Leonor E Canales v. Phoenix Housing Authority, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 10, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00564
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 WO 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

10 Leonor E Canales, No. CV-26-00564-PHX-DJH

11 Plaintiff, ORDER

12 v.

13 Phoenix Housing Authority, et al.,

14 Defendants. 15 16 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Leonor E. Canales’ (“Canales”) Application for 17 Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) and an Emergency Motion for 18 Preliminary Injunctive Relief (“Emergency Motion”).1 (Docs. 3 & 5). Having reviewed 19 her IFP Application, The Court will grant Plaintiff IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 20 screen her Complaint.2 Because the Court finds Canales’s claims are deficiently pled, her 21 Emergency Motion for preliminary injunctive relief is denied, without prejudice to renew 22 upon amendment of her claims. 23 1 Canales has also filed Notices with the Court at Docs. 8, 9 & 10. Canales says Document 24 8 details treatment history for her listed mental disabilities. (Doc. 8). Document 9 concerns Canales’ alleged ongoing irreparable harm from not receiving her requested disability 25 accommodations. (Doc. 9). And finally, Canales says Document 10 further references ongoing irreparable harm that Canales states cannot be relieved by later monetary relief. 26 (Doc. 10).

27 2 Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of a form Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and attached letter (Doc. 1 at 1–8); a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 28 Housing Discrimination Complaint, dated January 29, 2026 (Doc. 1 at 9–12); and a non- form Civil Complaint (Doc. 1 at 13–18). 1 I. Background 2 In her Complaint, Canales alleges that she is an individual with severe physical and 3 mental disabilities, “including but not limited to major depressive disorder, anxiety and 4 panic disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), bipolar disorder and borderline 5 personality disorder.” (Doc. 1 at 7 and 14). She avers that she is a participant in the Section 6 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program and an individual entitled to reasonable 7 accommodations under federal fair housing and disability laws. (Id.)3 8 Her claims are centered on her interactions with the Phoenix Housing Authority 9 (“PHA”), the City of Phoenix department that manages the HCV program. Canales says 10 “despite having already provided signed medical records confirming [her] disabilities” 11 PHA has denied her request for reasonable accommodations because a specific housing 12 authority form was not signed by one of her physicians. (Doc. 1 at 10, 15). She says her 13 medical providers have declined to complete the needed form “due to their own internal 14 policies.” (Id.) 15 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants refuse “to consider Plaintiff’s medical records or 16 alternative documentation and [thus] failed to engage in an interactive process, thereby 17 erecting an unlawful barrier to accommodation.” (Id. at 15). She says that she personally 18 went to the PHA on January 20, 2026, to discuss the issue and experienced “harassment, 19 humiliation, intimidation, and hostile treatment related to [her] disabilities” from PHA 20 employee Lori Cole (“Cole”). Plaintiff says that when she told Cole that she intended to 21 file a complaint with HUD, Cole “responded dismissively and stated that filing a complaint 22 would not matter because it would return to her office and be denied again.” (Id.) Plaintiff 23 took this statement to be retaliatory and intended to discourage her from exercising her 24 rights. (Id.) Plaintiff says she has experienced severe emotional distress, worsening of her 25 3 The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (“HCV”) is funded by the U.S. Department of 26 Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and is available for low-income individuals and families to provide safe and decent affordable housing. Program participants pay at 27 least 30% of their monthly income toward their rent to a private landlord of their choice and the program pays the landlord the remaining balance of the rent. See 28 https://www.phoenix.gov/administration/departments/housing/section-8-housing.html (last visited February 2, 2026). 1 mental health symptoms, loss of housing stability, humiliation and psychological harm as 2 a result of Defendants’ actions. (Id.) She is currently homeless and sleeping in her car. 3 (Id.) 4 Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages against Cole, and 5 injunctive relief requiring Defendants to engage in a lawful interactive process; accept her 6 comprehensive medical records when her physical forms are unavailable to cease 7 discriminatory and retaliatory practices and “recognition of a permanent reasonable 8 accommodation to prevent future harm.” (Doc. 1 at 17). 9 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges claims against the PHA, Cole, Cole’s supervisor, and 10 Lupe Martinez, a reasonable accommodation specialist (collectively “Defendants”) under 11 42 U.S.C. § 1983; failure to provide her a reasonable accommodation under the Fair 12 Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)) (“FHA); disability discrimination under Title II of the 13 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”); retaliation under 14 the FHA and ADA; and negligence. (Id. at 8–9, 16–17). 15 II. Legal Standard 16 When a party has been granted IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must 17 review the complaint to determine whether the action: 18 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 19 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 20 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 21 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).4 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only 22 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 23 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 24 Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that:

