Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed May 13, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-1324 Lower Tribunal No. F22-23260 ________________
Leonardo Cabrera, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Cristina Miranda, Judge.
Daniel J. Tibbitt, P.A., and Daniel J. Tibbitt, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Jason Michael Ross, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Leonardo Cabrera appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to
suppress his statements, rooster paraphernalia, and other documents
related to Cabrera’s cockfighting and animal cruelty charges. In the narrow
circumstances before us today, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand
the case with directions that the trial court grant Cabrera’s motion to
suppress.
On January 18, 2023, the State filed an Information charging Cabrera
with two counts relating to owning and selling roosters and possessing
materials used for cockfighting and one count of animal cruelty. Cabrera filed
a motion to suppress and argued that Miami-Dade Police violated his
constitutional right to be free of unlawful searches and seizures when the
police officer entered Cabrera’s property. Cabrera claimed that Detective
Kevin Rodriguez had alleged there was a federal search warrant issued for
the property for reasons unrelated to cockfighting, but the federal search
warrant had not been produced to the defense. Cabrera alleged that he did
not know if the federal search warrant existed and, if it did exist, whether the
federal warrant was properly issued. The motion to suppress alleged that
Detective Rodriguez had no idea of any criminal activity at Cabrera’s
residence until he was called by the FBI, which was after federal authorities
had entered the property on an unknown basis. Cabrera asserted that he
2 never consented to the search and that subsequent statements he gave
were not freely and voluntarily given. The State did not file a response to the
motion.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State contended it did
not have access to the federal search warrant. The defense presented its
case first, and the following evidence was introduced at the hearing: Cabrera
testified that on December 20, 2022, the subject property at 24480 S.W.
123rd Avenue was his home, and he was living there. His entire property is
surrounded by a six-foot-fence. The FBI showed up at his door and “simply
busted the door open and came in.” There were eighty to one-hundred law
enforcement officers that showed up at his house with bullet proof cars and
“one of those war tanks.” The FBI agents busted his door open, broke a shed
he had on his property, and broke his car. He asked to see a search warrant,
but the agents did not provide him one or ever show him one. The FBI did
not obtain Cabrera’s consent, nor did any agent speak to him. After the FBI
entered his property and did their search, Miami-Dade police arrived and
arrested Cabrera. He asked the Miami-Dade officers for a warrant, but
Miami-Dade police also never showed him a warrant. Cabrera never
consented to their search.
3 Cabrera testified he did not refuse to speak “because I said, well, I
haven’t committed any crime, so I have nothing to hide.” He was advised he
had a right to remain silent, had a right to an attorney, and that if he could
not afford one, one would be appointed for him. He testified that his
statements to police were made only after law enforcement entered his
property without consent and without showing him a warrant. The defense
then rested.
Next, the State called Miami-Dade Police Detective Rodriguez.
Detective Rodriguez was on a task force that worked on federal
investigations with the FBI. On the day in question, he was on the perimeter
of Cabrera’s property while the FBI executed its investigation. The FBI had
contacted Detective Rodriguez in advance because they “needed assistance
from state and local authorities in execution of the search warrant that he
had for the property.” Detective Rodriguez was advised that there was a
federal search warrant for the subject property and preliminary information
told them the FBI was investigating a kidnapping.
Detective Rodriguez described the property as an “open parcel of land
surrounded by a fence,” with various structures including an RV, a house
type residence in the rear, and makeshift structures on the property. Over
twenty federal agents were on the scene. Detective Rodriguez entered the
4 property and saw evidence of cockfighting. He stated, “Once the FBI
conducted their initial interview of the Defendant at that point they came over
to me, they advised that he was under Miranda, they already Mirandized him.
I approached [defendant] and reminded him that he was still under Miranda
if he wished to speak to me at this point, which he agreed to.” Detective
Rodriguez testified that Cabrera then made inculpatory statements about
being involved in cockfighting. He arrested Cabrera and applied for a search
warrant from a Miami-Dade judge based on what Detective Rodriguez had
observed from being on the property and learned from conversations with
the federal agents and Cabrera. Detective Rodriguez stated that a Miami-
Dade judge approved the search warrant, and Miami-Dade County Animal
Services euthanized the roosters on the subject property.
