Lesher v. City of Anderson

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 THERESE L. LESHER, No. 2:21-cv-00386 WBS DMC 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 15 CITY OF ANDERSON, a municipal corporation; CITY OF ANDERSON 16 POLICE SERGEANT SEAN MILLER, individually; CITY OF ANDERSON 17 POLICE OFFICERS JEFFREY MILEY, individually, and KAMERON LEE, 18 individually, and DOES 1-50, jointly and severally, 19 Defendants. 20

21 ----oo0oo---- 22 23 Plaintiff Therese Lesher (“plaintiff”) brought this 24 action against the City of Anderson (“Anderson” or “City”), 25 Anderson Police Sergeant Sean Miller, Anderson Police Officers 26 Jeffrey Miley and Kameron Lee, and DOES 1-50 seeking damages for 27 violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 28 42 U.S.C. § 1983; municipal and supervisory liability under 42 1 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. 2 Civil Code § 52.1; malicious prosecution; violation of Article 1, 3 § 13 of the California Constitution; assault and battery; false 4 arrest and imprisonment; and negligence. (See Second Am. Compl. 5 (“SAC”) (Docket No. 28).) 6 The City of Anderson now moves to dismiss the fourth 7 cause of action of the SAC for municipal liability under 42 8 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 29).) 9 I. Factual and Procedural Background 10 On or about August 13, 2019, at approximately 12:30 11 a.m., plaintiff was sitting on the porch of her apartment 12 building talking with her cousin, Denhene Leach, and two other 13 persons, accompanied by Leach’s dog. (See SAC at ¶ 17.) Several 14 Anderson Police Department (“APD”) vehicles pulled into the 15 parking lot in front of the building without lights or sirens. 16 (See id. at ¶ 18.) Unbeknownst to plaintiff and her group, 17 another tenant of the apartment complex had called in a noise 18 complaint to the APD. (See id.) Leach’s dog left the porch and 19 walked in the direction of the officers, who had exited their 20 vehicles. (See id. at ¶ 19.) Suddenly, one of the officers 21 yelled that he had allegedly been bitten by Leach’s dog. (See 22 id.) The dog was then retrieved and taken into Leach’s 23 apartment. (See id.) 24 Plaintiff’s dog, which was locked in her vehicle, began 25 barking. (See id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff went to her car to calm 26 down her dog and ensure that it stayed in her vehicle. (See id.) 27 As plaintiff approached her vehicle, defendant officer Miley 28 yelled for her to control her dog. (See id.) He told her that 1 he would pepper spray the dog or shoot it if plaintiff did not 2 control the dog’s barking. (See id.) In response, plaintiff 3 reached into the partially open rear window of the vehicle and 4 grabbed hold of her dog’s harness. (See id.) 5 Plaintiff disapproved of the way the officers were 6 performing their duties in their interactions with her and Leach. 7 (See id. at ¶ 21.) Accordingly, she criticized defendants, 8 including Miley and Miller, and expressed her disapproval of the 9 way they were conducting themselves. (See id.) Without warning, 10 plaintiff was then thrown against the side of her vehicle, 11 subjected to various uses of force, and handcuffed by defendants 12 Miller, Miley, and Lee. (See id. at ¶ 22.) 13 Plaintiff was searched and arrested, and her personal 14 property was removed from her person. (See id.) She was 15 transported to the Shasta County Jail and booked by defendants 16 for alleged violations of California Penal Code sections 69 17 (using threats or violence to prevent executive officers from 18 performing their duties or resisting executive officers in the 19 performance of their duties), 647(f) (being so intoxicated in a 20 public place that one is unable to care for their own safety or 21 the safety of others), and 148(a)(1) (resisting, delaying, or 22 obstructing a law enforcement officer). (See id.) Plaintiff 23 contends that she was cooperative, spoke calmly, and obeyed the 24 officers’ commands at all material times. (See id.) She 25 sustained an injury to her left forearm, fractures to her 26 clavicle and left finger, and property damage. (See id. at 27 ¶¶ 26, 29.) 28 Based on the arrest, plaintiff was criminally 1 prosecuted in Shasta County, California, for three misdemeanor 2 counts of violation of Penal Code section 148(a)(1). (See id. at 3 ¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants Miller, Lee, and Miley 4 deliberately and knowingly misrepresented the facts of the 5 incident and her behavior when reporting the incident, leading to 6 her prosecution, and continued to do so up to and during trial. 7 (See id.) She alleges they did so, and that these 8 misrepresentations were provided to the Shasta County District 9 Attorney’s Office, to make plaintiff defend herself against 10 criminal charges the officers knew were illegitimate and to cover 11 up their own criminal acts and abuse of authority. (See id. at 12 ¶ 24.) 13 On September 24, 2020, plaintiff was acquitted on all 14 three counts after a jury trial. (See id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff 15 alleges that in addition to her injuries and property damage, 16 defendants’ conduct also caused her to lose income and to have to 17 pay bail and attorneys’ fees. (See id. at ¶ 29.) 18 Plaintiff filed the instant action in this court on 19 March 2, 2021. (See Docket No. 1.) On June 30, 2021, the court 20 granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim 21 for municipal liability against the City. (See Docket No. 19.) 