Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-18-00546-CR
Leslie Ann GONZALES, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 14, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 561258 Honorable Susan Skinner, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 7, 2019
AFFIRMED
Leslie Ann Gonzales appeals her conviction of two counts of cruelty to nonlivestock
animals, asserting the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding the two dogs
were in her custody. Because we conclude a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt the dogs were in Gonzales’s custody, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Samuel Gover (Gonzales’s grandfather) called Animal Care Services (“ACS”) to seek
assistance and “see about the neglected animals in his backyard.” ACS investigator Joey Cortez 04-18-00546-CR
went to the property and interviewed Gover. Cortez learned that Gover owned the property, but
Gover was initially hesitant to provide information about the dogs’ owner. Gover finally told
Cortez the dogs belonged to his granddaughter (Gonzales) and her boyfriend and “they were
responsible for them.”
The property consisted of a main house, in which the Govers lived, and a separate back
apartment and yard, where Gonzales and her family had lived with her dogs. Inside the fenced
section of the yard adjacent to the back apartment, Cortez found one deceased dog, and one dog in
“very bad condition.” Cortez found no signs of food, water, or shelter that might have been
provided for the dogs.
Cortez later contacted Gonzales, who stated she owned the dogs. Gonzales told Cortez that
she, her boyfriend, and her two children moved from the apartment behind her grandparents’ house
four months prior to Gover making the telephone call to ACS. Cortez testified Gonzales told him
“it was her responsibility” to provide for the animals. Both Gonzales and her boyfriend told Cortez
they had been returning to the house to feed the dogs, and on occasions when they could not do
so, they would ask her grandfather to help, “but she said she would then go back to care for them.”
At trial, however, Gonzales and her daughter testified the Govers wanted the dogs to stay on the
property for security reasons and they had agreed to take care of the dogs. Gonzales denied having
returned to the house to feed the dogs after she moved and testified she believed her grandparents
were feeding them.
Gover told Cortez that he was physically unable to care for the dogs and Cortez testified
that Gover was elderly, moved very slowly, and did not appear to be capable of providing care for
the animals. Gonzales’s aunt testified her parents, the Govers, did not agree to take responsibility
for the care of the dogs and they would not have been able to take care of the dogs due to their
mobility issues and limited financial resources. The dogs were a large breed and both Gonzales’s
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grandparents had mobility and medical conditions that made them “frail.” The aunt further testified
her parents themselves needed full time assistance with food preparation, medication
administration, and transportation. They were on a fixed income and would not have been able to
purchase food for two large dogs.
Following the initial visit, Cortez obtained an Owner Surrender Form from Gonzales’s
boyfriend and Cortez took custody of the dogs. Upon examination of the dogs, the veterinarian
reported the surviving dog was severely malnourished and suffering from “chronic starvation.”
Both dogs had a flea and tick infestation, matted hair to the point of entanglement with twigs and
sticks, ringworm and hookworm infestation, lost approximately fifty percent of their body weight,
and had no visible fat or muscle tone. The veterinarian testified the deceased dog died due to
“chronic starvation” that possibly lasted weeks to months. Cortez testified this was “one of the
worst cases he had seen.” The veterinarian testified these conditions and the ultimate death could
have been prevented with adequate supply of food, water, over the counter medication, and basic
animal husbandry.
After the jury found Gonzales guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at one year in jail,
probated for two years, a $500 fine, and fifteen days in jail as a condition of probation.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Gonzales’s sole issue on appeal is the trial court erred when it denied the motion for a
directed verdict because the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding that the dogs
were in Gonzales’s custody. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); accord Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Merritt
v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “Our role on appeal is restricted to guarding
-3- 04-18-00546-CR
against the rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally,” and we must “defer to the
responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and
to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633,
638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Gonzales was charged with committing the offense of cruelty to nonlivestock animals by
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failing unreasonably to provide necessary food, water, care,
and shelter for an animal in her custody. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.092(b)(3). “Necessary food,
water, care, or shelter” includes the food, water, care, or shelter that is “required to maintain the
animal in a state of good health.” Id. § 42.092(a)(7). “Custody” is defined to include “responsibility
for the health, safety, and welfare of an animal subject to the person’s care and control, regardless
of ownership of the animal.” Id. § 42.092(a)(4).
Gonzales contends that although she owned the dogs, the Penal Code defines “custody” in
terms of responsibility for care of the animals, not ownership. Gonzales argues that when she
moved from the premises, her grandparents assumed responsibility for the health, safety, and
welfare of the dogs and she no longer had custody of them. Gonzales relies on her own testimony
and that of her daughter that the Govers wanted the dogs to remain on their property and that she
made an arrangement for her grandparents to feed and care for the dogs. She testified she believed
her grandparents were caring for the dogs and disagreed with her aunt’s testimony that they were
not capable of doing so.
The jury was free to disbelieve the trial testimony of Gonzales and her daughter. See
Hernandez v. State, 161 S.W.3d 491
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Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-18-00546-CR
Leslie Ann GONZALES, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 14, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 561258 Honorable Susan Skinner, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 7, 2019
AFFIRMED
Leslie Ann Gonzales appeals her conviction of two counts of cruelty to nonlivestock
animals, asserting the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding the two dogs
were in her custody. Because we conclude a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt the dogs were in Gonzales’s custody, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Samuel Gover (Gonzales’s grandfather) called Animal Care Services (“ACS”) to seek
assistance and “see about the neglected animals in his backyard.” ACS investigator Joey Cortez 04-18-00546-CR
went to the property and interviewed Gover. Cortez learned that Gover owned the property, but
Gover was initially hesitant to provide information about the dogs’ owner. Gover finally told
Cortez the dogs belonged to his granddaughter (Gonzales) and her boyfriend and “they were
responsible for them.”
