Leonard v. National Labor Relations Board. National Labor Relations Board v. Leonard

205 F.2d 355, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2305, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3665
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 23, 1953
Docket13557_1
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 205 F.2d 355 (Leonard v. National Labor Relations Board. National Labor Relations Board v. Leonard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leonard v. National Labor Relations Board. National Labor Relations Board v. Leonard, 205 F.2d 355, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2305, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3665 (9th Cir. 1953).

Opinion

DENMAN, Chief Judge.

Leonard and other retailers dealing in furniture in an employer unit association, hereafter the Dealers, petition us to set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board, hereafter the Board. The present Board order now attacked by the Dealers holds a violation of the Taft-Hart-ley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., a temporary lockout from their stores of employees during a pending labor dispute. The dispute has been settled and the question .before us is the validity of the Board’s order for back pay during the period of the lockout.

The question of the validity of the temporary lockout had been referred by us to the Board in the case of the same title, and based upon the same facts, 9 Cir., 197 F.2d 435. There we gave an extended consideration of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act’s provision concerning lockouts and the provisions themselves. What we there stated is to be deemed stated here.

The pertinent facts are that the single union of all the employees of the eleven Dealers was engaged in active negotiations with all the Dealers as a unit for an amend *356 .ment.of an existing agreement between .them as to wages and conditions of emplo ?- ment. While the negotiations were pending, the union, by , a vote of the employe ns of all the firm? of the Dealers’ unit, hud called a strike, which followed, of the employees of one bf the members of the Des 1-ers, the Union Furniture Company. The latter company at the time the strike wis called was ■ complying with all the pron i-sions of the then existing agreement.

. .The union leader in charge of,the strike called it on the particular dealer as the beginning of an announced “whipsawing process” against one. after. another of the remaining ten, which well could result in strikes against all the Dealers.

The effect, of such a recurrent whipsawing process i? obvious. No one of the ten remaining dealers could know whether nr not its store was next to,have its employees sawed off in the ’ continued whipping. Hence none could feel it safe to take orde rs from its customers on which they would be embarrassed by non-deliveries to them. ■Likewise, no • dealer was safe .in placing orders for furniture with the manuf'actu r-ers,.which well might.find no employee to unload ‘ it in th'eir stores, or if so deliver id to; the stores it would lié as depreciatii ig overstocked inventories. .

. To meet this powerful and effective economic coercion by’all their employees, the ten- remaining Dealers temporarily lock id ■them- but though retaining them-.on their payrolls — but -as not' working and .earnn ig -pay — and treating them as, employees wirh protection as to seniority'and other benef ts when the dispute was settled.

■ The Board in justifying its holding a temporary layoff in the circumstances violates the Taft-Hartley Act completely ,ig.nores the effect of the whipsawing procei s. It treated the question. we referred to it as if the whipsawing factor did not ex-st and the only fact to be considered was the single strike at one of the stores, stating:

“As we read the Court’s opinion, the sole question before us for consideration at this time is whether the lockout by, all the Dealers in this, case was justifiable, as a. use- of economic, pow- , er to offspt the IJnion’s economic action . in calling a strike against Union Furniture.”

In so ignoring the above effects of the whipsawing process, involving successive strikes against employers not knowing the succession, it reverses its position taken before us in the former case on the same facts, in a manner resembling what is known to athletes as “the aerial whirl back-flop.” It there stated the law to be that “An employer faced with a threatened strike against himself may lawfully lock out employees if his motive in doing so iá to protect 'his own economic interests.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The Board’s former contention then proceeded to give its “examples,” three of its cases, in which it held the Act permits lockouts. They hold justifiable the lockout to meet exactly the above described injuries caused the employers by the whipsawing process. It will be noted that the first of the Board’s cases justifying the- lockout was decided in 1943, that is under the Wagner Act. These examples are:

“ * * * For example, in Duluth Bottling Association, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1336, 1359-1360, the Board held that where a threatened strike against employers would result in a spoilage of their materials, the employers were entitled to guard against such loss by locking but their employees in anticipation of the strike. In Betts-Cadillac-Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 46; 28 L.R.R.M. 1509, the Board held that the union’s refusal to tell employers when the threatened strike would occur warranted the employers in refusing to accept further orders and locking out their employees, since the employer’s purpose was to guard against disappointing customers.
“And in International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 159, 27 L.R.R.M. 1504, the Board held that an employer faced with the prospect of recurrent work stoppages which made it difficult for him to plan production, was entitled to lock out his employees where his purposes in. doing so was to guard against economic loss.” (Emphasis supplied.)

*357 In the first of these cases the Board held that the employer’s action did not violate section 8(3) of the Wagner Act. In the two following, the employer action was held not violate Section 8(a)(3) or 8(a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Yet in its decision here the Board holds such action violated both these sections of the latter Act.

As stated by the Fifth Circuit in N. L. R. B. v. Dorsey Trailers, 179 F.2d 589, 592, the Board “is no ‘Poo Bah’ to loose or bind at will.” Congress made it an agency not as a labor board — created to aid labor in its struggle against the employer. As shown by its name, Congress created it to be a board concerned with the administration of “labor relations” in which the rights of the employer are to be as jealously guarded as those of the employee. We repeat the gustatory comment, erroneously attributed to Judge Learned Hand, that the Board should be vigilant to sec that what was sauce for the 'goose under the Wagner Act is now sauce for the gander under the Taft-Hartley Act. Capital Service, Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 9 Cir., 204 F.2d 848, 853.

Not only has the Board avoided the question we referred to it but even more significantly has it ignored the statement of the Senate author of the bill, Senator Taft, in consideration of one of the provisions concerning lockouts, and the purpose of the legislation to create equality in the economic struggle between employer and employee. His statement is:

“Mr.

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Related

National Labor Relations Board v. Brown
380 U.S. 278 (Supreme Court, 1965)
Body & Tank Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board
339 F.2d 76 (Second Circuit, 1964)

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Bluebook (online)
205 F.2d 355, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2305, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3665, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leonard-v-national-labor-relations-board-national-labor-relations-board-ca9-1953.