22 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on July 20, 2021, 23 (Docket No. 20), and, per the parties’ stipulation, a Second 24 Amended Complaint on September 5, 2021, (Docket No. 28). 25 II. Discussion 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 27 dismissal when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which 28 relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 1 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro 2 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding such a 3 motion, all material allegations of the complaint are accepted as 4 true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. 5 Id. 6 Dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to allege 7 “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory,” 8 id., or to state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its 9 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 10 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 11 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 12 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare 14 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 15 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although legal 16 conclusions “can provide the framework of a complaint, they must 17 be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 18 Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for vicarious 19 liability, a local government “may not be sued under § 1983 for 20 an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell 21 v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 22 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy 23 or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts 24 or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy, inflicts 25 the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under 26 § 1983.” Id. Here, plaintiff seeks to establish municipal 27 liability on the part of the City for (1) having an 28 unconstitutional custom or policy, (2) ratifying the decisions of 1 the police officers who caused the constitutional violations, and 2 (3) failing to adequately train its police officers. (SAC at ¶¶ 3 51-60 (Docket No. 28).) 4 A. Unconstitutional Custom or Policy 5 To establish Monell liability based upon an 6 unconstitutional custom or policy, a plaintiff must prove “the 7 existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized 8 by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and 9 well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of 10 law.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) 11 (plurality opinion) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 12 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). 13 At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must do 14 more than simply allege that a Monell defendant “maintained or 15 permitted an official policy, custom, or practice of knowingly 16 permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs” alleged 17 elsewhere in the complaint. Rather, the complaint must allege 18 “additional facts regarding the specific nature of that alleged 19 policy, custom[,] or practice.” See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. 20 Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 21 It is unclear from the SAC exactly what practice or 22 practices plaintiff relies upon to establish an unconstitutional 23 custom or policy causally related to the conduct which is the 24 subject of this case. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. 25 Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997) (holding that a Monell claim lies 26 where “the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree 27 of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between 28 the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights”). 1 The SAC lists, in shotgun fashion, ten so-called 2 “customs, policies, practices, and/or procedures” upon which 3 plaintiff’s Monell claim is based. (See SAC at ¶ 52 (Docket No. 4 28).)1 Each of these is couched in broad terms, such as 5 “[f]ailure to supervise and/or discipline officers for misconduct 6 that results in the violation of citizens’ civil rights,” or 7 “[u]sing or tolerating inadequate, deficient, and/or improper 8 procedures for handling, investigating, and reviewing complaints 9 of officer misconduct.” (Id.) If such generalized descriptions 10 were deemed sufficient, a plaintiff would be able to survive a 11 motion to dismiss a Monell claim in just about every excessive 12 force case under § 1983. 13 Even where the policy or custom is adequately specified 14 in the complaint, the plaintiff also “must ordinarily point to a 15 pattern of prior, similar violations of federally protected 16 rights, of which the relevant policymakers had actual or 17 constructive notice.” Hyun Ju Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 18 952 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 19 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011); Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 20 F.3d 1232, 1253 (9th Cir. 2010)); see, e.g., Perryman v. City of