25 4 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” 26 Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies 27 to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”) 28 (citation omitted). So, section 1915 applies to this non-prisoner IFP complaint. 1 A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party 2 claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the 3 grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new 4 grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain 5 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader 6 seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may 7 be demanded. 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands 9 more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. 10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).5 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 11 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain 12 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim 14 is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 15 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides “labels and conclusions” or “a 17 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 18 at 555. Nor will a complaint suffice if it presents nothing more than “naked assertions” 19 without “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. 20 To determine whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 21 granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court applies the same standards as those 22 required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 23 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127). 24 The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the facts in 25 the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th 26 5 “Although the Iqbal Court was addressing pleading standards in the context of a Rule 27 12(b)(6) motion, the Court finds that those standards also apply in the initial screening of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A since Iqbal discusses the 28 general pleading standards of Rule 8, which apply in all civil actions.” McLemore v. Dennis Dillon Automotive Group, Inc., 2013 WL 97767, at *2 n. 1 (D. Idaho Jan. 8, 2013). 1 Cir. 2000). That rule does not apply, however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 2 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating 3 them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 4 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). In line with this principle, the Court 5 must grant leave to amend if it appears that the plaintiff can correct the defects in the 6 complaint. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, if a claim or complaint cannot be saved by 7 amendment, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia v. Landfield Tr. v. City of 8 L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013). 9 III. Statutory Screening 10 Canales has not adequately pled enough facts to plausibly make out her claims. The 11 Court will address the Complaint’s deficiencies in turn. 12 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim 13 The facts supporting Canales’s Section 1983 are stated as follows: “Discrimination 14 of medical disability for reasonable accommodation. Refused to approve reasonable 15 accommodation due to disability. Denied because provider denied to sign off on my 16 reasonable accommodation form. I have past, present, updated medical documents and 17 records to prove my disability.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ B). 18 “Section 1983 does not alone create substantive rights; rather, [it] merely provides 19 a mechanism for enforcing individual rights secured elsewhere, i.e., rights independently 20 ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Johnson v. City of Detroit, 21 446 F.3d 614, 618 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To state a claim 22 under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the 23 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation 24 was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Long v. County of Los 25 Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). “A plaintiff will not be permitted to bring a 26 section 1983 action if (1) the statute does not create an enforceable right, privilege, or 27 immunity, or (2) Congress has foreclosed citizen enforcement in the enactment itself, either 28 explicitly, or implicitly by imbuing it with its own comprehensive remedial scheme.” 1 Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 Plaintiff has not clearly identified a constitutional right or federal law upon which 3 she predicates her Section 1983 claim.6 Again, there is no independent legal action for a 4 violation of Section 1983. The action must be premised on some deprivation of rights, 5 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. The Court will not 6 speculate which rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and/or laws 7 Plaintiffs believe Defendants may have infringed that could constitute a cause of action 8 under Section 1983. Presently, the claim is deficiently pled and will be dismissed. 9 B. Failure to provide Reasonable Accommodation under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)7 10 The FHA “prohibits discrimination in the form of ‘a refusal to make reasonable 11 accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may 12 be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’ ” 13 Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 14 § 3604(f)(3)(B)). To establish an FHA discrimination claim, a plaintiff can rely on one of 15 three theories: (1) disparate treatment, (2) disparate impact, or (3) failure to make 16 reasonable accommodations for handicapped housing. Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 17 F.3d 300, 304–05 (9th Cir. 1997). 18 Canales alleges Defendants failed to provide her reasonable accommodations under 19 the FHA when PHA “failed to engage in the required interactive process, rigidly enforced 20

