the proposed building will have two distinct sections. The northern section, built on parcel 11 A, will contain a new church building, while parcel 11B will contain a 109-unit residential development. Petitioners reside in the townhomes directly across Sixth Street from parcel 11. They argue that the structure will exceed the maximum lot occupancy allowed and that the Zoning Commission ignored the historic designation of the housing complex in which they live. We disagree and affirm the Zoning Commission’s order.

I. The Zoning Commission’s Role

“A P.U.D. applicant generally requests that a site be rezoned to allow more intensive development, in exchange for which the applicant offers to provide ‘amenities’ or ‘public benefits’ which would not be provided if the site were developed under matter-of-right zoning.” Blagden Alley Ass’n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm’n, 590 A.2d 139, 140 n. 2 (D.C.1991) (citing 11 DCMR § 2400.2). When evaluating a PUD application, the Zoning Commission is required to “judge, balance, and reconcile the relative value of the project amenities and public benefits offered, the degree of development incentives requested, and any potential adverse effects according to the specific circumstances of the case.” 11 DCMR § 2403.8 (2013).

A PUD application may be submitted as part of a one-stage or two-stage process. 11 DCMR § 2402.1 (2013). In a two-stage process, “[t]he Commission’s first-stage approval shall set forth the appropriate zoning classification to apply to the project, and shall state in detail the elements, guidelines, and conditions that shall be followed by the applicant in the second-stage application.” 11 DCMR § 2407.9 (2013). The second-stage application will be approved “[i]f the Commission finds the application to be in accordance with the intent and purpose of the Zoning Regulations, the PUD process, and the first-stage approval.” 11 DCMR § 2408.6 (2013).

This court “must affirm the [Zoning] Commission’s decision so long as (1) it has made findings of fact on each material contested issue; (2) there is substantial evidence in the record to support each finding; and (3) its conclusions of law follow rationally from those findings.”. Durant v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm’n, 65 A.3d 1161, 1167 (D.C.2013) (citations omitted).

II. Maximum Lot Occupancy

During the first-stage PUD application, Hoffman-Struever requested relief from the 60% maximum lot occupancy provided for in an R-5-B district. 1 The developer anticipated improving 73% of the lot, explaining that this was necessary to reduce the height of the church and the residential building and to allow above-grade, screened parking. Petitioners countered that their quality of life would be severely compromised if this degree of flexibility were approved because it would decrease *759 their light and air as well as their views of the water. The Commission approved the stage-one PUD application, noting that the requested incentives “accommodate the competing interests of moderate-density development against the need to provide an appropriate transition to existing stable neighborhoods.” Petitioners did not challenge this order.

In its second-stage PUD application, Hoffman-Struever increased its request, asking for a maximum lot occupancy of 86% for parcel 11. Although the footprint of the proposed building had actually decreased in size, this request was necessitated by a decrease in the overall size of the lot. 2 Petitioners claimed that this significant increase in lot occupancy was inconsistent with the first-stage approval and again argued that their quality of life would be severely compromised.

The Commission found that a maximum lot occupancy of 86% was “[c]onsistent with [its] finding in the Stage 1 application,” and “suitable under the circumstances.” “[T]he increased lot coverage on Parcel 11 is designed principally to accommodate parking on the ground floor rather than increased living spaces.” Although the lot occupancy previously approved could be achieved by eliminating the roof from the building’s covered parking or by extending the boundaries of the lot, the Commission explained that these actions would be “an unnecessary exercise in zoning technicalities.” Not only would uncovering the parking provide no real benefit to petitioners, it would be a detriment to residents of the PUD who would lose a central courtyard. Moreover, the Commission noted that the minimal impact of this requested incentive was offset by several benefits provided by the PUD, “including the provision of exceptional open spaces and public parks, most notably Waterfront Park[,] ... [a] beautifully designed park ... located immediately south of the residential building and diagonally across from the Sixth Street Neighbors^] residences.”

The Commission found “the Stage 2 PUD application to be in accordance with the intent and purpose of the Zoning Regulations, the PUD process, and the first-stage approval,” and ordered that “[t]he Parcel 11 Building may be constructed to a maximum lot occupancy of 86%.” Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but they “did not offer any new evidence or allegation of legal error but simply re-stated their disagreement with the Commission’s decision.” Having previously “fully vetted the lot occupancy controversy,” the Commission found “no reason to disturb its finding on this issue.” Petitioners now challenge this order.

An R-5 zoning designation allows “flexibility of design” and encourages “all types of urban residential development if they conform to the height, density, and area requirements.” 11 DCMR § 350.1 (2013). R-5-B districts are “generally consistent with the Medium Density designation.” 10-A DCMR § 225.5 (2013). “This designation is used to define neighborhoods or areas where mid-rise (4-7 stories) apartment buildings are the predominant use.” Id. Under traditional zoning, no structure in an R-5-B district may *760 occupy more than 60% of its lot. 11 DCMR § 403.2 (2013). When considering a PUD, “[h]owever, the Commission shall have the option to approve a lot occupancy greater or lesser than the normal requirement, depending upon the exact circumstances of the particular project.” 11 DCMR § 2405.4 (2013).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
83 A.3d 756, 2014 WL 260068, 2014 D.C. App. LEXIS 6, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leslie-randolph-v-district-of-columbia-zoning-commission-and-dc-2014.