21 1 In all respects pertinent to plaintiff’s unlawful 22 policy or custom theory, these allegations are identical to those in plaintiff’s original complaint. (Compare Compl. at ¶ 41 23 (Docket No. 1) with SAC at ¶ 52 (Docket No. 28).) In its Order granting in part defendants’ motion to dismiss that complaint, 24 the court held that because plaintiff had “merely allege[d] that the defendant has a policy or custom of performing various wrongs 25 alleged elsewhere in her complaint,” she failed to adequately plead a Monell claim. (Docket No. 19 at 9-10 (citing AE ex. rel. 26 Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637; Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, 16-cv- 27 02250 LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017); Mendy v. City of Fremont, 13-cv-4180 MMC, 2014 WL 574599, at *3 28 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014)).) 1 Pittsburg, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2021 WL 493396, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2 Feb. 10, 2021) (considering prior incidents in deciding whether 3 Monell complaint adequately identified pattern of past 4 violations); Hughey v. Drummond, 2:14-cv-00037 TLN AC, 2017 WL 5 590265, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (same); see also Bagley 6 v. City of Sunnyvale, 16-cv-02250 LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *15 7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss Monell 8 claim because plaintiff failed to “allege any facts that indicate 9 that the [city’s] police force is regularly taking actions 10 involving excessive force or unlawful arrests” and instead “only 11 [pled] actions related to his own arrest and prosecution”). 12 In an attempt to show a pattern of prior, similar 13 violations of federally protected rights of which the City 14 policymakers had actual or constructive notice, plaintiff 15 identifies four other lawsuits against Anderson and APD officers. 16 (See SAC at ¶ 57 (Docket No. 28) (citing Haught v. City of 17 Anderson, et al., 2:11-cv-1653 JAM CKD (E.D. Cal. 2011); Knighten 18 v. City of Anderson, et al., 2:15-cv-1751 TLN CMK (E.D. Cal. 19 2015); McMillan v. County of Shasta, et al., 2:20-cv-00564 JAM 20 EFB (E.D. Cal. 2020); Rawlins v. City of Anderson, et. al., 2:21- 21 cv-00567 TLN DMC (E.D. Cal. 2021)).)2 22 To determine whether this history of previous lawsuits 23 is sufficient to plausibly allege a municipal policy, custom or 24 practice at the pleading stage, the court considers all of the

25 2 Defendant City requests that the court take judicial notice of the docket and papers filed in the four cases plaintiff 26 identifies in her Second Amended Complaint. (See Req. for Jud. 27 Notice (Docket No. 29-2).) Plaintiff has not opposed that request. (See Opp. to Mot. (Docket No. 34).) Accordingly, the 28 City’s request is granted. 1 relevant factors, including (1) the number of prior lawsuits; (2) 2 the allegations in those lawsuits, including the degree of 3 similarity between the facts alleged in the prior lawsuits and 4 the facts alleged in the action under consideration; (3) the 5 timing of the prior lawsuits; (4) the disposition of the prior 6 lawsuits; (5) the number and identity of defendants in the prior 7 lawsuits, including whether the municipality itself was a 8 defendant and whether any of the defendants in the prior lawsuits 9 were the same as the defendants in the case under consideration; 10 and (6) the size of the municipality in relation to the number 11 and type of lawsuits. 12 Here, the previous cases in which APD officers were 13 alleged to have committed § 1983 violations were all relatively 14 recent, having been filed in the last ten years, and the although 15 the size of the APD is not alleged in the SAC, the court can take 16 judicial notice that Anderson is a relatively small city in 17 Shasta County, California, with a population of a little over 18 10,000. With regard to the number of prior cases, while the 19 Ninth Circuit has suggested that one or two prior similar 20 incidents, standing alone, are generally insufficient to prove 21 the existence of an unconstitutional custom or practice,3 the law 22 does not establish a precise number of previous lawsuits which 23 must be alleged to overcome a motion to dismiss. See Gonzalez v. 24 Cnty. of Merced, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017) 25 (O’Neill, J.) (observing same); (see also Mot. at 7-8 (Docket No. 26 3 See, e.g., Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 27 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) (one incident cannot establish a practice); Meehan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) 28 (two incidents cannot establish a custom). 1 29-1) (contending that the four prior incidents identified by 2 plaintiff in her Second Amended Complaint put it into a 3 precedential “grey area”)). 4 Accordingly, to determine whether the existence of 5 these previous lawsuits is sufficient to establish a pattern of 6 prior, similar violations of federally protected rights, of which 7 the relevant policymakers had actual or constructive notice, the 8 court must look to the other relevant factors, including the 9 similarity of the allegations in the prior cases to the 10 allegations in this case, the defendants in the prior cases, and 11 the disposition of those cases. 12 The most similar of the prior cited cases is Knighten, 13 in which defendant Miller in the instant case was alleged to have 14 reached into the plaintiff’s car window, pulled him against the 15 inside of the car door, twisted his arm, and slammed him against 16 Miller’s vehicle before informing the man he was under arrest for 17 making a “door ding” on Miller’s vehicle. (See SAC at ¶ 57 18 (citing 2:15-cv-01751 TLN CMK, Docket No. 21 at ¶¶ 3, 6-8).)4 19 Haught, however, bears no similarity whatsoever to the 20 present case. There, the plaintiff, who had already been 21

