Leroy Junior Gaines, Jr. v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 10, 2006
• Docket: 12-05-00079-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NO

NO. 12-05-00079-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

LEROY JUNIOR GAINES, §                      APPEAL FROM THE THIRD

APPELLANT

V.        §                      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE   §                      ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Appellant Leroy Junior Gaines was convicted by a jury of capital murder.  The State did not seek the death penalty.  The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at imprisonment for life.  In two issues on appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction.  We affirm.

Background

            On Friday, December 13, 2002, Appellant walked a short distance from his house to the Inwood Apartments in Palestine, Texas, to visit with his friends Kenneth and Lamond Johnson.  After sitting around on the porch for a while, Appellant called for a taxi from the apartment of  Shajuana Black, Lamond’s girlfriend.  The cab driver took Appellant, Kenneth, and Lamond to a nearby convenience store with the three men riding in the back seat.  Appellant entered the store to buy a bottle of beer and a “Black and Mild” cigar.  Although Appellant did not have enough money for the two items, the store clerk, who had attended high school with Appellant, allowed him to take the items in exchange for what little money he possessed.  Appellant got back in the cab and directed the driver to go out into the country, ostensibly to visit Appellant’s grandmother.  As the driver was turning around on a dirt country road leading to a cemetery, Kenneth shot the driver twice in the head.  Kenneth and Lamond dragged the body into the woods, and one of the three men rummaged through the dead man’s pockets for his wallet and money.  Kenneth then drove back to town as the three men discarded various items along the way, including the taxi’s clipboard.  The three abandoned the vehicle at a former bus parking lot near the Inwood Apartments.  Shajuana saw Lamond throwing something into the dumpster near the apartments after they returned.

            When the taxi driver did not respond to calls, the owner of the taxi company went looking for him and found the parked car.  When he looked inside, he saw “quite a bit” of blood and called the police.  The police went to the address to which the taxi had been dispatched, which was Shajuana’s apartment.  Shajuana directed them to the dumpster where they quickly recovered the gun and the taxi driver’s wallet.  The taxi driver was required to make change from his own money each time he picked up a fare.  However, there was no money in the wallet.  The police obtained statements from the  three men.  Lamond led them to the scene of the murder and showed them the location of  the body.  Police found Appellant’s footprint on the ground at the scene of the murder.  They found the three men’s fingerprints and DNA on several items and found Appellant’s fingerprints on the taxi’s clipboard that had been tossed out as the men drove back to Palestine.  Police also found a styrofoam cup in the front floor of the taxi with Appellant’s DNA on it.  Appellant gave three statements admitting to being with Kenneth and Lamond throughout the course of the murder and the return to Palestine. Captain Wharton of the Palestine police department testified that, during the course of his investigation, he was able to link Appellant to the capital murder of the taxi driver.  Police traced the murder weapon to Appellant’s neighbor, but the neighbor did not know Appellant.  Kenneth Johnson testified extensively about the murder and Appellant’s involvement, including Appellant’s motioning and urging him to use the pistol to rob the taxi driver.  After Kenneth suddenly and inexplicably refused to testify further, the defense moved to have Kenneth’s testimony stricken, and the trial court granted the motion. 

            The jury convicted Appellant of capital murder.  See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). The trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for life.  See Act of June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3602, amended by Act of June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 787, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 2705; Act of June 16, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 652, § 9, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2395, amended by Act of June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 787, § 6, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 2706.  This appeal followed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

            Appellant contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction.¹  Specifically, although he admitted he was present during the murder, he contends that his mere presence at the scene of the murder did not constitute legally or factually sufficient evidence to establish that he was guilty of the capital murder of the taxi driver.

Legal Sufficiency

            Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786-87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); see also Escobedo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d).  The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v.  State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.  See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789;  Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d at 186.  A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court.  See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S. Ct. 221, 2217-18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982).

            A person commits capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery.  Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003).  A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.  Id. § 7.01(a).  A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.  Id. § 7.02(a)(2). 

            Evidence is sufficient to convict a defendant under the law of parties where he is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages the commission of the offense either by words or other agreement.  Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).  While the presence of an accused at the scene of an offense is not alone sufficient to support a conviction, it is a circumstance tending to prove guilt, which, combined with other facts, may suffice to show that the accused was a participant.  Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).  In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to convict under the law of parties where the defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense, the reviewing court may look to events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense, may rely on actions of the defendant that show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act, and may use circumstantial evidence to prove party status.  Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).  The evidence must show that at the time of the offense the parties were acting together, each doing some part of the execution of the common purpose.  Cordova, 698 S.W.2d at 111.  Further, participation in an enterprise may be inferred from circumstances and need not be shown by direct evidence.  Beardsley, 738 S.W.2d at 684.  While flight alone will not support a guilty verdict, evidence of flight from the scene of a crime is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.  Valdez v. State, 623 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

            In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record reveals that Appellant was present at the scene of the murder; that he called the taxi for himself and his codefendants; that he was present at the murder scene; that he was outside the taxi at the murder scene; that he assisted his codefendants in throwing out various items from the taxi, specifically the clipboard, while they were driving back to Palestine in the taxi after the murder; and that after arriving in Palestine and parking the car, he fled back to his home to avoid being questioned in the subsequent murder investigation.  This is legally sufficient evidence that Appellant was a party to the murder and robbery of the taxi driver.  Therefore, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction.

Factual Sufficiency

            In reviewing factual sufficiency, we consider all the evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in dispute and compare it to the evidence that tends to disprove that fact.  See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  Although we are authorized to disagree with the jury’s determination, even if probative evidence exists that supports the verdict, see Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), our evaluation should not substantially intrude upon the jury’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witness testimony.  See Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 164.  Where there is conflicting evidence, the jury’s verdict on such matters is generally regarded as conclusive.  See Van Zandt v. State, 932 S.W.2d 88, 96 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1996, pet. ref’d).  As the court of criminal appeals explained in Zuniga, “there is only one question to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in its finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” See Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484.

            Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we also consider contrary evidence such as the absence of blood on Appellant’s clothes, which suggests that he was not the shooter, and the disposal of the items in the dumpster by someone other than Appellant.  However, the contrary evidence was not sufficient to undermine the integrity of the verdict.  We hold the evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding Appellant guilty of capital murder.  Appellant’s issue as to factual sufficiency is overruled.

Disposition

            Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                        SAM GRIFFITH   

                                                                                                    Justice

Opinion delivered May 10, 2006.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

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¹  Although Appellant argues in his sole issue that the evidence was both legally and factually insufficient, the case law he cites relates only to the issue of legal sufficiency.  His one paragraph argument of the facts and law does not differentiate between the two standards.  However, in the interest of justice, we will consider both the legal and the factual sufficiency of the evidence.