Detective Rodriguez testified he had knowledge about the parameters
of the federal search warrant but was not authorized to speak about it. He
stated he was not involved in the federal warrant, he himself had never seen
it, and he did not say what the probable cause was to obtain the federal
warrant. When asked why he felt he could go onto the property, he stated,
“The FBI had a [sic] ops plan as well as several agents on scene. We advised
that they were conducting a federal investigation on to the property. As being
a task force officer I worked with those agents closely before and we’ve
5 conducted numerous investigations together.” He stated he believed the
FBI’s information to be reliable and based his search on the FBI’s
representations of what they saw on Cabrera’s property.
Detective Rodriguez testified that by the time he got the State search
warrant, Cabrera had already been arrested and was in custody. When the
State warrant was executed the next day, Cabrera was not at the property.
There was no preexisting Miami-Dade investigation of this property, and
Detective Rodriguez had no knowledge about cockfighting at the property
until he went onto the property. The State then rested.
The defense argued that without the production of the alleged federal
search warrant, which they had requested but had not been provided, there
was no way to determine whether the search was proper based on that
alleged warrant. It argued that Cabrera had an expectation of privacy in his
home and fenced property. The defense contended that without more
information than what had been presented, the legality of Detective
Rodriguez’s entry could not be determined because the State warrant was
only issued after Detective Rodriguez entered the property, and the
observations he made during that illegal search and seizure were the sole
basis for the State warrant.
6 The State argued that Detective Rodriguez was contacted after federal
officers observed a State law violation upon their entry onto Cabrera’s
property. The State contended the defense had not shown there were any
false statements in the federal warrant, and the statements in support of the
State warrant were true and supported by Detective Rodriguez’s personal
observations.
The defense responded that it was not arguing that Detective
Rodriguez lied in the State warrant application, but rather that what Detective
Rodriguez observed and used for the application of the State warrant was
the fruit of his illegal entry onto Cabrera’s property. No evidence had been
presented regarding the existence or validity of any federal search warrant.
The State suggested that maybe the trial court could do an in camera review
of the federal warrant and that it would reach out to the FBI to see if they
could get a copy of the warrant. The court thus reset the case for the next
day.
The next day, the State advised the trial court that the federal
prosecutor told the State the file was sealed and “under no circumstances
was I to provide this Court with any copies of that search warrant without
express approval from the federal judge.” The court stated that if it saw the
warrant “the only thing I would be verifying is that there in fact was a warrant
7 and that the officers we acting in good faith.” The court further stated that the
“validity of the warrant wouldn’t really be relevant for [Detective Rodriguez’s]
purposes and his actions subsequent to it.”
The trial court denied the motion to suppress and found the following:
Officer Rodriguez was acting in good faith as part of a task force that he works on with the FBI and serves as local support to most of their investigations or many of their investigations . . . He was apprised of the fact that there was a federal warrant through the testimony of the Defendant. The Defendant indicated that there were 80 to 100 federal agents there. The Miami-Dade officer said 20 plus. . . . The Defendant said there was an armored car, there was an armored tank and everybody had FBI clothing and attire that identified themselves as FBI agents. There is no evidence to support the fact that this was an unlawful warrant. It leads you to reasonably believe based on the show of force and all of the groups that were there with the staging location where the Miami-Dade Police officers were to follow up with support. That there had been a process that was followed in order to enter into the premises. And then based on the fact that what they were looking for in the federal warrant was not discovered. Because we heard that it was a kidnapping. But there was in plain view evidence of an additional crime. The officers went in and did their appropriate investigation and we did have a copy of the warrant - - ... . . . So we have a copy of the state warrant which seems valid and wasn’t contested and was served. So based on the testimony that I’ve head [sic] thus far and on the information received of the ongoing investigation and the fact that the federal warrant is in fact sealed and the representation from the AUSA, as well as the Chief Counsel for the FBI of its existence, I’m just skipping over that part as to whether or not it’s valid because I can’t make a determination on the validity of the warrant. But because there’s another agency that acted upon it I don’t really have to come to that conclusion.
8 And I’m going to ahead [sic] and I’m going to deny the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of the rooster fighting paraphernalia that was discovered and at this point as well as the statements.
On appeal, Cabrera argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because no warrant was introduced at the suppression
hearing, nor did any witness testify to the factual basis behind any warrant
that existed before the search, questioning, and arrest. He contends that
because no warrant exception applies, Detective Rodriguez’s entry onto his
fenced property was unlawful. Under the particular circumstances of
Cabrera’s case, we agree.