22 4 In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff notes that the court in Knighten also identified several other 23 complaints for alleged uses of excessive force by Miller. (See SAC at ¶ 57 (citing Knighten, 2:15-cv-01751 TLN CMK) (Docket No. 24 28).) However, because the nature and circumstances of those uses of force are not apparent, the court cannot conclude that 25 they are sufficiently similar to the uses of excessive force alleged here. Moreover, while prior unlawful acts of Miller, if 26 they were sufficiently similar to the conduct alleged in this 27 case, might be relevant to show a common practice on his part, they would do little to establish a department-wide practice in 28 order to support Monell liability. 1 arrested, alleged she was subsequently driven to a remote 2 location and raped. (See id. (citing 2:11-cv-01653 JAM CMK).) 3 Similarly, the allegations in McMillian bear little resemblance 4 to the facts alleged here. There, the plaintiff alleged he was 5 arrested, that he was placed in handcuffs that were too tight and 6 placed into a patrol car, that the officer threatened to slam the 7 car door on him, and that the officer shoved his legs inside of 8 the car before closing the door. (See id. (citing 2:20-cv-00564 9 JAM EFB, Docket No. 43 at ¶¶ 20-27, 29, 92).) And in Rawlins, 10 the plaintiff alleged an officer instructed her to move her 11 vehicle, and when she checked her child’s car seat before doing 12 so, the officer reached into her vehicle, grabbed and twisted her 13 arm, and handcuffed and arrested her. (See id. (citing 2:21-cv- 14 00567 TLN DMC, Docket No. 1 at ¶ 18).) 15 With the possible exception of Knighten, the manner of 16 arrest and use of force in the other referenced cases, except for 17 the fact that a car was in some way involved, do not resemble 18 those alleged here, and thus do not plausibly suggest an unlawful 19 policy or custom of excessive force or false arrest. Nor do 20 those cases support, with the possible exception of McMillian, 21 the existence of the alleged unlawful policies or customs of 22 retaliatory arrest or “hurt a person – charge a person.” One 23 similar prior incident does not plausibly suggest the existence 24 of “a widespread practice . . . so permanent and well settled as 25 to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” 26 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (citation and quotation marks 27 omitted). “[R]andom acts” or “isolated or sporadic incidents” 28 are insufficient to prove the existence of an unconstitutional 1 custom or practice. Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 2 1995); Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Rather, the plaintiff must prove that the custom or practice in 4 question has “sufficient duration, frequency[,] and consistency 5 that [it] has become a traditional method of carrying out 6 policy.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. 7 Finally, at oral argument on the motion, counsel 8 represented to the court that none of the four referenced cases 9 went to judgment. It was represented that two of them settled, 10 and the other two were still pending. Settlement of a lawsuit 11 does not establish the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, and 12 without a judgment against the defendants, the allegations of a 13 complaint are little more than unproven allegations. 14 For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that 15 plaintiff has failed to state a claim for Monell liability based 16 on unlawful policy or custom. 17 B. Ratification 18 The Ninth Circuit has “found municipal liability on the 19 basis of ratification when the officials involved adopted and 20 expressly approved of the acts of others who caused the 21 constitutional violation.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 920. To show 22 ratification, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 23 municipality’s “authorized policymakers approve[d] a 24 subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Christie v. Iopa, 25 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 26 at 127). “Ratification . . . generally requires more than 27 acquiescence”; policymakers must “ma[k]e a deliberate choice to 28 endorse the officer[’]s[ ] actions.” Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of 1 San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 2 quotation marks omitted), rev’d in part on other grounds, 575 3 U.S. 600, 610-17 (2015). 4 In its previous order, the court held that plaintiff’s 5 original complaint failed to state a Monell claim under a 6 ratification theory. (See Docket No. 19 at 10-11.) It did so 7 because the complaint included only “conclusory pleading” in 8 support of ratification, rather than “any factual allegations 9 regarding any approval or ratification by Anderson . . . or the 10 basis for such approval.” (See id.) 11 Plaintiff’s new allegations in support of her 12 ratification claim appear to consist solely of her references to 13 the prior lawsuits, which include allegations of excessive force 14 and false arrest against defendants Miller and Lee, arguing that 15 their continued employment by Anderson despite being named in 16 those lawsuits “emboldened Defendants Miller and Lee to continue 17 to commit violations without