21 6 To the extent Canales’ § 1983 claim is predicated upon a violation of the ADA or RA, it fails to state a cognizable legal theory. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th 22 Cir. 2002); Karam v. Univ. of Arizona, 2019 WL 588151, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2019); Okwu v. McKim, 2011 WL 219565, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (“Section 1983 is not a 23 vehicle to vindicate statutory rights secured by the ADA; rather, plaintiff must sue under the ADA directly. Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights created by a statutory 24 scheme that already includes comprehensive remedial measures.”) (internal citations omitted). 25 7 Canales’ Emergency Motion argues only that Canales is entitled to injunctive relief 26 because she is likely to succeed on the merits of her FHA’s reasonable accommodation claim. (Doc. 5 at 3). Because the Court finds that her FHA reasonable accomodation is 27 insufficiently pled and is not allowing the claim to proceed, the Emergency Motion (Doc. 5) will be denied without prejudice. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 28 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1979) (Whether to grant or deny a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is within the Court’s discretion). 1 internal procedures, refused to consider alternative documentation, and denied a necessary 2 reasonable accommodation.” (Doc. 1 at 11). For Canales to state a viable claim for failure 3 to provide a reasonable accommodation under the FHA she must show: (1) she suffers 4 from a handicap recognized by the FHA; (2) defendant knew or reasonably should have 5 known of the plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap may be necessary 6 to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) the 7 accommodation is reasonable; and (5) defendants refused to make such an accommodation. 8 Salisbury v. City of Santa Monica, 998 F.3d 852, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2021); Dubois v. Ass’n 9 of Apt. Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d at 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). “The reasonable 10 accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination.” 11 United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997) 12 (citation omitted). 13 Canales has sufficiently alleged that she suffers from a handicap recognized by the 14 FHA, that Defendants had knowledge of her handicaps, and that Defendants refused her 15 requested accommodation. Canales offers few facts, however, about what accommodation 16 she requested, and no facts stating how the requested accommodation may be necessary to 17 afford her an equal opportunity to enjoy and use her home, or that it was reasonable. 18 Canales states that “Defendants’ refusal to accept alternative documentation and rigid 19 enforcement of internal procedures had a discriminatory effect and violated federal law.” 20 (Doc. 1 at ¶ 26). But Canales fails to allege how Defendants’ refusal to accept her form 21 without a physician’s signature deprived her of an equal opportunity to use or enjoy her 22 dwelling. As stated, Canales’s failure to accommodate claim is insufficiently pled. 23 Because she may be able to resolve these deficiencies by alleging additional facts, however, 24 the Court will give her leave to file an amended complaint with respect to this claim. 25 C. Disability Discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act 26 Canales also alleges disability discrimination under the ADA and the Rehabilitation 27 Act. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 27–29). Both the ADA and the RA use the same elements to establish a 28 claim for disability discrimination. Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 1 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). Under both, Canales must allege: (1) she is a “qualified 2 individual with a disability; (2) she was either excluded from participation in or denied the 3 benefits of a public entity's services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated 4 against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination 5 was by reason of his disability.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added); Does 1–5 v. 6 Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, under Section 504 of the 7 Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is an “individual with a disability”; (2) 8 she is “otherwise qualified” to receive the benefit; (3) she was denied the benefits of the 9 program solely by reason of her disability; and (4) the program receives federal financial 10 assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (emphasis added); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562– 11 63 (9th Cir. 1988). 12 Canales avers that she is disabled because of her listed mental disabilities. (Doc. 1 at 13 ¶ 8). Her Complaint states she was denied Section 8 housing and so she meets element 14 two. (Id. at ¶ 28). However, she has not sufficiently alleged enough facts to show that she 15 was denied her accommodations request because of/solely due to her disability. And the 16 Court is unable to overlook this omission since it is a required part of a discrimination 17 claim under both statutes. Does, 83 F.3d at 1155 (“[A] plaintiff proceeding under Title II 18 of the ADA must, similar to a Section 504 plaintiff, prove that the exclusion from 19 participation in the program was ‘solely by reason of disability.’ ”). The Court will also 20 assume that the PHA receives federal funds because Canales says as much in her 21 Complaint: “Defendants receive federal assistance and are subject to the Rehabilitation 22 Act.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 29). The Court finds that Canales has deficiently pleaded her claim for 23 disability discrimination under the ADA and RA, but the Court will allow her leave to 24 amend her Complaint. 25 D. Retaliation under the FHA and ADA 26 Canales also alleges a retaliation claim under the FHA and the ADA. (Doc. 1 at 27 16). Both statutes are analyzed identically because both follow the same standard for 28 determining retaliation. To state a retaliation claim Canales needs to show that (1) she was 1 engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse action; (3) and there was a 2 causal link between the two. Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 3 2004) (doing the same for the ADA retaliation standard).; Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. P’ship, 4 7 F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (outlining the FHA legal standard for retaliation). 5 Canales plausibly states that she engaged in a protected activity when she requested 6 reasonable accommodations for housing and expressed an intent to file “a complaint with 7 HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity.” (Doc. 1 at 11, 16). She alleges 8 that she suffered adverse actions when her accommodation form was unreasonably rejected 9 and she was deterred from filing her HUD complaint when Cole told her the complaint 10 would just come back to her office and be denied. (Doc. 1 at 10–11). Canales states: “After 11 I informed Ms. Cole that I intended to file a complaint with HUD’s Office of Fair Housing 12 and Equal Opportunity, she responded in a dismissive and mocking manner, stating that 13 filing the complaint would not matter because it would return to her office and be denied 14 again. I experienced this response as retaliatory and intend to discourage me from 15 exercising my fair housing rights.” (Id.) With what Canales has provided the Court; the 16 Court finds that she has plead enough facts for a viable FDA and ADA retaliation claim. 17 E. Negligence 18 For her final claim, Canales states that Defendants owed Canales a “duty of care to 19 administer housing programs lawfully and without discrimination.” (Doc. 1 at 33). She 20 then says that “Defendants breached that duty, causing foreseeable harm to Plaintiff.” (Id. 21 at 34). To sustain a negligence claim under Arizona requires Canales to demonstrate the 22 following: (1) a duty requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a 23 breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s 24 conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages. Romero v. Langston, 2018 WL 25 1415103, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). 26 Based on what Canales has alleged in her Complaint, there is no basis in law for 27 Canales’ negligence claim to go forward. Arizona bases duty in a negligence claim “solely 28 1 on special relationships and public policy.”8 Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 416 P.3d 824, 838 2 (Ariz. 2018). While Arizona courts recognize that a public housing agency owes a duty of 3 care to its tenants, the Court can find no case law that extends that duty to individuals who 4 are not yet tenants. See Cummings v. Prater, 386 P.2d 27, 31 (Ariz. 1963) (finding that 5 landlords owe their tenants a duty of care); see also Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz Cty. Fair & 6 Rodeo Ass’n, 866 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Ariz. 1994) (“The question is whether the relationship 7 of the parties was such that the defendant was under an obligation to use some care to avoid 8 or prevent injury to the plaintiff.”) (quoting Markowitz v. Arizona Park Bd., 706 P.2d 364, 9 368 (Ariz. 1985)); see also Quiroz, 416 P.3d at 838 (“Additionally, Arizona does not 10 presume duty; rather, in every negligence case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving 11 the existence of a duty”). 12 Canales stated in her Complaint that she is a “participant in the Section 8 Housing 13 Choice Voucher Program.” (Doc. 1 at 7). She has not alleged anywhere in her Complaint 14 that she was already a tenant in a Section 8 housing facility. In fact, from what the Court 15 can understand, it appears that Canales was applying for Section 8 housing but was unable 16 to secure it because she did not have the required physician’s signature on her forms. 17 Additionally, based on what she has pleaded, she is not owed a duty of care from 18 the individual Defendants she named in this case because she has not alleged that she has 19 a “special relationship” with any of them. See Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 851 (Ariz. 20 2004) (standing for the proposition that special relationships are those that arise out of 21 contract, joint undertakings, and family relationships); see also Bloxham v. Glock Inc., 53 22 P.3d 196, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (“ ‘We do not understand the law to be that one owes 23 a duty of reasonable care at all times to all people under all circumstances.’ ”) (quoting 24 Hafner v. Beck, 916 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)). Nor has Canales alleged that 25 there is a policy reason for finding that she is owed a duty of care by individual Defendants. 26 8 A duty based on public policy in Arizona is primarily a duty that is rooted in statute. See 27 Quiroz, 416 P.3d at 830. This is because deciding whether something is a duty from a public policy standpoint is a legislative function. Ray v. Tucson Med. Ctr., 230 P.2d 220 28 (Ariz. 1951). 1 See Quiroz, 416 P.3d at 830 (tethering the policy reasons for finding a duty of care to 2 statutes). 3 Therefore, at this juncture, the Court finds that Canales has not sufficiently pleaded 4 that she has a viable negligence claim under Arizona law. 5 IV. Leave to Amend 6 In accordance with the well-settled law in this Circuit, however, because “it is not 7 ‘absolutely clear’ that [Plaintiff] could not cure [the Complaint’s] deficiencies by 8 amendment,” the Court will give her the opportunity to do so. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 9 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (en 10 banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (holding that a pro se litigant must 11 be given leave to amend his complaint “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can 12 correct the defect” in the complaint). It will dismiss the Complaint and grant leave for 13 Plaintiff to file a first amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of 14 this Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (leave to amend should be “freely” given “when 15 justice so requires[]”). 16 Canales will be allowed leave to amend Counts One, Two, and Four of her 17 Complaint. Canales’ amended Complaint must be amended to address the deficiencies 18 identified above and she must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the 19 “First Amended Complaint.” Canales should, in a short and plain manner, then state each 20 claim or cause of action a separate count, alleging facts that that satisfy all the elements of 21 the claims she is bringing. For example, she must allege a private cause of action to base 22 each of her claims, identify the legal elements to meet that cause of action, and allege 23 sufficient and particularized facts that show how she meets each requisite element. 24 Canales’ amended complaint should follow the form detailed in Rule 7.1 of the 25 Local Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”). Examples of different types of complaints 26 demonstrating the proper form can be found in the appendix of forms that is contained with 27 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (forms 11–21).9 This amended complaint must be