The determination regarding a motion to suppress is subject to mixed
questions of law and fact, as the trial courts findings are presumed correct if
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but the application of law to
those facts is reviewed de novo. State v. Prieto, 415 So. 3d 918, 918 (Fla.
3d DCA 2025). When a court is reviewing the issuance of a search warrant,
“the duty of reviewing courts is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
‘substantial basis for … conclude[ing]’ that probable cause existed.”
DeLaPaz v. State, 453 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (quoting Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983)). “[A]lthough the reviewing court ‘should
afford a magistrate’s probable cause decision great deference,’ it should ‘not
defer if there is no “substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
9 existed.”’” State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1180-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
(citation omitted); Merrill v. State, 849 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
(“Thus, confining our analysis to the four corners of the affidavit, as we are
obligated, we must determine whether the totality of the sworn factual
averments contained therein created a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed.” (internal citation omitted)).
In addition, the “fellow officer rule,” or the “collective knowledge
doctrine,” in Florida allows a state police officer to rely on information from
federal agents to establish probable cause. State v. Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704,
707 (Fla. 2012). “The primary purpose of the rule is ‘to assist officers
investigating in the field to make arrests and conduct searches’ because ‘an
officer in the field may need to act immediately based on upon what he or
she is told by a fellow officer.’” Montes-Valeton v. State, 216 So. 3d 475, 478
(Fla. 2017) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). When the
defendant makes an initial showing that no warrant exists or that a search
was warrantless, the burden shifts to the State and “the prosecution ha[s] to
prove probable cause for (or otherwise explain) the fait accompli at the
suppression hearing, because the State did not justify the search before the
fact, by showing a judge grounds for issuance of a warrant.” State v. Setzler,
667 So. 2d 343, 345 (1995). “As a practical matter, absence of a search
10 warrant in the court file sufficed to shift the burden of going forward to the
prosecution.” Id.
Furthermore, “[o]n a motion to suppress the fruits of a search in
accordance with a warrant, a trial court examines whether the issuing
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed, and this determination is made by examining the affidavit in its
entirety.” State v. Vanderhors, 927 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Importantly, in determining the legality of the warrant, consideration of
testimony taken at the hearing on the motion to suppress which does not
appear in the affidavit in support of the search warrant is improper.
Montgomery v. State, 584 So. 2d 65, 66 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Courts
must base their probable cause determination solely on what was presented
to the issuing magistrate in the affidavit, thus confining their review to a
consideration of the four corners of the probable cause affidavit. See Id. at
66-67; Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1180. While the State does not bear the initial
burden when a valid warrant exists, it must be able to produce the warrant
and affidavit if challenged because “a trial court examines whether the
issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed, and this determination is made by examining the affidavit in its
11 entirety.” State v. McNeela, 367 So. 3d 557, 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citation
omitted).
Here, no affidavit in support of the federal search warrant was
presented to the trial court or provided to the defense. There was no way for
the trial court to determine that there was a substantial basis to conclude that
probable cause existed for the search warrant. The trial court acknowledge
this at the hearing when it denied the motion and stated, “I’m just skipping
over that part as to whether or not it’s valid because I can’t make a
determination on the validity of the warrant.”
Accordingly, the trial court denied Cabrera’s motion based on the good
faith exception to the warrant requirement. The Fifth District Court of Appeals
in State v. Redhead, 347 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022), described the
good faith exception as follows:
In sum, the good faith exception applies, precluding the suppression of evidence obtained by officers, if the officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, regardless of whether the warrant was later found by the trial court to be unsupported by probable cause. Thus, the issue before the trial court was whether, given the totality of circumstances, a well-trained officer with the same information would have believe the warrant to be valid, with the caveat that if the search warrant at issue was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause so as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, then the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply.
12 Id. at 418 (internal citations omitted).
However, the exception is inapplicable when the warrant and affidavit
are not in the record. “On appeal from a ruling denying the suppression of
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, ‘[t]his court’s review consists
of “a legal examination of the evidence in the affidavit to determine whether
it establishes probable cause . . . .”’” Coronado v. State, 148 So. 3d 502, 505
(Fla. 2d DCA 2014). In addition, “a warrant may be so facially deficient–i.e.,
in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized–
that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” U.S. v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). Accordingly, to make the decision to apply
a good faith exception requires a court to review the warrant and supporting
affidavit. Otherwise, there is no way for a court to determine whether a
“search warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,”
Redhead, 347 So. 3d at 418, or whether it is facially deficient if the court
cannot examine the four corners of the probable cause affidavit, which is the
trial court’s requirement when deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to
suppress. See Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1180.
