NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 3 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LESLIE GILBERT, Individually and As No. 22-56217 Successor in Interest to Scott Thomas Gilbert; GREG GILBERT, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-08599-MWF-RAO Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TRIESTE S. TURNER, R.N.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT; LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH; TIMOTHY BELAVICH,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 28, 2024 Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON, LEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Trieste Turner, a nurse at a Los Angeles County jail, appeals the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity in this lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The plaintiffs, the parents of Scott Gilbert, allege that Turner was deliberately
indifferent to the medical needs of their son, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, when Turner conducted a mental health “release evaluation” on Gilbert
and determined he did not meet the criteria for a 72-hour involuntary psychiatric
detention or other medical treatment. Tragically, less than 24 hours after being
released from custody, Gilbert committed suicide.
The district court denied Turner’s summary judgment motion, concluding that
the alleged constitutional violation was clearly established for purposes of qualified
immunity, and that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Turner
was deliberately indifferent to Gilbert’s medical needs. Turner appeals. We have
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine from the appeal of an order denying
qualified immunity. See Smith v. Agdeppa, 81 F.4th 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2023). Our
review is limited to the “purely legal contention that [the defendant’s] conduct did
not violate the Constitution and, in any event, did not violate clearly established
law.” Id. (quotations omitted). Reviewing de novo, see Tobias v. Arteaga, 996 F.3d
571, 579 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm the denial of qualified immunity, although with
some clarifications about the permissible scope of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Public employees “are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1)
2 they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of
their conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby,
583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The alleged
constitutional violation here arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. “[W]e have
concluded that the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard applies to claims that correction
facility officials failed to address the medical needs of pretrial detainees.” Clouthier
v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds, Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Under this standard, it is “well settled that prison officials
violate the Constitution when they choose a course of treatment that is medically
unacceptable under all of the circumstances.” Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 6 F.4th
961, 970 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted).
Turner does not argue that, even construing the facts in the plaintiffs’ favor,
no clearly established law required her to conclude that Gilbert needed immediate
psychiatric treatment. Instead, Turner’s sole argument for qualified immunity is that
she owed Gilbert no Fourteenth Amendment duty of care at all because she
encountered Gilbert while he was in the process of being evaluated for release from
custody, with Gilbert’s ultimate injury occurring after he had left custody.
Turner’s theory is unavailing. It is clearly established that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits prison officials from displaying “deliberate indifference” to
3 the serious medical needs of detainees in custody. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068. If a
prison official is aware of a present “substantial risk to [an inmate’s] health,”
including a psychiatric risk, she may not simply “decline[] to act upon this
knowledge.” Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1194 (9th Cir. 2002),
overruled on other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. At the time Turner
evaluated Gilbert, he was still in custody. Indeed, the point of Turner’s evaluation
was to determine whether Gilbert was medically fit for release. That Gilbert died
later, once he left custody, raises causation issues that plaintiffs will need to
overcome. But no authority indicates that Turner for that reason lacked any duty to
not provide unacceptable medical care to Gilbert while he was still detained.
Here, plaintiffs assert that Gilbert was experiencing an ongoing psychiatric
emergency while in custody, including during Nurse Turner’s release evaluation.
Given the dispute of fact over Turner’s deliberate indifference, Turner is not entitled
to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs’ allegation that Turner exhibited deliberate
indifference by not appropriately addressing Gilbert’s serious psychiatric needs with
the immediate medical treatment that a reasonable official would have provided.
However, to the extent plaintiffs’ case relies on Turner’s acts or omissions
related to discharge planning, plaintiffs have not cited any factually analogous cases
showing clearly established law. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he
affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s
4 predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation
which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). Thus, insofar as
plaintiffs challenge Turner’s not contacting Gilbert’s mother, not arranging for
Gilbert’s transportation upon release, releasing Gilbert when he did not have any
money or a cell phone, or similar shortcomings, Turner would be entitled to qualified
immunity. Plaintiffs point to Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999),
but that case holds only “that the state must provide an outgoing prisoner who is
receiving and continues to require medication with a supply sufficient to ensure that
he has that medication available during the period of time reasonably necessary to
permit him to consult a doctor and obtain a new supply.” Id. at 1164. Wakefield
does not clearly establish any additional duties beyond this.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 3 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LESLIE GILBERT, Individually and As No. 22-56217 Successor in Interest to Scott Thomas Gilbert; GREG GILBERT, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-08599-MWF-RAO Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TRIESTE S. TURNER, R.N.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT; LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH; TIMOTHY BELAVICH,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 28, 2024 Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON, LEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Trieste Turner, a nurse at a Los Angeles County jail, appeals the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity in this lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The plaintiffs, the parents of Scott Gilbert, allege that Turner was deliberately
indifferent to the medical needs of their son, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, when Turner conducted a mental health “release evaluation” on Gilbert
and determined he did not meet the criteria for a 72-hour involuntary psychiatric
detention or other medical treatment. Tragically, less than 24 hours after being
released from custody, Gilbert committed suicide.
