Leonardo Sanchez v. Merriam E. Spearman
This text of Leonardo Sanchez v. Merriam E. Spearman (Leonardo Sanchez v. Merriam E. Spearman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 LEONARDO SANCHEZ, Case No. 8:19-cv-01930-MCS-AGR
12 Petitioner, ORDER ACCEPTING IN PART 13 v. AND REJECTING IN PART FINDINGS AND 14 PATRICK COVELLO, RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 15 Respondent. JUDGE 16 17 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the operative habeas 18 petition, (SAP, ECF No. 33), all relevant documents filed and lodged in this action, 19 the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge, (Report, ECF 20 No. 46), and Petitioner’s Objections to the Report, (Objs., ECF No. 48). The Court 21 also considered oral argument presented by the parties at a hearing on September 16, 22 2024. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 72(b), the Court has conducted a de novo review of those portions of the Report to 24 which objections have been stated. 25 Having completed its review, the Court accepts in part and rejects in part the 26 findings and recommendations set forth in the Report. Specifically, the Court 27 respectfully rejects the Magistrate Judge’s determination that “[a] rational jury could 28 reasonably conclude Petitioner was the killer beyond a reasonable doubt” and 1 “could . . . find premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Report 2 9, 11.) The evidence in the trial record tending to show Petitioner killed the victim 3 with premeditation and deliberation was limited to sperm matching Petitioner’s DNA 4 profile taken from a vaginal swab of the victim and testimony from an individual who 5 described being taken by Petitioner to an orange grove near the one where the victim 6 was found and being beaten and raped by Petitioner nearly a decade previously. This 7 evidence was too scarce to support a conviction. No rational trier of fact could find 8 beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was the killer and killed the victim with 9 premeditation, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 10 prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Nevils, 11 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010). If this Court were the reviewing court on direct 12 appeal, it would have reversed the conviction. 13 But relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is available only if the state court’s 14 resolution of Petitioner’s insufficiency-of-the-evidence claims on direct appeal “was 15 contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 16 law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or “was based on an unreasonable 17 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 18 proceeding.” Under the “twice-deferential standard” that applies to Petitioner’s claims 19 here, Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012) (per curiam), the Court’s inquiry is 20 limited to whether the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s 21 insufficiency-of-the-evidence claims was an objectively unreasonable application of 22 Jackson, see Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2011); Juan H. v. 23 Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). 24 The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge that the state court’s resolution of 25 the claim on direct appeal “was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 26 clearly established federal law and was not an unreasonable determination of the 27 facts.” (Report 11–12.) In its reasoned decision, the California Court of Appeal 28 “review[ed] the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment” and 1 “conclude[d] substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding Sanchez was [the 2 victim’s] murderer” and “[s]ubstantial evidence supported the inference Sanchez 3 brought [the victim] to the orange grove to sexually assault her and then murder her.” 4 (LD 1, at 14, 16, ECF No. 37-1.) The state court’s review of the record ultimately was 5 consistent with Jackson. (Report 11.) 6 As to Ground One, Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeal unreasonably 7 characterized and misstated the record when it described Petitioner’s “prior sexual 8 offenses” and “history of violent sexual assaults” although the jury heard testimony 9 pertaining to just one 1984 incident at trial. (Objs. 3 (quoting LD 1, at 15).) But 10 Petitioner’s argument overlooks that the evidence showed Petitioner committed 11 multiple sexual offenses during that one incident. (LD 1, at 5 (recounting that 12 Petitioner raped the 1984 victim twice).) As to Ground Two, Petitioner persuasively 13 argues that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that “Sanchez would bring his victims to 14 a secluded location suggests planning” is belied by the dearth of evidence showing 15 the precise location where the killer committed the murder—which the Court of 16 Appeal acknowledged earlier in the same paragraph. (Objs. 4 (quoting LD 1, at 16).) 17 The Court agrees that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning is circular. That said, Petitioner 18 does not engage with another strand of the court’s reasoning, that the manner of killing 19 supported an inference of deliberate intent to kill. (LD 1, at 16–17.) Although the 20 Court disagrees that a rational jury should have been able to find deliberation beyond 21 a reasonable doubt just from that, the Court cannot call the appellate court’s inference 22 objectively unreasonable. 23 Although reasonable jurists could—and this Court does—disagree about how 24 Petitioner’s direct appeal should have been resolved, the Court cannot conclude the 25 state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. 26 The Court also concurs with the Magistrate Judge that Petitioner has not 27 demonstrated any other ground for habeas relief under § 2254. (Report 12–15.) 28 1 || Petitioner’s objections to the Report’s treatment of Grounds Three through Six are 2 || overruled. 3 The Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s ultimate conclusion that habeas relief 4 || is unwarranted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and 5 || judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. Ma 7 || DATE: December 26, 2024 ak , Conon 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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