Lerae Christensen v. Andrew Saul

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedSeptember 16, 2020
Docket5:19-cv-02100
StatusUnknown

This text of Lerae Christensen v. Andrew Saul (Lerae Christensen v. Andrew Saul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lerae Christensen v. Andrew Saul, (C.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

3 O

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 LERAE C., Case No. 5:19-cv-02100-KES

12 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 13 v. ORDER

14 ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16

18 I.

19 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

20 In March 2016, Plaintiff Lerae C. (“Plaintiff”) applied for social security 21 disability benefits under Titles II and XVI alleging an onset date of February 1, 22 2012, and a last date insured of December 31, 2017. Administrative Record 23 (“AR”) 20, 159-73, 229. On September 21, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge 24 (“ALJ”) conducted a hearing at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, 25 testified along with a vocational expert (“VE”). AR 38-63. On October 29, 2018, 26 the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. AR 14-37. 27 The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of 28 “osteoarthritis of the bilateral hips, osteoarthritis of the left shoulder, left shoulder 1 adhesive capsulitis, and status post left shoulder arthroscopy surgery.” AR 20. 2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s head tremors, anxiety disorder, and cervical and 3 lumbar spine issues were non-severe impairments. AR 21-22. 4 The ALJ found that, despite her impairments, Plaintiff had the residual 5 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional 6 limitations: 7 [T]he claimant can lift, carry, push, and pull up to 20 pounds 8 occasionally and 10 [pounds] frequently, can stand and or walk for 9 six hours with normal breaks, and can sit for six hours with normal 10 breaks. Pushing and pulling with left upper extremity is limited to 11 occasional, and overhead reaching with left upper extremity is limited 12 to occasional, with no limitations with respect to use of right. The 13 claimant can occasionally climb stairs and ramps, never climb ladders 14 and scaffolds, can occasionally balance, occasionally kneel, 15 occasionally stoop, occasionally crouch, and occasionally crawl. She 16 should avoid exposure to unprotected heights and avoid workplace 17 hazards. She should not operate a motor vehicle commercially. The 18 claimant should avoid exposure to extreme cold and avoid exposure 19 to heavy vibrations. 20 AR 24. 21 Based on this RFC and the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 22 could do her past work as a receptionist. AR 29. The ALJ made an alternative 23 finding that if restricted to “superficial interaction with people,” then Plaintiff 24 could work as a routing clerk and merchandise marker. AR 30, 59. The ALJ 25 concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 31. 26 II. 27 ISSUE PRESENTED 28 This appeal presents the sole issue of whether the ALJ erred in discounting 1 | Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. (Dkt. 21, Joint Stipulation [“JS”’] at 5.) 2 The Ninth Circuit has “established a two-step analysis for determining the 3 | extent to which a claimant’s symptom testimony must be credited.” Trevizo v. 4 | Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). “First, the ALJ must determine 5 | whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 6 | impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 7 | symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) 8 || (citation omitted). “Second, if the claimant meets the first test, and there is no 9 | evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 10 | severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 11 | for doing so.’” Id. (citation omitted). If the ALJ’s assessment “is supported by 12 | substantial evidence in the record, [courts] may not engage in second-guessing.” 13 | Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). 14 Il. 15 SUMMARY OF THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE 16 A. Plaintiff’s Mental Health. 17 Plaintiff completed some college coursework. AR 380. She worked as a 18 | receptionist for about five-and-a-half years. AR 45, 273. She reported that she 19 | stopped working in February 2012 due to anxiety. AR 45-46, 380. In February 20 | and March 2012, she received treatment from the Inland Psychiatric Medical 21 | Group. AR 340 Gnvoice for services without treating notes). After leaving her 22 || receptionist job, she looked for and obtained other work; she had earnings in 2014 23 | that were not substantial gainful activity.' AR 20, 46. 24 In March 2016, Plaintiff requested a “psych referral” from her primary care 25 | physician. AR 348. 26 In April 2016, she underwent a psychiatric consultative examination with 27 08 ‘Tn her IFP application, Plaintiff declared she last worked in 2012. (Dkt. 3.)

1 Dr. Rezapour. AR 379. At that time, she was not receiving mental health 2 treatment and her only medication was ibuprofen. AR 380. She appeared “very 3 anxious,” but she was “engaged and cooperative” and had “no difficulty interacting 4 with the clinic staff.” AR 379, 382. She could do “household chores, run errands, 5 shopping, and cooking”; she rode the bus independently and pursued gardening as 6 a hobby. AR 379-80. Dr. Rezapour diagnosed her with “generalized anxiety 7 disorder” with a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 66.2 AR 8 382. 9 On September 5, 2016 (about two weeks after hip replacement surgery), 10 Plaintiff met with Dr. Umugbe at Healthy and Happy America. AR 613. She rated 11 her anxiety level as 10/10 but reported, “I don’t like taking med not even aspirin 12 and I am on no med for my hip now not even pain med.” AR 614-15. Dr. 13 Umugbe did not establish a care plan, instead instructing Plaintiff to follow up in 14 three months “in case [she] wants meds at that time.” AR 615. 15 About seven months later in April 2017, Plaintiff obtained treatment from 16 Interim Psychiatric Care. AR 690. At that time, she was taking “no meds” with a 17 GAF score of 60. Id. In April 2017, she started taking Paxil (generic name 18 paroxetine). AR 323. By June 2017, she had filled a prescription for an anti- 19 anxiety medication, Vistaril (generic name atarax), but she had not yet taken it. 20 AR 694. By August 31, 2017, she had taken Vistaril 2 or 3 times as needed for 21 improved sleep. AR 693. 22 In December 2017, she reported, “No problem with meds.” AR 693. By 23 January 2018, she reported, “No problem with meds; no anxiety or panic attacks.” 24

25 2 A GAF score of 61-70 indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school 26 functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally 27 functioning pretty well, [with] some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” Tagger v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 28 1 | AR 692. In June 2018, she reported, “No problem with Paxil [illegible]. Panic 2 | attack 2/per week.” AR 692. By August 2018, however, her doctors noted, “She 3 | stopped Paxil a month ago .... Now no meds for 8 weeks.” AR 691. Plaintiff 4 | reports starting a prescription for Cymbalta (generic name duloxetine) in July 5 | 2018. AR 323. 6 B. Plaintiff’s Physical Health. 7 1. 2012-2015 8 In February 2012, Plaintiff rated her pain as zero. AR 343. By November 9 | 2015, she had some difficulty walking but no “difficulty walking 2 blocks.” AR 10 | 353. She denied prior “serious illness” and “arthritis.” Id. She had smoked two 11 | packs of cigarettes per day for 35 years. AR 342, 352, 380. 12 She had several MRIs in December 2015 for her left hip and shoulder. AR 13 | 334-338, 397.

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Related

Lingenfelter v. Astrue
504 F.3d 1028 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Tagger v. Astrue
536 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (C.D. California, 2008)
Barbara Nathan v. Carolyn W. Colvin
551 F. App'x 404 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Russell v. Keeran
8 Va. 9 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1837)
Trevizo v. Berryhill
871 F.3d 664 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

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Lerae Christensen v. Andrew Saul, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lerae-christensen-v-andrew-saul-cacd-2020.