The district court denied Turner’s summary judgment motion, concluding that
the alleged constitutional violation was clearly established for purposes of qualified
immunity, and that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Turner
was deliberately indifferent to Gilbert’s medical needs. Turner appeals. We have
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine from the appeal of an order denying
qualified immunity. See Smith v. Agdeppa, 81 F.4th 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2023). Our
review is limited to the “purely legal contention that [the defendant’s] conduct did
not violate the Constitution and, in any event, did not violate clearly established
law.” Id. (quotations omitted). Reviewing de novo, see Tobias v. Arteaga, 996 F.3d
571, 579 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm the denial of qualified immunity, although with
some clarifications about the permissible scope of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Public employees “are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1)
2 they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of
their conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby,
583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The alleged
constitutional violation here arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. “[W]e have
concluded that the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard applies to claims that correction
facility officials failed to address the medical needs of pretrial detainees.” Clouthier
v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds, Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Under this standard, it is “well settled that prison officials
violate the Constitution when they choose a course of treatment that is medically
unacceptable under all of the circumstances.” Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 6 F.4th
961, 970 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted).
Turner does not argue that, even construing the facts in the plaintiffs’ favor,
no clearly established law required her to conclude that Gilbert needed immediate
psychiatric treatment. Instead, Turner’s sole argument for qualified immunity is that
she owed Gilbert no Fourteenth Amendment duty of care at all because she
encountered Gilbert while he was in the process of being evaluated for release from
custody, with Gilbert’s ultimate injury occurring after he had left custody.
Turner’s theory is unavailing. It is clearly established that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits prison officials from displaying “deliberate indifference” to
3 the serious medical needs of detainees in custody. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068. If a
prison official is aware of a present “substantial risk to [an inmate’s] health,”
including a psychiatric risk, she may not simply “decline[] to act upon this
knowledge.” Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1194 (9th Cir. 2002),
overruled on other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. At the time Turner
evaluated Gilbert, he was still in custody. Indeed, the point of Turner’s evaluation
was to determine whether Gilbert was medically fit for release. That Gilbert died
later, once he left custody, raises causation issues that plaintiffs will need to
overcome. But no authority indicates that Turner for that reason lacked any duty to
not provide unacceptable medical care to Gilbert while he was still detained.
Here, plaintiffs assert that Gilbert was experiencing an ongoing psychiatric
emergency while in custody, including during Nurse Turner’s release evaluation.
Given the dispute of fact over Turner’s deliberate indifference, Turner is not entitled
to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs’ allegation that Turner exhibited deliberate
indifference by not appropriately addressing Gilbert’s serious psychiatric needs with
the immediate medical treatment that a reasonable official would have provided.
However, to the extent plaintiffs’ case relies on Turner’s acts or omissions
related to discharge planning, plaintiffs have not cited any factually analogous cases
showing clearly established law. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he
affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s
4 predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation
which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). Thus, insofar as
plaintiffs challenge Turner’s not contacting Gilbert’s mother, not arranging for
Gilbert’s transportation upon release, releasing Gilbert when he did not have any
money or a cell phone, or similar shortcomings, Turner would be entitled to qualified
immunity. Plaintiffs point to Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999),
but that case holds only “that the state must provide an outgoing prisoner who is
receiving and continues to require medication with a supply sufficient to ensure that
he has that medication available during the period of time reasonably necessary to
permit him to consult a doctor and obtain a new supply.” Id. at 1164. Wakefield
does not clearly establish any additional duties beyond this.
Thus, plaintiffs may proceed on their theory that Turner was deliberately
indifferent to Gilbert’s medical needs while he was in custody because he was in the
midst of an ongoing psychiatric episode that, without immediate medical care,
created a present and substantial risk of serious harm. See Gordon v. Cty. of Orange,
888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). But to the extent they raise them, plaintiffs
may not proceed with any broader theories relating to adequate discharge planning
following release from custody.
AFFIRMED.