Here, the trial court did not conduct this review because it could not do
so, as it explicitly stated at the hearing. Thus, it erred in applying the good
13 faith exception. In both Leon and Redhead, the courts conducted an analysis
of the contents of the application for the search warrant. This analysis
supported the courts’ decisions for finding that a good faith exception
applied. As Cabrera points emphasizes in his Initial Brief, “The good faith
exception is not ‘the searching officer was told by the other officers that a
warrant for a search based on unrelated reasons existed’”. Here, at a
minimum, Detective Rodriguez did not testify as to the reasons surrounding
the search or what was contained in the federal search warrant or supporting
affidavit. Accordingly, the good faith exception is inapplicable here. See
Smitherman v. State, 342 So. 3d 685, 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“When
assessing whether there is probable cause to justify a search, ‘the trial court
must make a judgment, based on the totality of the circumstances, as to
whether from the information contained in the warrant there is a reasonable
probability that contraband will be found at a particular place and time.’ ‘This
determination must be made by examination of the four corners of the
affidavit.’”); see also Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002).
Moreover, “[i]n filing a motion to suppress the defendant undertakes
the burden of making an initial showing that the evidence at issue was
obtained by the government as a result of a search and seizure.” State v.
Gay, 823 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). In the case before us, the
14 defense met this burden. Then, the burden shifts to the State “to establish
that the evidence sought to be suppressed was obtained lawfully,” by, for
example, presenting the warrant and affidavit. Id. at 154-55. In Cabrera’s
case, the trial court erred when it found that the defense could not make a
good faith argument that the alleged federal warrant was invalid because the
defense had not seen the warrant. In fact, the party responsible for proving
that the federal warrant was valid was the State.
In Cabrera’s case, there are no other exceptions to the warrant
requirement that would be applicable. Cabrera did not consent to the search.
The cockfighting paraphernalia was not in plain view. Detective Rodriguez
testified he did not see any of it until after he entered Cabrera’s fenced
property. There was no claim of emergency or other exigent circumstances.
Accordingly, Cabrera’s motion to suppress should have been granted.
Minter-Smith v. State, 864 So. 2d 1141, 1144-45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
Because the search was illegal, any statements Cabrera made after the
search should have been suppressed, as the statements were “fruit of the
poisonous tree.” Betancourt v. State, 224 So. 2d 378, 381 (Fla. 3d DCA
1969); see also Talley v. State, 581 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
With respect to the “fellow officer rule,” no fellow officer testified at the
hearing to having the requisite knowledge that the warrant was valid. And as
15 previously discussed, the trial court did not and could not review the warrant
and affidavit to see if any other officer besides Detective Rodriguez held any
other knowledge that was objectively reasonable. As this Court stated in Albo
v. State, 477 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), the fellow officer rule
“makes very clear . . . that the rule works both ways: to validate an arrest
when the responsible officers have probable cause and to vitiate it when, as
here, none objectively exists.” In addition, in quoting Whitely v. Warden, 401
U.S. 560 (1971), this Court stated in Albo:
Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, however, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.
Albo, 477 So. 2d at 1073 (quoting Whitely, 401 U.S. at 568).
Under the facts in the record, no officer testified to having knowledge
of the contents of the warrant and affidavit. In addition, the trial court did not
have that knowledge, either. Thus, there was no way to know if anyone had
an objective belief that the search warrant and supporting affidavit were valid.
CONCLUSION
Detective Rodriguez entered Cabrera’s property without a search
warrant and without a reasonable reliance on an alleged federal search
16 warrant which he had not seen and which the State did not produce at the
motion to suppress hearing. Under the particular circumstances presented
in this case, there was no applicable exception to the warrant requirement,
the search constituted an illegal search and seizure, and the trial court erred
in denying Cabrera’s motion to suppress. For these reasons, we reverse the
trial court’s ordering denying Cabrera’s motion and remand for the trial court
to grant the motion.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.