Leroy v. Gamboa

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedApril 5, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00016
StatusUnknown

This text of Leroy v. Gamboa (Leroy v. Gamboa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leroy v. Gamboa, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DONALD LEE LEROY,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-CV-16-JPS

TODD DELAIN, C.O. GAMBOA, ROBERT WEED, RALPH ORDER LEYENDECKER, T. BARTELS, BRIAN LAURENT, HSU SHERRA, and HSU KORTNEY,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Donald Lee Leroy, an inmate confined at Dodge Correctional Institution, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On January 26, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $5.33. ECF No 8. Plaintiff paid that fee on February 8, 2024. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 5. The Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s unsigned motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. ECF No. 2. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations During all relevant times, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in the Brown County Jail. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Todd Delain (“Delain”), Gamboa, Robert Weed (“Weed”), Ralph Leyendecker (“Leyendecker”), T. Bartels (“Bartels”), Brian Laurent (“Laurent”), HSU Sherra (“Sherra”), and HSU Kortney (“Kortney”). Id. at 1. The events of the complaint took place between November 17, 2023 and November 29, 2023. Id. at 2. Gamboa did not take reasonable measures to guarantee that Plaintiff received adequate medical treatment when alerted to overdose symptoms. Id. at 3. On November 20, 2023, Weed committed a due process violation in regard to Plaintiff’s grievance by claiming witness unavailability and not holding a timely hearing. Id. Leyendecker violated Plaintiff’s due process rights on November 17, 2023, when he placed Plaintiff on TLU for a major ticket regarding his overdose symptoms. Id. Laurent committed a due process violation on November 20, 2023, by closing Plaintiff’s grievance so that the issues presented were ignored. Id. Sherra violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by dispensing inmate Phillips’ controlled medication to Plaintiff without first ascertaining the identity of the inmate. Id. Kortney violated Plaintiff’s rights because he knew that Plaintiff had been given the wrong medication at med pass, but did not relay this information to correctional staff. Id. Sheriff Delain was responsible for the care and well-being of all inmates placed in his custody. 2.3 Analysis Plaintiff alleges that he was a pretrial detainee during the relevant time period. ECF No. 1 at 1. A § 1983 claim that a state pretrial detainee has received inadequate medical care is predicated on the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2018)). Claims of inadequate medical care while in pretrial detention are subject to an objective reasonableness standard. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate objective unreasonableness, and he must make a two-part showing. Id. First, he must show that the defendant acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when considering the consequences of her response to the medical condition at issue in the case. Id. (citing McCann v. Ogle County, Ill., 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018)). Second, the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct was objectively unreasonable given the totality of the relevant facts and circumstances. Id.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Alfredo Miranda v. County of Lake
900 F.3d 335 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Valerie McCann v. Ogle County, Illinois
909 F.3d 881 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Dustin James v. Deborah Hale
959 F.3d 307 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Leroy v. Gamboa, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leroy-v-gamboa-wied-2024.