The property consisted of a main house, in which the Govers lived, and a separate back
apartment and yard, where Gonzales and her family had lived with her dogs. Inside the fenced
section of the yard adjacent to the back apartment, Cortez found one deceased dog, and one dog in
“very bad condition.” Cortez found no signs of food, water, or shelter that might have been
provided for the dogs.
Cortez later contacted Gonzales, who stated she owned the dogs. Gonzales told Cortez that
she, her boyfriend, and her two children moved from the apartment behind her grandparents’ house
four months prior to Gover making the telephone call to ACS. Cortez testified Gonzales told him
“it was her responsibility” to provide for the animals. Both Gonzales and her boyfriend told Cortez
they had been returning to the house to feed the dogs, and on occasions when they could not do
so, they would ask her grandfather to help, “but she said she would then go back to care for them.”
At trial, however, Gonzales and her daughter testified the Govers wanted the dogs to stay on the
property for security reasons and they had agreed to take care of the dogs. Gonzales denied having
returned to the house to feed the dogs after she moved and testified she believed her grandparents
were feeding them.
Gover told Cortez that he was physically unable to care for the dogs and Cortez testified
that Gover was elderly, moved very slowly, and did not appear to be capable of providing care for
the animals. Gonzales’s aunt testified her parents, the Govers, did not agree to take responsibility
for the care of the dogs and they would not have been able to take care of the dogs due to their
mobility issues and limited financial resources. The dogs were a large breed and both Gonzales’s
-2- 04-18-00546-CR
grandparents had mobility and medical conditions that made them “frail.” The aunt further testified
her parents themselves needed full time assistance with food preparation, medication
administration, and transportation. They were on a fixed income and would not have been able to
purchase food for two large dogs.
Following the initial visit, Cortez obtained an Owner Surrender Form from Gonzales’s
boyfriend and Cortez took custody of the dogs. Upon examination of the dogs, the veterinarian
reported the surviving dog was severely malnourished and suffering from “chronic starvation.”
Both dogs had a flea and tick infestation, matted hair to the point of entanglement with twigs and
sticks, ringworm and hookworm infestation, lost approximately fifty percent of their body weight,
and had no visible fat or muscle tone. The veterinarian testified the deceased dog died due to
“chronic starvation” that possibly lasted weeks to months. Cortez testified this was “one of the
worst cases he had seen.” The veterinarian testified these conditions and the ultimate death could
have been prevented with adequate supply of food, water, over the counter medication, and basic
animal husbandry.
After the jury found Gonzales guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at one year in jail,
probated for two years, a $500 fine, and fifteen days in jail as a condition of probation.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Gonzales’s sole issue on appeal is the trial court erred when it denied the motion for a
directed verdict because the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding that the dogs
were in Gonzales’s custody. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); accord Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Merritt
v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “Our role on appeal is restricted to guarding
-3- 04-18-00546-CR
against the rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally,” and we must “defer to the
responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and
to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633,
638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Gonzales was charged with committing the offense of cruelty to nonlivestock animals by
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failing unreasonably to provide necessary food, water, care,
and shelter for an animal in her custody. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.092(b)(3). “Necessary food,
water, care, or shelter” includes the food, water, care, or shelter that is “required to maintain the
animal in a state of good health.” Id. § 42.092(a)(7). “Custody” is defined to include “responsibility
for the health, safety, and welfare of an animal subject to the person’s care and control, regardless
of ownership of the animal.” Id. § 42.092(a)(4).
Gonzales contends that although she owned the dogs, the Penal Code defines “custody” in
terms of responsibility for care of the animals, not ownership. Gonzales argues that when she
moved from the premises, her grandparents assumed responsibility for the health, safety, and
welfare of the dogs and she no longer had custody of them. Gonzales relies on her own testimony
and that of her daughter that the Govers wanted the dogs to remain on their property and that she
made an arrangement for her grandparents to feed and care for the dogs. She testified she believed
her grandparents were caring for the dogs and disagreed with her aunt’s testimony that they were
not capable of doing so.
The jury was free to disbelieve the trial testimony of Gonzales and her daughter. See
Hernandez v. State, 161 S.W.3d 491, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[A] factfinder may disbelieve
some or all of a witness’s testimony . . . .”). The jury could have believed Gonzales was telling the
truth when she told Cortez she was responsible for the dogs’ care and could have believed Cortez’s
testimony that Gonzales and her boyfriend told him they had continued feeding and caring for the
-4- 04-18-00546-CR
dogs after they moved. Moreover, a reasonable juror could have concluded from the evidence that
Gover and his wife were not physically or financially able to provide the food, water, and care
necessary to maintain the dogs in good health and that Gonzales would have known this when she
moved from the property. Finally, the jury could have believed Gonzales’s aunt, who testified the
Govers did not agree to take responsibility for the care of the animals. Viewing all of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and resolving all inconsistencies in the evidence in
favor of the verdict, we conclude a jury rationally could have found that Gonzales retained
responsibility for the health, safety, and welfare of the dogs even after she moved away from the
property. See Mouton v. State, 513 S.W.3d 679, 681-83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.)
(holding defendant had custody of animals even though he claimed to have made arrangements for
their care while he was away from property for extended period of time). The evidence is therefore
legally sufficient to establish Gonzales had custody of the dogs, and we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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