28 9 Those forms as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules, as well as other information for individuals filing without an attorney may be found on the District 1 retyped or rewritten in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original 2 Complaint by reference. It must also clearly state the grounds for this Court’s jurisdiction, 3 either by bringing a federal cause of action or by showing how the Court may exercise its 4 diversity jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). 5 The Court recommends Canales review the information available in the District 6 Court’s Handbook for Self-Represented Litigants, which is available online.10 Canales 7 should also be aware that “an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and 8 renders it without legal effect[.]” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 9 2012) (en banc). Thus, after amendment, the Court will treat an original complaint as 10 nonexistent. Id. at 925. 11 IV. Warning 12 Canales is advised that if she elects to file an amended complaint but fails to comply 13 with the Court’s instructions explained in this Order, the action will be dismissed pursuant 14 to section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and/or Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal with 16 prejudice of amended complaint that did not comply with Rule 8(a)). If Canales fails to 17 prosecute this action, or if she fails to comply with the rules or any court order, the Court 18 may dismiss the action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rule of Civil 19 Procedure. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); Ghazali v. Moran, 20 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 21 Accordingly, 22 IT IS ORDERED: 23 (1) Plaintiff Leonor Canales’ Application to Proceed in District Court Without 24 Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 3) is granted. 25 (2) Plaintiff’s Count One for Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation 26 under the Fair Housing Act, Count Three for Disability Discrimination under Americans