fearing discipline, demotion, or 18 termination.” (See SAC at ¶ 58 (Docket No. 28).) Plaintiff also 19 points to the allegation in Knighten that Miller was promoted to 20 Sergeant and given a pay raise after the incident at issue in 21 that case. (See id.) 22 However, plaintiff has not provided any factual 23 allegations identifying any authorized policymakers who approved 24 the officers’ actions and the basis for such approval. See 25 Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239. Such conclusory pleading, absent any 26 supporting factual allegations, does not sufficiently state a 27 Monell claim. See Hicks v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 1:17-cv-01187 28 LJO SAB, 2018 WL 347790, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018) 1 (dismissing ratification claim where complaint contained no 2 factual allegations to support claim that defendant county 3 “approved, ratified, condoned, encourage, sought to cover up, 4 and/or tacitly authorized” conduct of police unit). Plaintiff 5 has therefore failed to state a cognizable claim of ratification 6 under Monell. 7 C. Failure to Train 8 To state a claim for failure to train under Monell, a 9 plaintiff must show that (1) the existing training program is 10 inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular officers must 11 perform”; (2) the relevant officials were “deliberate[ly] 12 indifferen[t] to the rights of persons with whom the police come 13 into contact”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training “‘actually 14 caused’ a deprivation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional 15 rights.” Merritt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th 16 Cir. 1989) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 17 390-91 (1989)). 18 In her opposition, plaintiff contends that the Second 19 Amended Complaint adequately states a Monell claim based on 20 failure to train “for the same reasons as . . . with respect to 21 Plaintiff’s policy, custom, or practice Monell claim.” (Opp. to 22 Mot. at 25-26 (Docket No. 34).) However, as the court has 23 already concluded, plaintiff has not adequately stated a Monell 24 claim based on unlawful policy or custom. 25 Further, the Second Amended Complaint contains hardly 26 any references to the City’s training programs or alleged 27 deficiencies therein, and plaintiff does not explain how the 28 alleged unconstitutional policies or customs addressed above 1 necessarily also evince a lack of training. Indeed, since her 2 original complaint, plaintiff appears to have removed most of her 3 complaint’s references to “training.” (Compare, e.g., Compl. at 4 ¶¶ 42, 47 (Docket No. 1) (alleging City “fail[ed] to properly 5 . . . hire, train, instruct, monitor, supervise, evaluate, 6 investigate, and discipline” defendant officers) (emphasis added) 7 with SAC at ¶¶ 53, 59 (Docket No. 28) (alleging City “fail[ed] to 8 properly . . . monitor, supervise, evaluate, investigate, and 9 discipline” defendant officers).) 10 Plaintiff has provided no factual allegations as to (1) 11 how Anderson’s officer training is inadequate, (2) how the 12 relevant officials have been deliberately indifferent to the 13 rights of Anderson citizens, or (3) how the inadequacy of the 14 training actually caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s 15 constitutional rights. See Merritt, 875 F.2d at 770. In fact, 16 plaintiff has provided no factual allegations whatsoever 17 regarding the Anderson officer training program. (See SAC 18 (Docket No. 28).) Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a 19 cognizable claim of failure to train under Monell. 20 For the reasons stated, plaintiff has failed to state a 21 claim for municipal liability under Monell based on failure to 22 train. 23 III. Conclusion 24 For all of the foregoing reasons, the court concludes 25 that the fourth cause of action of the SAC fails to state a claim 26 against the City of Anderson for municipal liability under 42 27 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 Counsel for plaintiff has suggested that plaintiff be eee en ene enn nnn nn nnn nn nnn nn on oe ONO EE

1 allowed to proceed on the bare-bones generalized allegations in 2 the SAC at least until she has had the opportunity to conduct 3 some limited discovery to develop facts to support her Monell 4 claim. There are sound reasons why the law does not permit a 5 | plaintiff to do that. Particularly given the current the state 6 of the economy, a city of the size and location of Anderson 7 understandably has limited resources. Before a plaintiff may be 8 permitted to tap into those resources to require responses to the 9 kind of discovery requests which could be expected in order to 10 develop a direct claim against the City, the law requires the 11 | plaintiff to come forward with something of more substance and 12 specificity than the kind of generalized conclusions and 13 speculation in plaintiff’s SAC. And because plaintiff has unable 14 to state a viable claim under Monell after multiple rounds of 15 amendment to the complaint, the court declines to grant further 16 leave to amend. 17 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 18 dismiss plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, alleging municipal 19 liability under § 1983, be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 20 | Dated: December 2, 2021 he bloom HK Ld. bE 21 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16