Leroy Alford v. Office of Personnel Management

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided September 5, 2024·No. DC-1221-19-0754-W-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LEROY ALFORD, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-1221-19-0754-W-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: September 5, 2024 MANAGEMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Leroy Alford , Temple Hills, Maryland, pro se.

Nadia K. Pluta , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner recused himself and did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the basis for the Board’s dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND The appellant filed an IRA appeal in which he appeared to allege that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had improperly collected $1,600 from his retirement annuity during the pendency of, and in retaliation for, an appeal he had earlier filed with the Board challenging OPM’s determination that he was overpaid in his annuity. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. In that prior appeal, the administrative judge affirmed OPM’s reconsideration decision, finding that OPM properly determined the existence and amount of the overpayment and that the appellant had not shown that recovery of the overpayment was against equity and good conscience. Alford v. Office of Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. DC-0845-17-0207-I-3, Initial Appeal File, Tab 27, Initial Decision at 6-10. The appellant filed a petition for review, and the Board has affirmed that initial decision. Alford v. Office of Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. DC- 0845-17-0207-I-3, Final Order (June 17, 2024). 3

With his current appeal, the appellant has submitted a copy of his OSC complaint and OSC’s closure letter. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-13. In his initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the administrative judge relied on Guzman v. Office of Personnel Management, 53 F. App’x 927 (Fed. Cir. 2002), an unpublished decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) dismissing the appellant’s IRA appeal on the basis that both the alleged protected disclosure and the alleged retaliatory action occurred after Ms. Guzman had left Federal employment. IAF, Tab 27, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 3-4. The administrative judge found that, because the appellant’s alleged protected disclosures were made in 2017 and 2019, and the alleged retaliation occurred in the same time frame, and because he retired under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System effective July 17, 2013, and was not seeking Federal employment at the time he made the alleged protected disclosures, he had no cause of action under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). Id. The appellant has filed a petition for review (PFR), PFR File, Tab 3, to which the agency has responded in opposition, PFR File, Tab 5.

ANALYSIS Following the issuance of the initial decision, the Board issued Abernathy v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 37, in which it considered whether disclosures made when an individual is neither a Federal employee nor an applicant for Federal employment are protected under the WPA. After requesting and considering amicus briefs on this question, the Board found no reason to overrule its precedent regarding this issue. Under that precedent, an appellant's disclosures are not excluded from whistleblower protection simply because he was neither a Federal employee nor an applicant for employment when he made them. 2 See Weed v. Social Security Administration, 113 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶¶ 8-12

2 The Board in Abernathy observed that its precedent on this issue appeared to conflict with some nonprecedential Federal Circuit decisions, including Guzman. Abernathy, 2022 MSPB 37, ¶ 10 n.6. It noted, however, that nonprecedential decisions of the 4

(2010) (holding that, at the time of making a disclosure, an individual need not be an employee or applicant for employment at the agency that took the alleged retaliatory action in order to qualify for protection under the WPA as a whistleblower); Greenup v. Department of Agriculture, 106 M.S.P.R. 202, ¶¶ 8-9 (2007) (finding that the Board had jurisdiction over an appellant's claim that the agency failed to select her for a position in retaliation for disclosures she made when she was neither an employee nor an applicant). Thus, to the extent the administrative judge found that the appellant’s disclosures are excluded from whistleblower protection because he was neither an employee nor an applicant for employment at the time he made them, we disagree and modify the initial decision accordingly. Nonetheless, although former employees are included among those who can seek corrective action from the Board, 3 they cannot do so for actions taken when they were neither an employee nor an applicant for employment. See Weed, 113 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 11 (citing with approval the principle that a former employee's appeal rights are limited to actions taken while they were in the status of being an employee or applicant for employment). Section 2302(b)(8) prohibits any employee in a position of authority from taking, failing to take, or threatening to take “a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (emphasis added). Section 2302(b)(9) similarly prohibits personnel actions taken “against any employee or applicant” because of certain classes of protected activity. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) (emphasis added). Therefore, we agree

Federal Circuit are not binding on the Board, and that it is possible that the Board’s decision in such a case would not be reviewed by the Federal Circuit. Id.

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Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Guzman v. Office of Personnel Management
53 F. App'x 927 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Mark Abernathy v. Department of the Army
2022 MSPB 37 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)