27 Court’s internet web page at www.azd.uscourts.gov/.

28 10 The Handbook may be found at http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/handbook-self- represented-litigants. 1 with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and Count Four for Negligence are 2 dismissed without prejudice. Defendants must answer Count Two for Retaliation under 3 the Fair Housing Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. 4 (3) If Plaintiff attempts to amend to address the shortcomings identified in this 5 Order, the amended complaint must be filed within 30 days and retyped or rewritten in its 6 entirety (including the claims that were not dismissed), and Plaintiff must comply with 7 Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 15.1 of the Local Rules of Civil 8 Procedure. 9 (4) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff this Order, and a copy of the 10 Marshal’s Process Receipt & Return form (USM-285) and Notice of Lawsuit & Request 11 for Waiver of Service of Summons form for each named Defendant. 12 (5) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 13 within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide 14 service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 15 (6) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 16 complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a named Defendant 17 within 90 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, 18 whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. 19 Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 20 (7) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First 21 Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 22 (8) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of 23 this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 24 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this 25 Order. 26 (9) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First 27 Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not 28 the Plaintiff, within 30 days of the date of the notice and request for waiver of service 1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)(F) to avoid being charged the cost of 2 personal service. 3 (10) The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 4 summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned 5 by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, 6 the Marshal must: 7 (a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, and this 8 Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure; and 10 (b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service for 11 Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service 12 of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 13 upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of 14 service form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal 15 for photocopying additional copies of the Summons, First Amended 16 Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return 17 forms (USM285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the 18 personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of 19 Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 20 (11) Defendants must answer the relevant portions of the Complaint or otherwise 21 respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of 22 Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23 (12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose 24 behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that 25 does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 (13) The Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Doc. 5) is denied without prejudice. 3 Dated this 9th day of February, 2026. 4 5 ' So — □□ 6 Ke Diangf i 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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